the commentary is given as the *Tātparyaviveka*. (2) *Guṇavivṛtiviveka*, also called *Tātparyasandarbha*, on the *Guṇakiraṇāvalīprakāśa* of Varddhamāna. (3) *Śabdālokaviveka*, on Pakṣadhara's *Śabda-Āloka*. He has also commented on the *Dīdhitis* of Raghunātha on the *Cintāmaṇi-anumāna*, *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa*, and *Ātmatattvaviveka*. He has also written on the *Pratyakṣamaṇi* a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Sarasvatı Bhavan*, Varanasi.

His date

His time is not known for certain. Mm. Kavirāj however, says, "His time is unknown, but it may be surmised that he lived about the end of the 16th century. This is proved by the fact that there exists in the India Office Library a ms. of his *Guṇavivṛtiviveka* with 1534 Śaka[1] (*vedabāṇāgniyute śakābde*) or A. D. 1612 as the date of its transcription. Besides, as his tutor cannot be identical with the famous author of the *Advaitasiddhi*, the time here proposed for him would not seem incompatible. The fact that he was criticised by the Jain Logician Yaśovijayagaṇi (A.D. 1608-1688) in the latter's *Nyāyakhaṇḍanakhādya* presents no chronological difficulty."[2]

That he was a great Naiyāyika is obvious from the verse current amongst the Paṇḍitas of that period—

Guṇopari guṇānandī, etc. quoted before.

11. MATHURĀNĀTHA TARKAVAGĪŚA

(16th century)

As indicated before, there were six great Maithila scholars, namely, Udayana, Gaṅgeśa, Vallabha, Varddhamāna, Pakṣadhara and Raghunātha, whose works, *Kiraṇāvalī*, *Ātmatattvaviveka*, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Nyāyalīlāvatī—Prakāśa*, *Āloka and Dīdhiti* were mostly studied by students of Navyanyāya and commented upon, in that period. There were perhaps no other works which attracted the attention of intelligent students. If any one could attempt beyond these, he took *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādya* of Śrīharṣa for study and this also simply because the neo-logicians had enough of navyanyāya in it. In fact, it illustrates only one of the *Prameyas*, namely, *Vitaṇḍā* of Nyāyaśāstra. So every great scholar of Navya-Nyāya tried to write something according to his capacity and time on these works.

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[1] Not A. D. 1622 as stated by Dr. Vidyabhusan in his *Indian Logic*, p. 468).

[2] Saraswati Bhavan Library, Varanasi, Vol. V. p. 139.

Mathurānātha Bhaṭṭācārya Tarkavāgīśa was one of those scholars who wrote commentaries on all these works. His scope of work was perhaps the widest. He wrote regular running commentaries. His method of writing was easier and elaborate. He tried to explain the most difficult portions of the texts easily. This was a peculiarity which was not found in his teacher's writings. So says Mathurānātha himself—

yadyapi bahubhirbahuṣu bahudhā carvvitaṁ, jñāyate ca kaiścit sāmānyato hetvābhāsāntam, tathāpi tannānāsthānavitatamaśeṣāprakāśakam bahutarakutarkasambalitamasāmpradāyikañca vyāmohāyaiva kevalam sarveṣāmbhavatīti sarvārthajighṛkṣayā sattarkamāmūlavyākhyāya vaiśadyāya ca mamātra param nirbandhaḥ.[1]

Translation.—Though many have in many ways tasted and expressed it (the text of the *Cintāmaṇi*) and some others (referring to Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti*) ordinarily understood it upto the *hetvābhāsa* section only, yet all these have not thrown sufficient light on all the topics, which are widely extended, and (whatever they have said) are full of wrong arguments and are not in accordance with the traditions of the school, so they are only to confuse all the readers. Hence, in order to bring out all the thoughts, here is my great pertinacity to clarify all the topics after having explained everything including the text with the help of correct reasonings.

It was therefore, that *Mathurānāthī* became more popular than the *Dīdhiti*. It is hence, the verse quoted above-*Sarvatra Mathurānāthī*, holds good. His works are generally named *Rahasya*.

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[1] *Anumānarahasya*, beginning lines pp. 1-2.

His works

He has commented upon the whole of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*. His comment is called *Rahasya*. *Pratyakṣarahasya* is complete in print. Anumāna is also in print upto *Bādha* section. So far, the *Rahasya* on the *Īśvarānumāna* has not been published. Its manuscript is also not so common. *Anumāna-cintāmaṇi* is the best test for the intelligence of the Naiyāyikas. So is the case with the commentaries on the *anumāna*. *Śabdarahasya* also is not yet completely printed. *Rahasya* is available upto *Kāryānvita-śaktivāda*, so it has been published; beyond that it is not published.

Mathurānātha also wrote his *Rahasya* on the *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara. But it is not available completely. Portions available have been published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series*. Manuscripts in parts are found in various libraries of India and also a few are in the *India Office library*.

Other works are—*Guṇadīdhiti-Māthurī*, *Bauddhādhikāra-Dīdhiti-Māthurī*, *Līlāvatī-Dīdhiti-Māthurī*, *Ākhyātavādaṭīkā*. So far all these are Mathurānātha's commentary on the *Dīdhiti*. But he has also written commentary directly on some texts, namely *Kiraṇāvalī*, *Bauddhā-dhikāra*, *called Vivṛti* which has been partly published by the *Asiatic Society of Bengal* and *Līlāvatī*. Again, on Vaiśeṣika also he has written commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa* and *Līlāvatīprakāśa* of Varddhamāna. Besides, he says in his commentary on the *Ākhyāta-śaktivāda*[1]—*śeṣamasmatkṛtasupśaktivāde anusandheyam*. Mm. Kavirajajī mentions a work named *Siddhāntarahasya* of Mathurānātha.

He flourished towards the end of the 16th century.

12. RUDRA NYĀYAVĀCASPATI

(17th century)

Rudra Nyāyavācaspati was the eldest son of Vidyānivāsa. He lived at Kāśī. Like other great Naiyāyikas, he commented upon the works of Pakṣadhara's *Āloka*, Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti* on the *Cintāmaṇi* and the

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[1] P. 954.

Kiraṇāvalī. He also wrote on the *Kusumāñjali-Kārikā*. His commentaries are known as *Parīkṣā*. Besides, he has written *Nañvāda-ṭīkā*, *Padārtha-khaṇḍana-ṭīkā*, *Līlāvatīprakāśaṭīkā and Vādapariccheda*.[1] He is placed in the beginning of the 17th century.

13. HARIRĀMA TARKAVĀGĪŚA

(17th century)

Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa was the teacher of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. He lived in Navadvīpa and was a very honoured Naiyāyika. He wrote several works. Most of them are not available at present. There is one manuscript of his work, named *Parāmarśarahasya* in the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* library.[2] In the colophon it is written—*iti mahāmahopādhyāya Harirāma-viracitam parāmarśarahasyam*. There are references to śrīpakṣadharamiśra and Dīdhitikāra[3] in this manuscript.

There are several small works attributed to him noted by Mm. Kavirāj in the *Sarasvati Bhavana studies*,[4] which I quote here :

An adaptation from the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, a commentary on the *Sapta-padārthī* of Śivāditya Miśra. *Ācārya-matarahasya* vindicating Udayana's theory of *anumiti*. *Nyāyanavyamatavicāra*, *Ratnakośavicāra*, *Viṣayatāvāda*, *Pratyāsattivicāra*, *Maṅgalavāda*, *Pramāṇapramoda*, *Anumitiparāmarśabādhabuddhi*, *Pratibandhakatāvicāra*, *Viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyabodhavicāra*, *Navyadharmitāvacchedakatā*. His *Jñānalakṣaṇavicārarahasya*, *Manastvavicāra*, *Muktivāda-vicāra*, *Prāmāṇyavāda* have been published.[5]

He died at a very old age. Gadādhara and Raghudeva were his reputed students.[6] He is therefore, placed in the first quarter of the 17th century.

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[1] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, PP. 273-75.

[2] No. 124/3027

[3] Foll. 8-9. Vol. V., pp. 147-49

[5] Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta Publications.

[6] Hall. P. 55; Peterson, VI, PP. 15-16.

14 GAURĪKĀNTA SĀRVABHAUMA

(17th century)

Gaurīkānta Sārvabhauma flourished in the early part of the 17th century. He is the author of a commentary, called *Bhāvārthadīpikā*, on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra. Besides, he is the author of a *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, which according to Mm. Kavirājajī, is a commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* and which has been referred to in the *Bhāvārthadīpikā*.[1] He has also commented upon the *Cintāmaṇidīdhiti*. It is referred to as the *Maṇidīdhitivivecana* in the *Bhāvārthadīpikā*. He is also said to have written a commentary on the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa and *Sadyuktimuktāvalī*. He writes of himself as *Kavitārkika-cakravartī* in the *Bhāvārthadīpikā*.

15. VIŚVANĀTHA BHATTĀCĀRYA

(17th century)

Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya, also known as Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya, was the son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya. In the beginning of the *Nyāyasūtravṛtti*, his most important work, he writes—

vidyānivāsasūnoḥ kṛtiresā viśvanāthasya /
viduṣāmatisūkṣmadhiyāmamatsarānām mude bhavitā //

He was the youngest son of his father. Rudra Nyāyavācaspati was his eldest brother. Mm. Kaviraj however, writes that Viśvanātha was the eldest son of Vidyānivāsa.[2] About Vidyānivāsa Mm. Kavirajaji writes—His younger brother was Nārāyaṇa and his father was the son of the younger brother of the great Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and is said to have been highly honoured by Rājā Mānasimha of Amber, and had defeated in a public scholarly assembly, at the court of Ṭodaramala, the great scholar Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa of Benares.

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[1] Varaṇaseya Skt. Unvi. Ms. No. 156, Fol. 3b.

[2] *Sarasvati Bhavan studies*, Vol. V. p. 156.

He was a Vaiṣṇava by faith and so he retired to Vṛndāvana in his last days.

But it does not mean that Viśvanātha had no faith in Śiva or Bhavānī. In the beginning of his *Nyāyasūtra-Vṛtti* itself he writes—

saṁyuktām yuktarūpamabhinavanihitā-
laktakāraktabhāsā
sandhyāpīyūkhabhānoratiruciratarām-
cūrṇayantīmabhikhyām /
mānavyāmokanamratripuraharaśiro-
ramyabhūsā viśeṣam
bhūyo bhavyam vidhātuṁ caraṇanakharucam
bhāvayāmo bhavānyāḥ //

It was at Vṛndāvana that he wrote his *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* in 1556 śaka, that is, 1634 A.D. Mm. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda, in his *Nyāyavārttikabhūmikā*, quotes from an edition of the *Vṛtti*—

rasabāṇatithau (1556) śakendrakāle
bahule kāmatithau śucau sitāhe /
akaronmunisūtravṛttimetam
nanu vṛndāvanavipine sa eṣa viśvanāthaḥ //

From this it is evident that Viśvanātha wrote this *Vṛtti* in 1556 Śaka=1634 A.D., at Vṛndāvana. This work of his is most popular and in fact, Viśvanātha is known to the scholarly world by this work. So he may be placed in the latter half of the 17th century. Mm. Kavirājajī, however, thinks that the date is 1576 Śaka or 1654 A.D.[1]

His works

He composed a small but very useful work for understanding the *Nyāyasūtra*, a *Vṛtti* in Vṛndāvana.

About its merits, the author himself says at the end of his work—

eṣā munipravaragotamasūtravṛttiḥ
śrīviśvanātha kṛtinā sugamālpavarṇā /
śrīkṛṣṇacandracaraṇāmbujacañcarīka—
śrīmacchiromaṇivacaḥ pracayairakāri//[2]

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[1] Vide *Saraswati Bhavana studies*, Vol. V, p. 156.

[2] Vide the beginning verse of the *Vṛtti*.

Translation.—This *sūtravṛtti*, on the *Gotamasūtra*, written by the greatest of the munis, by śrīviśvanātha, the wise, is very easy and is brief. It has been composed in pursuance of the interpretation of Śiromaṇi, who is a devotee of the lotus like feet of the Lord Śrīkṛṣṇa. Viśvanātha's aim in writing this *Vṛtti* is that as the Nyāyaśāstra is very wide, an intelligent student may know it easily without much effort.

Nyāyamuktāvalī, not his work

About the mistake of attributing the authorship of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and the *Nyāyamuktāvalī* to Viśvanātha, it has been already pointed out above that Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma was their author and the name of some other Viśvanātha, an author of a commentary called *Ullāsa* on it, due to some reason not known so far, came to be associated with these works as their author. This has been variously now proved and so I do not add them to the list of the works written by Viśvanātha. Mm. Vindhyeshwari Prasad in his *Nyāyavārttika-Bhūmikā*[1] writes that Viśvanātha was also the author of the *Nyāyāloka*, a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*. But it is to be explained why did the same author write two commentaries on the same text ? Of course, there are such instances in our literature like, the *Nyāyamañjarī* and *Nyāyakalikā* both by Jayanta, but here there is neither any reference found in any work, nor is there any such tradition. It is said that the *Nyāyāloka* is a very big commentary. No other reference of this book is found anywhere so far.

His other works are—*Ākhyātavādaṭīkā*, a commentary on the *Padārtha-tattvanirūpaṇa* of Raghunātha, *Nañvādaṭīkā*, *Padārthatattvāloka*, *Subarthatattvāloka*, *Nyāyatantrabodhinī*, *Alaṅkārapariṣkāra*, *Bhedasiddhi*, *Māṁsatattva-viveka* which has been published now in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Text series*, and *Prākṛtapiṅgalaṭīkā* which has been published by the *Asiatic Society* of Bengal. He has also written a work named *Sūktimuktāvalī* containing 122 good verses on diffirent subjects.

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[1] P. 145.

16. JAYARĀMA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA

(17th century)

Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana was the pupil of Rāmabhadra. He himself says in his commentary, called *Gūḍhārthavidyotana*, on he *Cintāmaṇidīdhiti*—

> śrīviśveśamaśesamaṅgalabhuvaṃ
> bhūyo'bhivādyādarān
> mūrdhnyādhāya ca rāmabhadracaraṇa-
> dvandvāravindadvayam/
> gūḍhājñānaghanāvṛtā na viṣayaprodbodhinī dīdhitis-
> tasmācchrījayarāma eṣa tanute gūḍhārthavidyotanam//

But who is this Rāmabhadra? Dr. Vidyabhusan identifies him with Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma.[1] Mm. Kavirajaji however, thinks that he was Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa, the pupil of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra.[2] The Sārvabhauma was the *guru* of Jagadīśa who must have lived in the last quarter of the 16th century. Jayarāma, who, on the other hand, flourished long after Jagadīśa, cannot be the pupil of the *guru* of Jagadīśa. Moreover, from a documentary evidence we know that Jayarāma was a signatory to a document (*vyavasthā*) of the Paṇḍitas of Kāśī, dated 1714 Samvat, that is, 1657 A.D., which has been published by R. S. Pimputkar in a book called *Citale Bhaṭṭaprakaraṇa*.[3] This shows that Jayarāma was living at Benares in 1657 A.D. So Jayarāma could not have been the pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma. This is what Mm. Kavirājaji has written. Dr. Mangal Deva Shastri, the editor of the work, has also accepted this view.[4] But Professor D.C. Bhattacārya is of opinion that as the references to *guravastu* found in the *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā* are all found in the *Nyāyasāra* of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, there is no reason why Jayarāma should not be the pupil of the Sārvabhauma. Further, Professor Bhattacaryya says that it was the Sārvabhauma who alone could have said on a different reading of the *Dīdhiti*[1] suggested by his *guru* Jagadīśa in the following words—*gurucaraṇā ittham pāṭham kalpayanti.*[2] From these references, it is concluded that Jayarāma was the pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma and *not* of the Siddhāntavāgīśa. It is also clear from the above that Jayarāma lived long and that he was living in 1657 A.D. So he may be placed towards the end of the 17th century. Then there is another evidence in its support. Dr. Vidyabhusan says that Jayarāma composed his *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā* in Samvat 1750, that is, 1693 A.D.[3]

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[1] *Indian Logic*, P. 477.

[2] *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. V, p. 149.

[3] 1926, PP. 78-81. Sarasvati Bhawan Studies, vol. V. p. 149.

[4] Vide, his *Introduction to the Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*, PP. 17-19.

His works

Jayarāma has written following works known to me so far :

(1) *Guḍhārthavidyotana* on the *Cintāmaṇidīdhiti*—It is unpublished. Its manuscripts are available in several libraries of India and also in the *India office*, London. (2) *Tattvacintāmaṇyālokaviveka* referred to as *Ālokarahasyam* in his commentary on the *Kusumāñjalikārikā*. (3) *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*—It has been published in two parts in the *Sarasvati Bhavan Text series*. It contains a brief commentary on the following *Nyāyasūtras*—I. i.9-12, 14-41; I. ii. 1—19; V. ii. 1, 4, 12-14, 18, 20-22, 24-25. It is clear from this that the work is not complete, nor is it a running commentary on all the sūtras.

References to authors and works

Ākare[4], *Ācāryyāḥ*[5], Ācāryamatam[6], Ācāryānusāriṇaḥ[7], Uktam upādhivāde[8], Upādhyāyāḥ[9], Umāpatiḥ[10], Kīrttiḥ[11], Guravaḥ[12], Candraḥ[13], Carmāmbara[14], Jñānaśrī[15], Tīkāyām,

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[1] Vide, Chauwkhamba edition, P. 1184.

[2] *Vañge Navyanyāyacarcā*. P. 98.

[3] *Indian Logic*, P. 478.

[4] PP. 128, 139.

[5] PP. 10, 41, 43, 44, 48, 112, 120, 163, 170, 178.

[6] P. 41. [7] P. 32 [8] P. 170. [9] PP. 27, 37.

[10] P. 4. [11] Dharmakīrttiḥ, PP. 144, 176.

[12] P. 62. [13] P. 171. [14] Jaina, P. 176.

[15] P. 176.

Tīkākṛtah, Ṭīkākāra[1], *Tattvabodha*, *Tattvabodhe*, *Tattvabodha-kṛtaḥ*[2], Tāntrikāḥ[3], Digambarabhedāḥ[4], Diṅnāga[5], Dīdhitikṛtaḥ[6], *Nibandhe*[7], *Nibandha*, Ṭīkākārādi,[8], *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*[9], Nyāsakāra[10], *Padārthamālā*[11], Pāśupata[12], Pāṣaṇḍāḥ[13], Bhāṭṭaikadeśī Maṇḍanaḥ[14], *Bhāsyam*[15], Bhāskaraḥ[16], Maṇikaṇṭhaḥ[17], *Maṇi*, Maṇikṛt[18], Mahārṇavakāraḥ[19], Miśrāḥ[20], Murāri Miśrāh[21], Ratnakosakṛtaḥ[22], Varddhamānaḥ[23], Vāgīśaḥ[24], *Vārttika*, Vārttikakāra[25], Vṛttikṛtā,[26] Śaṅkara Miśrādayaḥ[27], Śūnyavādino Digambarasya[28], Sānātaniḥ[29], and Somasiddhānta, that is, Pāṣaṇḍamata[30].

From the nature of this portion of the work it appears as if the author had written some more work on Nyāya in its continuation.

It ends with the following two verses--

nānāgrantha vṛthā vacovivaraṇaistattāratamyārthinamājīvābhyasane'pi gūḍhavisayairvyutpitsavo vyākulāḥ/
matvaivaṁ jayarāma eṣa viśadaiḥ sattarkaśuddhāksaraiḥ munyuktaṁ nijagāda tatkaruṇayā vijñairanujñāyatām//

> sannyāyapratipāditā pratipadaṁ sadyuktimuktānvitā
> dustarkoddhatavādidarpadamanī vijñaikavedyāśayā/
> nirvānādhvavivecikā sumanasāmantastamonāśinī
> śrīviśvesapadāmbujapraṇayanī siddhāntamālāstu me//

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[1] PP. 19, 27
[2] PP. 4-5, 15, 48
[3] P 168.
[4] ksapanaka, Śvetāmbara, Nīalāmbara, Carmāmbara, Raktāmbara. Barhāmbara etc., P. 178.
[5] PP. 139, 170.
[6] PP. 41, 81, 82, 90, 97, 103, 105, 170.
[7] PP. 22. 103
[8] P. 27
[9] P. 16.
[10] P. 37.
[11] PP. 4, 7, 9
[12] P. 17.
[13] PP. 46, 175
[14] P. 176.
[15] PP. 3, 7, 13, 17, 20, 21, 56, 62.
[16] P. 162.
[17] P. 165.
[18] PP. 16, 36-37, 44, 90, 94, 97, 103, 105.
[19] P. 171.
[20] PP. 37, 60, 82.
[21] P. 171.
[22] P. 100.
[23] PP. 5, 10, 12, 13, 22, 122.
[24] P. 113
[25] PP. 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 17, 20,
[26] =Kāśikākārena, P. 37.
[27] PP. 65, 161.
[28] P. 46.
[29] P. 54.
[30] P. 175.

From these verses it appears as if Jayarāma was living at Benares when he composed this work. In order to justify the name *Siddhāntamālā*, the authar adds a section at the end of this work—*Atha prasaṅgāt siddhāntabhedā ucyante.* This whole section appears, as if, it is based on a similar section of the *Vādivinoda* of Śaṅkara Miśra or any other similar work. Comparing versions of both the works it seems as if Jayarāma had copied a portion of the *Vādivinoda* with slight variations in the readings in two or three places. This book was composed in Saṁ, 1750=1693 A. D.

Besides, he is the author of a commentary on the *Kusumāñjalikārikās*, called *Vivṛtti*. It is referred to in the *Padārthamālā*[1]. (5) *Śabdālokarahasyu* referred to in his own *Ākhyātavādatīkā*. (6) *Padārthamālā* a work on Vaiśeṣika. (7) *Anyathākhyātivāda*. (8) *Laghusannikarṣavāda*, (9) *Nyāyamālā* (10) *Nañvādavyākhyā*. Besides *Kārakavāda and Samāsavāda* and a commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* which has in the beginning—

> śrījayarāmaḥ sukṛtī natvā śambhoḥ padāmbujam/
> kāvyaprakāśaṭīkām tanute vidvadvinodāya//

Janārdana Vyāsa and Laugāksi-Bhāskara were his students who also wrote a commentary on the *Mañjarī* and *Padārthamālā* respectively.

17. GADĀDHARA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

(17th century)

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the son of Jīvācārya and a younger contemporary of Jagadīśa, was a Vārendra Brāhmaṇa of Bengal. He was the last of the great Navadvīpa scholars. The scholarship which was brought by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi from Mithilā in the 15th century and which raised the name of Navadvīpa or Bengal in the scholarly world and produced brilliant scholars and contributed great works of repute which had been honoured

Rise and fall of Navadvīpa

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[1] adhikaṁ kārikāvyākhyāyāmanusandheyam, Fol. 74b ms. belonging to the *Saraswati Bhavan*.

and studied all these centuries, came to an end with Gadādhara. So says Professor D. C. Bhaṭṭācārya also in his *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*,—"*The most glorious period of Navadvīpa has definitely ended with the death of Gadādhara in 1709 A. D. and signs of distinct revival of the ancient glory of Mithilā were discernible at Mañgarauni*"[1]. Even Phaṇibhūsana Tarkavāgīśa says—

Revival of Scholarship in Mithilā

gadādharai navyanyāyera carama avatāra.[2]

Gadādhara was the pupil of Mahāmahopādhyāya Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa. So he writes about him in the beginning of his commentary on the *Pratyakṣadīdhiti*—

natvā nandatanūjasundarapadaṁ smṛtvā gurorādarāt/
urvīmaṇḍalamaṇḍanāyitayaśorāśeraśeṣā giraḥ//

It may also be pointed out here that at this period, scholars from Mithilā, Bengal and South all used to assemble at Kāśī which had become the most important centre of learning in all the śāstras. I do not think that after the 17th century scholars had more attraction towards any other centre of learning. In fact, they considered for various other reasons to go to Kāśī and study there. It was also felt that at Kāśī, a regular pious bath in the Gaṅgā and the worship of Viśvanātha and other gods and goddesses would also add to the purification of their *antaḥkaraṇa* which would purify their intelligence and make their scholarship shine like anything. So they prefered to go to Kāśī than to any other place for study.

Rise of Kāśī-a great centre of learning

Gadādhara was undoubtedly, the best student of Harirāma. It was a great problem as to who would succeed Harirāma as a teacher in the *ṭol*, when the latter fell seriously ill and there was no hope of his recovery. So Harirāma also, in order that his *ṭol* could maintain past traditions and reputations of Navadvīpa, had expressed his desire that after his death Gadādhara should become the *guru* of that *ṭol*. Gadādhara out of shyness did not consider himself fit for the job, but he could not, at the same time, disregard the desire of his *guru*. So he had to accept it.

Gadādhara, successor of Harirāma

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[1] P. 197.

[2] *Nyāyaparicaya*, P. 33.

But he did not get any student to teach. They refused to be taught by him as he was so junior. Then it is said that Gadādhara was not dejected with this affair. He left the abode of his *guru* and founded a seminary of his own on the wayside of the main road leading to Gaṅgā. No student turned up even there. So he found out a way and attended his seminary at the right time every day as it was the practice in his *guru's* seminary and began to teach loudly the texts addressing it to the garden, trees and creepers in the absence of students. Learned Paṇḍitas and students passing that way came to hear his teachings and found them to be of high order. Thus, they became attracted towards Gadādhara and gradually came to him to study. In a very short time his reputation spread all over the locality and he came to be respected like his *guru*.[1]

His works

Like so many other scholars, he wrote on the works of Udayana, Gaṅgeśa, Pakṣadhara and Raghunāth. Thus, on Udayana he commented upon the *Kusumāñjali*, a manuscript of which is noticed by Keilhorn[2]; on Gaṅgeśa, he wrote a commentary on the *anumāna* section, a manuscript of which, though incomplete, was in possession of Professor D. C. Bhattacarya.[3] He also wrote on the *Śabdakhaṇḍa*. His *Śaktivāda* and *Vyutpattivāda* are two well-known works read widely by scholars. In fact, no study of Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa is considered to be complete without a thorough knowledge of these two works. On Pakṣadhara, he has written commentary on *Pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *Āloka*. In the beginning of a manuscript of *Śabda*, it is written—

praṇamya gīrvāṇagaṇaikavandyaṁ
pādāravindam puruṣottamasya /
nigūḍhamāviṣkurute prayatnāt
gadādharaḥ pakṣadharasya bhāvam//[4]

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[1] *Navadvīpamahimā*, PP. 82—84.

[2] His *search of mass. central provinces*, 1874, P. 144.

[3] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 178.

[4] *Tanjore mass. Catalogue*, PP. 4525—27.

Then on Raghunātha, he has written commentaries on the *Pratyakṣadīdhiti*, *Anumānadīdhiti*, *Bauddhādhikāra-Dīdhiti*. Besides, Gadādhara wrote many small works called *Vādas* which number 64 as they say. Of these, we have not found all the *vādas* so far, but those which are more important and studied are—*Viṣayatāvāda*, *Muktivāda*, *Sādṛśyavāda*, *Ratnakośavāda*, *Kāraṇatāvāda*, *Vidhisvarūpavāda*, *Anumitimānasavāda*, *Navyamatavāda*, *Śaktivāda and Vyutpattivāda*, already mentioned above. Besides these, he has also written one work *Brahmanirṇaya* and also a commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. A manuscript of the latter is found in the library of the *Government Sanskrit College*, Calcutta and also in the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*. He has also commented upon the *Durgāsaptaśatī*, a manuscript of which is preserved in my own private library written by my grand-father.

With all these works to his credit, Gadādhara lived a pretty long life. He was born according to Bengali scholars' calculation on the basis of certain records found in Gadādhara's family, in 1604 A.D. and passed away at a ripe age in 1709 A.D. So, he lived for about 104 years.

Thus, came to an end the glory of Navadvīpa with the death of Gadādhara. It does not mean that there were no scholars in Bengal after Gadādhara; what it means is that no more great savants of Navya-nyāya flourished in Bengal thereafter.

18. RAGHUDEVA NYĀYĀLAṄKĀRA

(17th century)

Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra was one of the disciples of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa. Dr. Vidyābhusan quotes from the *Madras Catalouge*[1] a verse of his *Nañvāda-vyākhyā*—

śivam praṇamya tatpaścāt Tarkavāgīśvaram gurum/
kriyate raghudevena nañvāde suvecanam//

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[1] No. 4254,*Indian Logic*, p. 481.

which supports the above statement. So says Mm. Kavirājaji also. But Professor D. C. Bhattacarya in his *Vañge navyanyāyacarcā* holds that Raghudeva was the pupil of Cirañjīva Bhaṭṭācārya[1] and he refers to a line in the printed edition of *Kāvyavilāsa* from Benares.

His works

Tattvadīpikā—is a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. A portion of its *anumāna* section is preserved in the *Madras Oriental library*[2]. It is called *Raghudevī* or *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*. He also commented upon the *Kusumāñjalikārikā*, a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Library*, dated Saṁ. 1739=1682 A. D. It was transcribed by the great Naiyāyika Mahādeva Puntāmakra. He has also commented upon the works of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, such as, *Padārthatattvanirūpana*. It has been published in the *Pandit* series from Benares. Raghudeva has expressed his own views on several points in this work against Śiromaṇi's views. So he says at the end of his commentary—

Śrīmaddīdhitikārakalpitaghaṭīkolāhalavyākule
mārge sañcaraṇāya yannigaditaṁ siddhāntasiddhetarat/
daivāt tena bhavedyadīha sahasā prauḍhāparādho mama
kṣantavyaḥ kṛtibhiḥ śruto yadi bhaved yakṣānurūpo
baliḥ//

Besides, he has also written the following books—*niruktiprkāśa*.[3] This is a work on some commentary on the *Āloka*. In the beginning of the *Pratyakṣa* he says—

pratyakṣatastadālokāt tadīyaṭippaṇādapi /
arthā saṅgṛhya likhyante raghudevena yuktibhiḥ //

Similarly, in the beginning of the *Anumāna* he writes—

ayatnataḥ paṇḍitamaṇḍalīnāṁ
gūḍhārthatattvapratipattihetoḥ /
saṅkṣepataḥ śrīraghudevaśarmā
navīnanirmāṇamidaṁ tanoti[4] //

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[1] Vide P. 280.

[2] No. D. 3999.

[3] ms. preserved in *the Benares Sarasvati Bhavana Library*. No. 334.

[4] *Tanjore Cat.* P. 4792.

(4) *Dravyasārasaṅgraha*—It is a Vaiśeṣika work. Its manuscript is available in the *Asiatic Society of Bengal Library.*[1] It has a verse in the beginning—

raghudevakṛtadravyasārasaṅgrahalokanaiḥ /
santaścarantu niśśaṅkam siddhāntasiddhavartmasu //

(5) *Ākhyātavādaṭīkā*, (6) *Nañvādaṭīkā*. Both these manuscripts are in the *Tanjore manuscript library.*[2] He has also written another work (7) *Viṣayatāvicāra*, which he has referred to in his commentary on the *Padārthanirūpaṇa*[3]—adhikaṁ viṣayatāvicāre'nusandheyam. Besides, he is said to have written small tracts, such as—*Viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyabodha-vicāra*, *Anumitiparāmarśavicāra*, *Sāmagrīvāda*, *Pratiyogijñānakāraṇatāvicāra*, and so on.[4]

About his time it may be said that there is a manuscript of his commentary on the *Kusumāñjalikārikās*, dated Saṁ. 1739=1682 A.D. copied by Mahādeva Puntamakar, in *the Sarasvati Bhavana Library* and the *Vyavasthā* written by the Paṇḍitas of Benares contains his signature also. Both these evidences prove that he must have lived before 1682 and that as the date of the *Vyavasthā* is Saṁvat 1714=1657 A.D.,[5] it is concluded that he was living in 1657. So he may be placed in the third quarter of the 17th century.

His date

19. RĀMAKṚṢṆA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA CAKRAVARTĪ

(17th century)

Professor D. C. Bhattacarya holds that Rāmakṛṣṇa was the direct pupil of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. He was a great devotee of Śiromaṇi as the former wrote all his works on the *Dīdhitis* of Raghunātha known till then. This is true, but all who wrote on the *Dīdhiti* need not be Śiromaṇi's direct pupils. Of course, Rāmakṛṣṇa commented upon the *Dīdhitis* on the

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[1] III A. 9.

[2] Tanjore cat. pp. 4568, 4787.

[3] page 78.

[4] *Vañge navyanyāyacarcā*, p 279.

[5] Saraswati Bhowd Steeds, vol. v.

Cintāmaṇi, Anumāna and Pratyakṣa, where in the very beginning of the Pratyakṣa he says—

> śaraṇīkṛtaviśveśacaraṇo'vanato gurūn
> Śrī-rāmakṛṣṇo vyācaṣṭe pratyakṣamaṇidīdhitim /

Again, in the (anumāna section) he says—

> praṇamya vāṇīmunnītaḥ sadbhiḥ samanugṛhyatām /
> adhidīdhitibhāvārtho rāmakṛṣṇaprakāśitah //

These manuscripts are found in the libraries of the *Sarasvati Bhavana*, Benares and the *Asiatic society of Bengal*, Calcutta. Besides, he wrote a commentary on the *Līlāvatīdīdhiti* and also on the *Guṇadīdhiti-prakāśa*, whose manuscripts are preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavana* and India Office Libraries and also in the *Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal* library. He has also commented upon the *Ākhyātavāda* and the *Nañvāda*.

The beginning verses are—

> mukundacaraṇadvandvamādāya hṛdayāmbuje /
> ākhyātavādasadvyākhyā rāmakrsṇena tanyate //
>
> kṛtvā hariharacaraṇau śaraṇe śrīrāmakrsṇena /
> atha nañvicārabhāvo dīdhitikartuḥ prakāśyate ko'pi//
>
> kṛtvā hariharacaraṇam śaraṇam śrīrāmakṛṣṇena/
> adhilīlāvatibhāvo dīdhitikartuḥ prakāśyate ko'pi//

Mahāmahopādhyāya Kavirājaji adds *Nyāyadīpikā*, *Tarkāmṛta* and certain number of *Vādārthas* to the list of his works. He also holds that as his great-grandson Kṛṣṇakānta lived in 1801, Rāmakṛṣṇa's time may be assigned, with some probability, to the last quarter of the 17th century (śāke rāmākṣiśailakṣitiparigaṇite—1723 Śaka = 1801 A.D.)[1] Kṛṣṇakānta gives the list of his great-grand-father's works in the following verse—

> bhaṭṭācārya-cakravartī mamāyaṁ prapitāmahaḥ /
> nyāye *vādārthasindhuñca* smṛtau ca *smṛtisāgaram* //
> *tarkāmṛtam* padārtheṣu *jyotir-dīpanam*eva ca /
> jyotiḥśāstre nibandhañca kṛtavān sa kṛtī yataḥ//[2]

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[1] *India Office Catalogue*, P. 654, Ms. no. 814.

[2] *Vañge navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 213.

20. KṚṢṆAKĀNTA VIDYĀVĀGĪŚA

(19th century)

Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgīśa was the son of Kālīcaraṇa Nyāyālaṅkāra and Tāriṇī Devī and the great-grandson of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya-Cakravartī. He was the pupil of Rāmanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana.

So he writes in the beginning of his commentary on the *Śabda-śaktiprakāśikā* of Maithila Jagadīsa Bhaṭṭācārya—

nyāyālaṅkārayuktaṁ tribhuvanajanakaṁ śrīpatīśena-
juṣṭaṁ
tuṣṭaṁ dhīresu ruṣṭaṁ satatamavidusāṁ śyāmalaṁ
sāmagītam/
khyātaṁ tātaṁ nitāntaṁ sadayamasadṛśaṁ mādṛśāṁ
sādhusaṁjñaṁ//
Śrīyoktaṁ cātra kālīcaraṇamaracayaṁ granthamādau
praṇamya//
brahmaśrīkṛṣṇakāntātmakasutayajanaprollasatpādapadmā
sānandānandamandasmitamilitavacobhāṣaṇādhvas-
tapāpā//
kiñcitkrodhotthatāpāhataripukalitāniṣṭaceṣṭādidoṣā
śiṣṭā kharvā viśiṣṭā prabhavatu jananī tāriṇī me namasyā/
nyāyasaṁsārapāthodhi-magnopāsakatārakam/
rāmanārāyaṇam vande tarkapañcānanam gurum//

About his date, we find that Kṛṣṇakānta wrote his commentary on the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* in 1732 Śaka, that is, 1810 A.D. He writes at the end of it— His date

śāke rāmākṣiśailakṣitiparigaṇite (1732) karkaṭe yāti
bhānau
viṁśāhe viśvanāthārccitapadayugalaṁ śyāmalaṁ
mokṣabījam/
dhyāyannadhyāpakānāṁ nikhilapadapadārthādicintā-
pahantrīm
tene śrīkṛṣṇakāntāhvaya iha sukṛtī ṭippaṇī gūḍhabhāvām//

From this verse we can also gather the information that he lived and wrote this commentary in Benares. So he lived in the first quarter of the 19th century.

His works

(1) *Śaktisandīpanī*, his commentary on the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* of Jagadīśa, is his well-known work. There are references to the following in this commentary : (*Nyāya*) *līlāvatī*[1], *Guṇaprakāśa*,[2] *Rabhasa* (this seems to be either the name of a lexicon or its author),[3] Devīputra[4], and Śrīpatidatta[5]. There are some other old references. (2) *Nyāyaratnāvalī*.—Professor Bhattacarya says that a copy of its manuscript was preserved in the library of Rājā Rādhākānta Deva. It is written both in prose and poetry. It deals with certain *Vādas*. It has a verse in the beginning—

navya-prācīna-tārkīna-sarvārthādhīnadhīmatā/
tanyate kṛṣṇakāntena nyāyaratnāvalī matā//

It has a commentary also of his own, called (3) *Nyāyaratnaprakāśikā*, which was also in the library of the Rājā. Its beginning verse is—

nyāyaratnāvalīṭīkāṁ tanūṁ natvā ca nīlikām/
tanoti Śrīkṛṣṇakāntaḥ nyāyaratnaprakāśikām//[6]

(4) *Tṛtīyamaṇidīpinī*—This is a commentary on the Upamānakhaṇḍa of the *Cintāmaṇi*. (5) *Sautrasandīpinī*—It is a commentary on the *Gotamasūtra*. The following are some of the beginning verses—

anvīkṣānayaveśmamadhyavilasatsaṅguptaratnāvalīm
śrīmadgautamatāpasena nihitāmākṛṣya sadgrāhake/
sarvasmin vitarītumeva niyataṁ tenehamānvīṣikī-
ṭīkāṁ vaidikavaṁśajaḥ sulalitāṁ śrīkṛṣṇakāntah sudhīḥ/

ṭīkākṛtāṁ vṛttikṛtāñca bhāvaṁ
sūtrotthitaṁ gūḍhamabhīpsavo ye/
dhīrā mamaitā sakalā hi sautra-
sandīpinīṁ sādhu vivecayantu//

The colophon at the end of the fifth chapter reads as—

itiśrī kṛṣṇakāntavidyāvāgīśabhaṭṭācāryaviracitāyām sautrasandīpinyāmānvīkṣikīṭīkāyāṁ pañcamādhyāyavyākhyā.

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[1] P. 7. [2] P. 86. [3] P. 119.
[4] P. 150. [5] P. 209. [6] *Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 214.

Though the author has praised this commentary like anything, yet on scrutiny it is found that it is very brief and not of any considerable merit. There is a reference to his *Nyāyaratnāvalī* in this commentary. (6) *Tarkāmṛtataraṅgiṇī*—As mentioned by the author, the *Taraṅgiṇī* is his commentary on the *Tarkāmṛta* which should be different from the *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadīśa his great-grand-father. From this it may be said that there is some relation between Kṛṣṇakānta and Jagadīśa. So perhaps Krsnakānta might have been the great-grand-son of Jagadīśa. He says—

asmatpitāmahapiturvacanāmṛtena
tarkārthasārthasukhabodharasānvitena /
śrīkṛṣṇakāntaracitā tu taraṅgiṇī yā
tatrādimaḥ parisamāptataraṅga eṣaḥ //

(7) A commentary on the *Padārthakhaṇḍana* of Raghunātha. A manuscript of it has been noticed by Mm. H. P. Shastri.[1]

His date

About his time, he himself writes at the end of his *Sautrasandīpanī*—..

śāke nabhovedamunīndumāne
pakse'valakse śucisañjñamāse /
ṭīkā kṛtā gotamasūtrasandī—
panī mayā dhīrahitāya kācit //

which shows that this work was written in Śaka 1740 = 1818 A.D. From this it is concluded that he lived in the first quarter of the 19th century.

Nineteenth century Naiyāyikas

In the 19th century there flourished several good Nyāya scholars in Bengal. Some of them wrote one or two commentaries either on some commentary of the *Cintāmaṇi*, or the *Kiraṇāvalī*, or the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. For instance, Rāmacandra Siddhāntavāgīśa wrote a commentary on the *Pratyakṣa-Dīdhiti* a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavana*, Benares; Jayakṛṣṇa Tarkācārya wrote *Nyāyavādārthamañjarī*; Mādhavacandra Tarkasiddhānta wrote *Padārthakhaṇḍanavivṛti* and a commentary on the *Śaktivāda* of Gadādhara and some other works on other śāstras and passed away in 1865 A.D.; Goswāmī Bhaṭṭācārya (of Shantipura) wrote amongst other works, *Tattvadīpikā* on Nyāya and also a *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* which has been published in the *Pandit* paper issued from Benares, and *Vyākhyāprakāśa* a commentary on the *Haridāsī* on the *Kusumāñjali-kārikā*; Raghunātha Vidyālaṅkāra, author of *Anumānadīdhiti-Pratibimba*[1] and *Ākhyātavādaṭīkā*, a manuscript of which written in Sam. 1746 = 1824 A.D. is preserved in the *Asiatic Society* of Bengal which has a verse at the end as—

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[1] Report, 1901-02 to 1905-06, P. 9.

> śiromaṇikṛtākhyātavādavyākhyānakaitavāt /
> raghunāthena vihita ākhyātārthavinirṇayaḥ //

and *Pramāṇaratna* (a mīmāṁsā work). These are some of the more important writers on Nyāya. Besides, there were many more scholars who, for some reason or other, could not produce any work, but were great teachers. They used to write their own notes on different topics almost every day which later on, came to be known, if really they were found useful, by the name of their authors, like the *Golokīya* of Golokanātha Nyāyaratna; the *Kālīkiṅkarī* of Kālīśaṅkara Siddhāntavāgīśa, *Jagannāthīya* of Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana and others, or came to be known as *Vivecanā* (for Nyāya) or *Khaḍarā* (mostly common amongst Vaiyākaraṇas). With the help of these *Vivecanās* they used to teach their students and the students also used to utilize these notes for their studies.

Twentieth century Naiyāyikas

Kāśī became the best and the most flourishing centre of learning in all the śāstras in the eighteenth century. Scholars from every part of India assembled here and carried on their studies. There were several scholarly gatherings from time to time where scholars were invited to discuss the various problems of Śāstras, mostly on Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa. They came in contact with scholars of different parts of the country and in their mutual contact and discussions scholarship developed. It was really on the lines of *Vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhaḥ*.

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[1] A *ms*, is preserved in the Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Varanasi.

But in course of time, degeneration came in and gradually, in the gatherings, *Jaya and Parājaya* became the chief aim of scholars instead of enriching their learning by mutual contact. This grew from bad to worse in course of time, and has now led to the downfall of real scholarship in this twentieth century.

But even then there were, however, great scholars in this century also. I give below a few names of whom I have known so far: Mahāmahopādhyāya Kailāśacandra Śiromaṇi, Mm. Rākhāladāsa Bhaṭṭācārya Nyāyaratna of village Bhaṭṭapallī in Bengal, born in 1751 Śaka = 1829 A.D., author of *Nyūnatāvāda* on the Dīdhitikāra (*Dīdhitikṛnnyūnatāvāda*), *Advaitavādakhaṇḍana*, *Muktivicāra*, *Brahmavicāra*, *Upaniṣanmīmāṁsā*, *Paramāṇutattvanirūpaṇa*, *Sākāropāsanā*. His other works are—*Jīvatattvanirūpaṇa*, *Tattvasāra*, *Śaktivādarahasyaprakāśa*. He was also a good Sāhityika. He wrote several poems which are included in his *Rasaratna*. He was the son of Sītānātha Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Vimalā Devī.

He was the pupil of Yadurāma Sārvabhauma of Bhaṭṭapallī in Bengal. He was awarded the title of Mahāmahopādhyāya in 1887 A.D. by the British Government. Mahāmahopādhyāya Śivacandra Sārvabhauma was one of his students. He came to live at Kāśī in Śaka 1815 = 1893 A.D. He died at Kāśī.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Pramathanātha Tarkabhūṣaṇa was the youngest son of Tārācaraṇa Tarkaratna, a younger brother of Mm. Rākhāladāsanyāyaratna. He lived at Kāśī and was a *sabhāpaṇḍita* of Kāśirāja Mahārāja of Benares. His only work known to me is the *Vyāptipañcakaṭīkārahasya-vivṛti*. After sometime he left for Calcutta where he was a Professor in the Government Sanskrit College. He has written some works and has translated some Vedānta works, like *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* of Vidyāraṇya into Bengali.

At this very time there lived in Calcutta Mahāmahopādhyāya Kāmākhyānātha Bhaṭṭācārya a very great Naiyāyika and a dilectician. He wrote many works of which, I am aware of his commentary on the *Haridāsī-vyākhyā* called *Vivṛti* on the *Kusumāñjalikārikā*.

His commentary is very lucid and easy to understand Udayana's *Kārikās*.

At Benares there were others, like Śrīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya (an expert in *hetvābhāsa*), Mm. Pañcānana Tarkaratna, author of *Śaktibhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, of Bhaṭṭapallī in Bengal, and father of Śrījīva Nyāyatīrtha of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta; Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, Professor of Nyāya in the Government Sanskrit College, Benares, who were very successful teachers and authors of some Nyāya works.

Along with these, there was Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūsana Tarkavāgīśa, a Professor of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika at the *Tīkamaṇi Sanskrit College*, Benares. During that period he was the only scholar known to have studied Prācīna-Nyāya and written books on the *Nyāyasūtra*. He had translated the *Nyāyasūtra* along with the Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* in Bengali alongwith copious critical notes.

We know that the text of the *Nyāyasūtra* was, rather is, even to day to a certain extent, not free from defects. It has been a headache to our Naiyāyikas of the present day. It was Mm. Tarkavāgīśa who worked hard to restore the correct version. His translation and *Ṭippaṇī* on the same have made the text easier to understand. It is very elaborate and lucid. He was no doubt, an old type of traditional Naiyāyika of the *tol*, but his critical outlook and approach to the various problems of Nyāya, Vaiśesika, and Buddhism were wonderful. He was a very successful teacher and taught hundreds of students. Even modern University students were very satisfied with his teachings and critical outlook. He has written one independent book, called *Nyāya-paricaya* in Bengali, which is very useful for the beginners. It gives me a great satisfaction to say that I had the unique fortune to sit at the feet of Mm. Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya and Mm. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa and study some texts of Nyāya. Mm. Tarkavāgīśa left Kāśī and went to Calcutta, perhaps due to financial difficulties, in his old age and became a Professor of Nyāya in the Government Sanskrit College and died at Calcutta. His son Śrī Ahibhūsaṇa Bhaṭṭācārya is a Professor in the Anglo-Bengali College, Vārāṇasī.

GOPĪNĀTHA (BĀGCHĪ) KAVIRĀJA

(born on September 7, 1887—)

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopīnātha (Bāgchī) Kavirāja was born in village Dhāmarāi, District Dacca, East Bengal, on September 7, 1887. He lost his father and mother at a very young age. His father Vaikuṇthanātha (Bāgchī) Kavirāja was also a scholar. Due to reasons of health Kavirājajī had to come to Jaipur in Rajasthāna for his studies and graduated from the Maharaja's College, Jaipur in 1910. Later on, he came to Benares and joined the Queen's College under Dr. A. Venis and took his Master's degree in Epigraphy in 1913 and was placed in first division. He studied Nyāya on traditional lines under Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, Professor of Nyāya, Government Sanskrit College, Benares.

Śrī Kavirājajī joined Government service as the Librarian of the Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit Library under Dr. Venis in 1914. He also used to take some classes for the post-graduate students reading Sanskrit in the Queen's College. Later on, he became the Principal of the college and the Superintendent of Sanskrit Studies, U. P. He retired from service earlier in 1937. The title of Mahāmahopādhyāya was conferred on him in 1934 and the Doctor of Letters degree in 1947 by the Allahabad University.

He is a yogin of very high rank. His *gurudeva* Śrī Viśuddhānanda Sarasvatī, a very great and reputed Yogin of *Sūryavijñāna* had initiated Śrī Kavirājajī into yoga. Thus, he studied philosophy both in theory and practice and to day he is the greatest living scholar of Sanskrit, specially in all the branches of philosophy, Āgama and Tantra. He has contributed more than a thousand research articles written in English, Sanskrit, Bengali and Hindi. The *Bihar Rastrabhasa Parisad*, Patna has recently published two volumes containing his articles and some more volumes are ready for publication from other sources.

I, the writer of this book, have the rare fortune to study under him since 1918 and all that I know is simply due to his blessings. He has achieved the perfect realization of the highest reality and perhaps there is nothing under heavens which is not within the scope of his *jñāna*. In spite of all these, he is a perfect *jñānin* without any self praise in any form. As a disciple of this great *yogin-scholar* I should not have said anything about him, but still in order to guide the future students I think it necessary to say a few words about my *guru*. He is still hale and hearty helping the *jijñāsus* to proceed on the path towards God-realization.

His contribution to Nyāya is not in any book form written in Sanskrit. But his *History and Bibliography of Nyāya literature* which appeared in the *Sarasvati Bhavan studies series*, Benares, Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 and his critical introduction to the English translation of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Vārttika* by Dr. Ganganatha Jha are sufficient proof to show how deep is his scholarship in this direction.

Again, at Calcutta we have even at present great Naiyāyikas, like Mahāmahopādhyāya Kālipada Tarkācārya, retired Professor, Government Sanskrit College and author of several works, like *Nyāyaparibhāṣā*. He has been a great teacher and has to day hundreds of students to follow him. He is at the same time a great Sāhityika. He has written several poems.

Besides, there is Dr. Gaurīnātha Śāstrī, M.A., D. Litt, Principal of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta who is also a good Nyāya scholar. There are still many more whom I have not known, but it can be said with great confidence that the country is not devoid of great Nyāya scholars even to day. They pursue their studies with the same zeal and spirit as before. The only defect which has now come up in this academic pursuit is that students have made *Artha* (earning and amassing wealth for worldly purposes) as their ultimate end of life and study, so the standard has gone down and is still further deteriorating day after day and we do not find scholarship of the present day so flourishing as before independent of every other consideration.

Southern Contribution

Coming to the contribution of the *Deccani Paṇḍitas*, it has to be noted that perhaps due to their being far away from Mithilā, the home of *Prācīna* and *Navya* Nyāya, and there being no easy journey to the south in thóse old days, scholarship could not travel to that part so easily as in northern India. Moreover, it appears that from very early times, Southern India was influenced by Vaiṣṇava cult and also by Śaiva cult. Of these two cults, it is also to be considered that ordinarily, the longings of a human heart are not as much satisfied with the tasteless śaiva cult as it is with the Vaiṣṇava cult. It is therefore, that Southern India became the abode of almost all Vaiṣṇava cults except the Caitanya movement of Bengal. The followers of the Vaiṣṇava schools found more congenial feelings in that cult. No doubt, there is *rasa* in it, and for persons of tender heart and emotional feelings and hence, of lower standard, *rasa* is more attractive than *Jnāña*. It was perhaps due to this very fact that the Southern scholars had no intention to enter into the logical quarrels leading to the most insipid and impracticable *Advaita of Śaṅkara from the worldly point of view*. Ordinarily, people do not rise to that standard which Śaṅkara expects of his followers. So the attention of Southern scholars could not be drawn towards the growing logical literature in northern India. Then again, it also might be said that the growth and development of logic and dialectics were mainly due to there being clash with the early Buddhists and the Jainas to a certain extent. This clash was from the very beginning of the Nyāya system in the North. Hence, in the south we do not find much contribution to Nyāyadarśana, at least in its earlier centuries.

There was however, another type of clash in the South. It was amongst the Vaiṣṇavites themselves where also there was some logic and dialectics. In fact, every academic quarrel grows and develops with logic when misused leading to dialectics. There can be no quarrel, academic or social, without going astray which involves wrong arguments, that is, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti and nigrahasthāna. However, we are at present concerned with logical contributions of the Southern traditional scholars to Nyāya School alone.

1. BHAṬṬA VĀDĪNDRA

(13th century)

Vādīndra is a disciple of one Yogīśwara. His real name seems to be Hara Kiṅkara or Śaṅkara Kiṅkara[1]. The name Vādīndra or Vādīśa is perhaps due to his being a great expert in the art of dialectics (Vāda). His pupil Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, an author of a commentory on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* speaks very highly of his scholarship. He was the *dharmādhyakṣa* of the court of Śrīsiṁha.[2] In the *Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit library*, Benares, there is a manuscript of Bhaṭṭa Rāghava's commentary on the *Nyāyasāra*, called *Nyāya-sāravicāra*. It contains a date as given in the following verse—

Date of Vādīndra.

śake catuḥsaptatisankhyake śataih
śatādhikairabhyadhike ca pañcabhiḥ/
dvighātitaistatra babhūva vatsarai-
rdhruvaṁ vicāraḥ paribhāvi..vā.

This verse can be interpreted in two ways—(1) 500 × 2=1000+ 100 + 74=1174 Śaka=1252 A. D. and (2) 500 + 100 =600 × 2 = 1200 + 74 = 1274 Śaka= 1352 A.D. It is to be noted here that the first interpretation is correct and it has been supported by Mr. Telang in his Introduction to the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* of Vādīndra[3] and also by my teacher Mm. G. N. Kavirājajī in his introduction to his edition of the *Rasasāra* by Vādīndra. The obvious reason is that the manuscript referred to above has an inscription showing that it was purchased in Sam. 1428=1371 A. D. It means that the manuscript was transcribed earlier and that it was composed even earlier. So 1352 A. D. as the date of its composition does not appeal to us. Hence, it is better to accept the other alternative of 1252 A. D. as the most probable date of its composition.

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[1] *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, Pariccheda I, Verse 2.

[2] III. 3. [3] PP. xii-xiv.

His work

Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra has written two books known so far : (1) *Rasasāra* a commentary on the *Guṇakiraṇāvalī* of Udayana. It has been published in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Text series*. In the maṅgal verse the author bows down to Śiva—

namasyāmo dūrīkṛtabhuvanabhaṅgaṁ bhagavato
vapurviśvārambhasthitilayanidānam puraripoḥ /
yadaspṛṣṭaṁ bhogairapi dalitakāmaṁ karuṇayā
bhavānībhrūbhaṅgapraṇayakalahebhyaḥ spṛhayati[1] //

This verse occurs as the *maṅgalācaraṇa* of the third pariccheda of the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*. Similarly, the *maṅgala* verse of his another work *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* is also in praise of Lord Śiva—

vākkāyacetaḥprabhavāparādha—
prabandhasambandhatamaḥprakāśa /
unmudritajñānasudhānidhāna
gaurīpate tvāṁ śaraṇam prapadye //

Besides, all other paricchedas of the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* also have praised Lord Śiva. This shows that he was devoted to Lord Śiva. Further, we learn from the beginning verses of the third pariccheda of the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* that Śivāditya and other Tārkikas were puzzled to see the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* (positive and negative arguments) forms of syllogism frustrated by fallacies (*upādhi-vyādhi-nirdhūta*), and then they adopted the *Mahāvidyā* form of syllogism through *kevalānvayi form*—

upādhivyādhinirdhūtamanvayavyatirekiṇam /
matvodbhinnamahāvidyāḥ śivādityāditārkikāḥ //

Then again, he says—

teṣāmeva viśeṣeṇa nirākaraṇasaṁbhramaḥ /
śrīsiṁhadharmādhyakṣeṇa vādīndreṇa vidhīyate //

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[1] P. 99.

This verse shows that Vādīndra wrote this book as the *Dharmādhyakṣa* of king śrīsiṁha and also that it was written to criticize the above mentioned *Tārkikas*. This Śrīsiṁha is identified with Siṅghaṇa of Devagiri who ruled from 1210-1247 A.D. This date is quite in conformity with the date 1252 fixed for Vādīndra. So he must have lived in the latter half of the 13th century A. D.

His works so far known to me are—

His works

(1) *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* seems to me to be his first work, as there is a reference to *Mahāvidyā* in the *Rasasāra*—

> *anvayinyupādhivirahācca pratibandhasiddhiḥ ityañca mahāvidyā tattad-vyavasthāpakavad-vyakti-pakṣīkaranena sarvavipratipannajātisidhaye prayojyā iti saṅkṣepaḥ*[1] . . .

which must have been written later.

Reference to the *Mahāvidyā-viḍambana*

The earliest reference to *Mahāviḍyā* is found in the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukhācārya[2]—

> athavā ayam ghataḥ etadghatānyatve sati vedyatvānadhikaranānyaḥ padārthatvāt ghatavat ityādi-mahāvidyā-prayogairapyavedyatvaprasiddhirapyūhanīyā

Citsukhācārya is said to have lived in about 1200 A. D.

Next, we find Amalānanda referring to it in his *Vedāntakalpataru*-evaṁ sarvā mahāvidyā tacchāyā vānye prayogāḥ khaṇḍanīyā iti.[3] Amalānanda is said to have flourished about 1247-1260 A. D. Then we find Ānandagiri (1260-1320) referring to Mahāvidyā in his *Tarkasaṅgraha*. Lastly, we find the great Rāmānuja philosopher Śrī Veṅkaṭanātha, generally called Vedāntācārya, (1267-1369 A.D.), referring to Vādīndra and his *Mahāvidyā-viḍambana* in his *Nyāyapariśuddhi*[4] and *Tattvamuktākalāpa*.[5] Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara also has referred to it in his *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, a commentary on the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana.[6] Besides, there are so many other references to the *Mahāvidyā* in various forms which lead us to conclude that it must have been known and used before the 12th century A. D.

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[1] P. 8. [2] P. 13 Nirnayasagar Bombay, ed.

[3] *Vedāntasūtra*, II, ii, 37.

[4] PP. 125, 126, 273-276, 278, Choukhamba edition

[5] PP, 478, 485-491, Pandit edition.

[6] PP. 6, 23, 42. *Pandit reprint*.

Mahāvidyāviḍambana is divided into three *Paricchedas.* In the first *Pariccheda*, the author defines *Mahāvidyā* as a *kevalānvayi probans.* The author explains the term *Mahāvidyā* as—

Kevalānvayini sādhye vyāpake pravartamāno hetuḥ pakse vyāpakapratītyaparyavasānabalādanvayavyatirekisādhyaviśeṣaṁ vādyabhimataṁ sādhayan mahāvidyetyucyate/tasya ca mahāvidyātvam asidhatvādisakaladoṣaviraḥ[1].

Translation—a *kevalanvayi* hetu, which being present in the *pakṣa* (subject) proves the *anvaya-vyatirekisādhyaviśeṣa* and as desired by the disputant (vādī) by force of the circumstances that the pervader (vyāpaka) would not be established, is called *Mahāvidyā.* It is so called because it is free from all fallacies of *asiddhatva* etc.

This may be illustrated as—
this sound is non-eternal,
because it is produced.

Here, in this premiss, the *probandum* (*anityatva*) to be proved by the *mahāvidyā probans* (*kṛtakatva*) is valid only when the *śabda* is non-eternal and not otherwise. So the non-eternity of sound has to be accepted by the force of circumstances. Such a *probans* is called *mahāvidyā*.

Justification for the use of the term *Mahāvidyā*

How it has come to be called by the name *mahāvidyā* is to be considered. The term originally meant the ten female deities, such as—

Kālī Tārā Mahāvidyā Soḍaśī Bhuvaneśvarī
Bhairavī Chinnamastā ca Vidyā Dhūmāvatī tathā /
Vagalā Siddhavidyā ca Mātaṅgī Kamalātmikā
etā daśa Mahāvidyāḥ siddhavidyāḥ prakīrtitāḥ[2] //

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[1] *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, P. 3, *Gaekwad's Oriental series* ed.

[2] *Cāmuṇḍātantra*, quoted in the *Śabdakalpadruma*, under *Mahāvidyā*, Bengali edition, p. 996.

Further, about these ten *mahavidyās*, the *Mālinīvijaya* says—

dosajālairasaṁspṛṣṭāstāh sarvā hi phalaissaha, //

While commenting on the words *mantra* and *vidyā*, Bhāskara Rāya, the great Tāntrika scholar of the 16th century, writes in his commentary on the *Lalitāsahasranāma*[1],

> pumdaivatyā mantrāh, strīdaivatyā vidyā iti mantravidyayorlakṣanabhede'pi asyāḥ śivaśaktisāmarasyarūpatvādubhayātmateti dyotanāya mantrānāṁ madhye vidyetyuktam.

In the *Paiṅgalāmata*, as quoted by Raghava Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on the *Śāradātilaka*[2] also, it is said—

'śaktyādyā tu bhaved-*vidyā* śivādyo *mantra ucyate*/

So Vādīndra, or Kulārka Paṇḍita, the author of the *Mahāvidyādaśaślokīsūtra*, upon which this *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* is based, used the term *vidyā* for the *kevalānvayi-hetu* in a syllogism, most probably, due to the fact that there were sixteen factors in such a syllogism named after one of the Mahāvidyās, named *Ṣoḍaśī*. It is believed that Kulārka was a Tāntrika devoted to the *Ṣoḍaśī*. Then again, a further justification for naming it as such, may be given by its supporters that as the Tāntrika *Mahāvidyā* is *siddha* and free from every *doṣa*, so is the case with the proposed *Kevalānvayi hetu-doṣajālairasaṁspṛṣṭāḥ*. But Vādīndra does not believe in the validity of this type of syllogism. It is therefore that he says in the beginning of this work—

Samullasati Vādīndracandre śaṅkarakiṅkare/
unmīlanti mahāvidyā doṣakairavakorakāḥ//

Translation.—Faults of mahāvidyā become manifest when the moon-like Vādīndra the devotee of Śaṅkara, rises. And again, he says in the third chapter—

Upādhivyādhinirdhūtamanvayavyatirekiṇam
matvodbhūnnamahāvidyāḥ Śivādityāditārkikāḥ/
teṣāmeva viśeṣeṇa nirākaraṇasaṁbhramaḥ
Śrīsimhadharmādhyakṣeṇa Vādīndreṇa vidhīyate/

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[1] Verse 17. [2] P. 5. Kashi Edition

But it may be pointed out here that Vedāntācārya Śrīveṅkaṭanātha in his *Nyāyapariśuddhi* and *Tattvamuktākalāpa* has refuted the view of Vādīndra that the *kevalānvayi-hetu* is entirely untenable. He holds that the method of *mahāvidyā* is not sound, but a *kevalānvayihetu* with a *kevalānvayi-sādhya* is sound.

Origin of the term Mahāvidyā

As to the origin of this term *Mahāvidyā* for this type of *hetu*, Bhuvanasundarasūri, a commentator on the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, says in this very book[1]—

bhāṭṭā nityaṁ śabdaṁ yaugādyā vādinastvanityam/
pratijānate tato'yaṁ jātah teṣām vivādo'tra//
tattasyānityatvam pratipādayitum tu bhāṭṭavādīndrān/
yaugācāryo varyaḥ kṛtavānetām *mahāvidyām*//

It is clear from the above that the Naiyāyikas founded this syllogism to convince the Bhāṭṭas on the non-eternity of sound.

The commentator also illustrates the syllogism as follows—

yatra mūlānumānaṁ mukhvānumānaṁ anvayavyatireki syāt tatra mahāvidyānumānaṁ prayojyam/kim viśistam? kevalānvayi/ tathā hi—

anityah śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvāt, ghatavat, ityatra anvayavyatirekini mūlānumāne mahāvidyānumānam yathā—

ayam śabdah svasvetaravṛttitvānadhikaranānityanisthadharmavān, meyatvāt, ghatavat. idañca kevalānvayi eva.

It is also to be kept in mind that in such syllogism all *nitya* and *anitya* objects and their *dharmas* are put forth as examples (*dṛṣṭāntas*).

Thus, in the first chapter he has given the syllogism and has refuted criticizms against this *hetu*. He has supported his views on the non-eternity of sound. In the second *pariccheda*, he says—
kevalānvayihetuviśeṣo mahāvidyā ityuktam—tanna.[2] He has criticized here several definitions of *kevalānvayi-hetu*. In the third *pariccheda*, he has pointed out how these syllogisms are frustrated with the fallacies of *upādhi*, *viruddha*, *anaikāntika and satpratipakṣa*. Thus, he has stated that these syllogisms cannot prove the

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[1] P. 2.

[2] P. 76.

non-eternity of sound. Hence, it is of no use in a controversy.

Reference in the work.

The following are the references found in both: Kulārka Paṇḍita,[1] Udayana[2], Bhāṣyakāra (Praśastapāda),[3] Śivādityaḥ, Śivāditya Miśrah.[4] Śrīsimhah[5], Pūrvācāryāh.[6]

A similar *vaitaṇḍika* work is found to be the *Vādivinoda* of Śaṅkara Miśra of the 15th century.

It may be added at the end that just as the tāntrika *Mahāvidyās* are the *sādhana* (means) to achieve a *siddhi* (success) in any action, so this form of syllogism is believed to be, by its author, a great means to achieve success in any argument Hence, the term *Mahāvidyā* seems to have been used for a particular type of syllogism.

2. CENNU BHAṬṬA

(14th century)

In the field of Nyāya, *Prācina* and *Navya*, we do not find any name of the Southern Scholars before the 13th century. The earliest work known to me is a commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra by Cennu Bhaṭṭa, who was also known as Cinna Bhaṭṭa or Caitanya Bhaṭṭa. He was the son of Sahaja-Sarvajña Viṣṇu, younger brother of Sarvajña. Śrīharihara Mahārāja was his patron. This is what is found in the colophon of a manuscript of this commentary, noticed in the *Aufrecht Oxford Catalogue*.[7] The colophon runs as—

> iti śrīhariharamahārājaparipālitena sahajasarvajña-visnudevārādhyatanūjena sarvajñānujena cinnabhattena viricitāyāṁ tarkabhāsāprakāśikāyām prameyādiparicchedah samāptah.

Mahārāja Harihara, mentioned above, is undoubtedly identical with the famous king Harihara II of Vijayanagara (A. D. 1400). This Sarvajña Viṣṇu has been mentioned by the younger Mādhava, the son of Sāyaṇa Mādhava, in his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, as the son of Śārṅgapāṇi and as his own *guru* and whom Sāyaṇa refers to as the author of *Vivaraṇavivaraṇa*, in his Śaṅkaradarśana of the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* section—taduktaṁ vivaraṇavivaraṇe sahajasarvajñaviṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāyaiḥ.[1]

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[1] P. 17. [2] P. 83 [3] P. 98.

[4] PP. 74, 99, 107. 109, [5] P. 99. [6] P. 109.

[7] p. 224a

References found in the commentary

Cennu Bhaṭṭa has referred to Udayana, Kandalīkāra, Maṇḍana Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra I, Varadarāja (most probably the author of the *Tārkikarakṣā*), Vādīndra and Śālikanātha.

According to the date of his patron and his relation with Sāyaṇa Mādhava, he may be placed in the 14th century.

3. VYĀSATĪRTHA

(1460-1539)

Vyāsatīrtha, Vyāsarāya, or Vyāsarāja Svāmin, as he is variously known, was the disciple of Brahmaṇyatīrtha who initiated him into the life of a *parivrājaka*, so he says in his *Tātparya-candrikā*—

kaṁsadhvaṁsipadāmbhoja saṁsakto haṁsapuṅgavaḥ /
brahmaṇyagururājākhyo vartatām mama mānase //

while Laksmīnārāyaṇa muni, who was also called Śrīpādarāja, was his *vidyāguru*. So he writes in his *Nyāyāmṛta*—

jñānavairāgyabhaktyādikalyāṇaguṇaśālinaḥ /
lakṣmīnārāyaṇamunīn vande vidyāgurūn mama //

His family history.

Vyāsarāja was born in or about 1460 A. D. in the village of Bannūr in the district of Mysore. Rallaṇṇa Sumati of Kāśyapagotra was his father and Akkamma was his mother. In his pre-initiation period he was called Yatirāja. But when he was initiated into the life of a monk of the *Mādhva-sampradāya*, he was baptised as Vyāsatīrtha by Brahmaṇyatīrtha. But soon his *guru* died and Vyāsatīrtha had to come to Kāñcī for the study of śāstras. He studied under the Paṇḍitas of Kāñcī various *darśanas*. Then he left for Mulbāgal which was also a great seat of learning. He met Śrīpādarāja at this place. Here he stayed for about six or seven years and studied the Śāstra under Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Munin, so he writes at the end of his *Mandāramañjarī*—

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[1] P. Benares edition.

> lak mīnārāyaṇākhyāt dvaitakulatilakādadhītamadhvaśāstrāmṛtena vyāsayatinā viracitā mandāramañjarī samāptā.

From there he was sent by Śrīpādarāja to the court of Sāluva Narasiṁha at Candragiri in about 1485-86. There he stayed for some years and met several scholars, and had good discussions with them on Navyanyāya. He left for Vijayanagar in about 1493. He thus passed his time at Vijayanagar writing and reading and meeting scholars in disputations till 1539 when he passed away.[1]

The following are his works known to me—

His works

(1) *Nyāyāmṛta*—This work was written with a view to criticize the *advaitins* and contribute some original views to the Mādhva thought. He has shown here his dialectic ability. It contains references to *Kusumāñjali*, *Bauddhādhikāra*, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* amongst many others of Vedānta schools. He says about his achievement in this work—

> vikṣiptasaṅgrahāt kvāpi kvāpyuktasyopapādanāt /
> anuktakathanāt kvāpi saphalo'yaṁ śramo mama //

(2) *Tātparyacandrikā*—It is a Vedāntika work dealing with the *Brahmasūtra* and its commentaries from the Mādhva point of view. He himself writes about his own contribution in this work—

> sūtre bhāṣye'nubhāṣye ca sannyāyavivṛttau tathā /
> ṭīkāsu ca yadaspaṣṭaṁ tacca spaṣṭīkariṣyate //
>
> pratisūtraṁ prakāśyete ghaṭanāghaṭane mayā /
> svīyānyapakṣayoḥ samyak vidāṅkurvantu sūrayaḥ //

(3) *Tarkatāṇḍava*—This is his best work which shows his great ability in discussion through dialec-

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[1] Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, *A history of Dvaita school of Vedānta*, PP. 24-34.

tical methods with the Naiyāyikas. Here he freely criticizes the views of Udayana, Gaṅgeśa, Pakṣadhara, Pragalbha, Yajñapati and so on.

This work is divided into three chapters according to the three *pramāṇas* dealt with in the Mādhva school. He has changed the ordinarily recognized order of the *Pramāṇas*, that is, he has placed Anumāna after Pratyakṣa and Śabda. He says that according to the *Mādhvasiddānta*, Pratyakṣa and Śabda both strenthen Anumāna, so they should be treated before Anumāna.

Vyāsatīrtha with all his dialectical methods has vigorously criticized the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views and has established the Mādhva views on very sound footing. Besides, he has written (4) *Mandāramañjarī* in three parts, namely, *tattvavivekaṭīkā*, *Upādhikhaṇḍanaṭīkā*, and *Māyāvādakhaṇḍanaṭīkā* and *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍanaṭīkā* which are all meant to establish the superiority of Mādhva stand in Vedānta. (5) *Bhedojjīvanam*. This is also his *sāmpradāyika* work. In all these he has shown his dialectical superiority even over the Naiyāyikas. Perhaps in the South he may be said to be the best of the dialecticians. It is said that he had met Paksadhara for Śāstravicāra in Mithilā and was very pleased to see Pakṣadhara's scholarship due to which he had uttered the well-known verse—

yadadhītaṁ tadadhītaṁ yadanadhītaṁ tadapyadhītam/
pakṣadharavipakṣo nāvekṣi vinā navīnavyāsena//

It is not correct to say that Pakṣadhara went to Mulbāgal to see Vyāsatīrtha. He never took any such journey to the South. It was Vyāsatīrtha, a *Parivrājaka-sannyāsin*, who, while moving from place to place, might have come to Mithilā and met Pakṣadhara there.[1]

4. ŚESA-ŚĀRṄGADHARA

(16th century)

Śeṣa-Śārṅgadhara's date is not certain. He gives his own reference in his commentary on the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana as—

sagarvagarvadalanaśeṣaḥ Śārṅgadharaḥ sudhīḥ/
cakāra lakṣaṇāvalyā vivṛttiṁ kṛtinām mude//

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[1] Dr. Sharma; *Hist. of Dvaita school*, P. 35.

Translation—The learned Śārṅgadhara who is (like) the *Śeṣa* the King of the Serpent in the destruction of the arrogance of his arrogant opponents wrote the *Vivṛtti* of the *Lakṣaṇāvali* for the pleasure of scholars.

Date

His another reference is found in the *Nyāyasidhāntadīpaprabhā*, a commentary by Śeṣānanta on the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara—

> so'yaṁ śaśadharācāryakṛtivyākṛtikaitavāt/
> śeṣaḥ śārṅgadharādiṣṭapuṣṭadhīrupatiṣṭhate[1]//

From this it is evident that Śesa was the teacher of Śeṣānanta. He could not have lived before the 14th century as he quotes from the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukhācārya[2] and *Vedāntakalpataru* of Amalānanda[3] both of whom flourished in the 14th century. Again, he must have lived earlier than the 17th century as is evident from the date of a copy of the manuscript of the *Padārthacandrikā* dated Sam. 1658=1715 A. D. Śeṣānanta in his *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpaprabhā* (beginning verse) says that Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara was his *guru*. This Śeṣānanta must have lived after the author of the *Līlāvatīprakāśa* of Varddhamāna, whom Śeṣānanta refers to.[4] Moreover, he had Pratāparāja of about 1500 Śaka =1578 A. D. as his patron.[5] So he can be placed in the 16th century.

His work and references.

His only work known so far is a commentary on the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana. He says in two places-*-vistarastu anyatra*[6] which shows that he might have written another work. The author bows down to *Bālā*, a form of female deity. He has referred to Tattvapradīpikākāra, Citsukhācārya[7], *Daśaślokīviḍambanam*[8], Tarkasaṅgrahakāra[9], Vallabhācārya[10], *Kalpataru* (of Amalānanda)[11], Vādīśāḥ[12], Vādīndrāḥ[13], Vādivāgīśvarāḥ.[14]

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[1] Here in place of *Śeṣaḥ* the *Pandit edition* reads *sataḥ* which does not seem to be a correct reading. Dr. A. Venis also accepts *Śeṣa* as the correct reading.

[2] *Nyayamuktāvalī*, PP. 4, 15.

[3] *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, PP. 23, 37.

[4] P. 26.

[5] Introduction to the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*.

[6] PP. 2, 11.

[7] PP. 4, 15, 23.

[8] P. 6.

[9] PP. 14, 38, 40-41.

[10] PP. 23, 35.

[11] PP. 23, 37

[12] P. 29.

[13] P. 42.

[14] P. 51.

5. ANNAM BHAṬṬA

(17th century)

We know more about Annam Bhaṭṭa from his well-known and most popular primer called *Tarkasaṅgraha* with his own commentary, called *Dīpikā* or *Tarkadīpikā.* It is a small book written for the young children—'bālānāṁ sukhabodhāya kṛyate Tarkasaṅgrahaḥ' and he says the same in the beginning of his commentary on it—'ṭīkāṁ śiśuhitāṁ kurve tarkasaṅgrahadīpikām'. He has paid homage to Lord Viśveśvara in both the works, so I presume that he wrote these two works at Kāśī.

Annam Bhaṭṭa was the son of Tirumalācārya of the Advaitavedācārya Rāghavasomayāji family.[1] Mr. R. B. Godbole, in his *Dictionary of Modern History of India* gives some account of his family history which according to Bodas is not reliable.[2] There is enough influence on his *Tarkadīpikā* of later 17th century writers. So he can be placed in the 17th century at the latest. Moreover, the period when such syncretist works were written cannot fall before the 16th century. So I have placed him in the 17th century.

Annam Bhaṭṭa was an all-round scholar. His *Tarkadīpikā* on his *Tarkasaṅgraha* is a bit advanced type of work. In certain sections he has added some matter from the original navyanyāya works. Besides his two works on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, he has written works on Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṁsā, and Vedānta also. He has commented upon the *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara, called the *Siddhāñjana*. Aufrecht mentions the following works against his name in his *Catalogus Catalogorum*-*Mitākṣarā* (a commentary on the Bādarāyaṇasūtra), *Tattvabodhinīṭīkā, Nyāyapariśiṣṭaprakāśa (on Udayana's Nyāyapariśiṣṭa) and Subodhinīsudhāsāra* also known as *Rāṇakojjīvinī*. That he was a great scholar is proved by the following proverbial line—*Kāśīgamanamātreṇa nānnambhaṭṭāyate dvijaḥ.*

Tarkasaṅgraha, though an elementary work, has been commented upon by several standard writers. Some of their commentaries are named here—(1) *Tarkadīpikā* by Annaṁ Bhatta himself, (2) *Nyāyabodhinī* by Govardhana Miśra, (3) *Siddhāntacandrodaya* by Śrīkṛṣṇadhūrjaṭidīkṣita, (4) *Padakṛtya* by Candraja Siṁha, (5) *Tarkasaṅgraha-Tattvaprakāśa*, generally called *Nīlakaṇṭhī*, by Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa, son of Rāmabhaṭṭa. (6) *Ṭippaṇī*, also called *Nirukta*, by Paṭṭābhirāma. (7) *Candrikā* by Mukundabhaṭṭa Gadgil, (8) *Vākyavṛtti* by Meru śāstrī Godbole. (9) *Tarkāphakkikā*, By Kṣamākalyāṇa, (10) *Ṭīkā* by Anantanārāyaṇa. These are old commentaries. In modern times also scholars have written several commentaries, such as, *Sītā* by Nyāyācārya Ānanda Jhā, Lucknow University, *Gaṅgā* by Śivadatta Miśra, son of Mm. Prabhudatta Śāstrī, of Vārāṇasī.

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[1] Vide colophon of the *Dīpikā*, Bodas edition.

[2] Vide *Introduction to his edition of the Tarkasaṅgraha* p Lx.

6. MAHĀDEVA PUṆTĀMAKARA

(17th century)

Mahādeva was the son of Mukunda of the Puṇtāmakara family of Mahārāṣṭra. He lived at Kāśī. He was the pupil of Śrīkaṇṭha Dīkṣita. But in the Maṅgala verse three, he bows to his *guru* named Śitikaṇṭha. So he says in the beginning of his *Nyāyakaustubha*-Pratyakṣa—

mukundam pitaraṁ naumi ṣaṭśāstrīm tattvadarśinam/
yatpuṇyaparipākeṇa śāstre gatirabhūnmama //
puruhūtapurohitaṁ sabhāyām
kavitāyāṁ kila kālidāsamanyam /
nikhilākhilaśāstraviddhurīṇāṁ
śitika ṭhābhidhasadgurum namāmi //

He writes in the beginning of his *Sarvopakāriṇī*[1]—

yadālambanato mūrkha-
stārkikāṇāṁ dhurandharaḥ /
budho bhavati tam bande
gurum Śrīkaṇṭhadīkṣitam //

Again, he writes—

Śrīkaṇṭhadīkṣitaṁ naumi guruṁ gautamarūpiṇam /
yena cūrṇīkṛtāssadyoviduṣāṁ garvaparvatāḥ //

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[1] Ms. in the *Gaṅganātha Jhā Research Institute.*

It may be possible that, his *guru* had two names, or that he had two different *gurus*. Any how, it is clear that his *guru* Śrīkaṇṭha was also a very great scholar. But so far we have not seen any of his works.

He was a devotee of Śiva and also an *upāsaka* of goddess Siddheśvarī. So he says—Siddheśvarī Jaganmātā prīṇātu saśivā bhṛśam[1]. His date can easily be fixed with the help of several manuscripts transcribed by him and preserved in the *Sarasvatī Bhavan* library, Benares. Mm. Kavirājajī says that he has found dates in the manuscripts ranging from Samvat 1727 = 1670 A.D. to Samvat 1753 = 1696 A. D. So he can be easily placed in the second half of the 17th century A. D.

From an entry in one of the manuscripts it is gathered that he had once gone to Nadiā from Benares. It may be just to attend a gathering of the Paṇḍitas which was so common in those old days. He was regarded a leading scholar of Nyāya in that period in Benares.

He was the author of two commentaries on the *Bhavānandī* on the *Anumāna-Dīdhiti*. He says in the beginning of the *Sarvopakāriṇī*—

Bhavānandakṛtavyākhyāne'numānamaṇidīdhiteḥ /
vyākhyāyate nigūdhārtha Mah¯devena tattvataḥ //

It is found that Bhavānanda was almost neglected in his days. His commentary did not attract the attention of any Bengali scholar for writing a commentary. It was not honoured in Bengal. But it had maintained its position in Benares. Its importance was further realised by scholars when Mahādeva wrote two commentaries on this very work. He himself says in the beginning of his *Sarvopakāriṇī*—

bhavānandīprakāśastu vistṛto racito mayā/
ataḥ saṅkṣepataḥ kurve vyākhyāṁ sarvopakāriṇīm//

About this commentary he writes at the end—

bhavānandīyathārthārthajñānecchā yasya vidyate /
tenopāyasahasreṇa saṅgrāhyeyaṁ kṛtirmama //
madīyakṛtimuttamāmabhinavārthavidyotinīṁ
vilokyamudamāpnūyādyadi satāṁ budhānāṁ gaṇaḥ /
tadābhavati nindayā kimiha vāliśānām śataiḥ
vidhuḥ kuvalayepsito na dinaṁ nindyate tāmasaiḥ //

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[1] End of the *Sarvopakāriṇī*.

The first commentary is called *Dīdhitigūḍhārthaprakāśikā*, or only *Bhavānandīprakāśa*. This commentary is big and is full of technical minutia. It was written to defend Bhavānanda against the latter's critics. It is very difficult and is meant for critical students of Nyāya. The other commentary is smaller and is meant for the beginners of lower standard. It is therefore, called *Sarvopakāriṇī*. He writes in the very beginning of this smaller work—

> anālocya siddhāntavāgīśavāṇyām
> vṛthāsūyitaiḥ paṇḍitairgauḍajātaiḥ/
>
> yadudbhāvitaṁ dūṣaṇābhāsavṛndaṁ
> taduddhāraṇārtho mamodyoga eṣaḥ//

(3) He also commented upon the *Padārthaprakāśa of* Laugāksi Bhāskara. Besides, he wrote independent works. *Nyāyakaustubha* is his *magnum opus* in this direction which he wrote after his *Bhavānandīprakāśa*. It is an original work on Nyāya. Here he has followed the line of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. It is divided into four chapters according to the four *pramāṇas* accepted by Nyāya. While writing this work, Mahādeva says in the beginning of the Pratyakṣa *Kaustubha*—

> mokṣahetupramāṇāditattvajñānāya saddhiyām/
> mahādevena sudhiyā kriyate nyāyakaustubhaḥ//
>
> nyāyasiddhāntaniṣkarṣe jijñāsā yasya vidyate/
> saṅgrāhyastena sudhiyā nyāyakaustubha ādarāt//
>
> nyāyāmbhodhiṁ samunmathya bhāvanāmandarādriṇā/
> viṣṇuneva mahādevenāyaṁ kaustubha uddhṛtaḥ//

The following are referred to in the Pratyakṣa which alone is so far published from the *Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit library*, Benares and edited by me. Ācāryamatam[1], Ācāryānuyāyinaḥ[2], Dīdhitikāraḥ[3], Dīdhitikārānuyāyinaḥ[4],

References found in the Pratyakṣa

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[1] P. 25 [2] P. 161

[3] PP. 3 , 38, 46, 53, 79, 108, 122, 153, 158, 228,234

[4] PP. 169, 177, 185

Pakṣadharamiśrāḥ[1], Miśrāḥ[2], Miśramatam[3], Miśroktam[4], Murārimiśraḥ[5], Maithilāḥ[6], Līlāvatīkārānuyāyinaḥ[7], *Āloka*[8], *Kaṇṭakoddhāra*[9], *Dīdhitiḥ*[10], *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam*[11], *Bhavānandīprakāśa*[12], Miśragranthah[13].

He also wrote small tracts, such as *Īśvaravāda, Sādṛśyavāda and Nyāyānumitiparāmarśayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvavicāra.*

But the most important are the only three—*Bhavānandīprakāśa* and the *Nyāyakaustubha* which he regards as his two sons and the *Sarvopakāriṇī* as his daughter. It is therefore, that he says at the end of the *Sarvopakāriṇī*—

> prakāśakaustubhau putrāvātmajāmupakāriṇīm/
> buddhipatnyāmalaukikyāṁ mahādevo hyabhāvayat//
> laukikyāṁ laukikaṁ patnyām alaukikyāmalaukikaṁ/
> utpādya patyamabhajan-mahādevaḥ kṛtārthatām//

The colophon of the manuscript, preserved in the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Allahabad, contains the following—

> iti śrī-Kāśīnivāsi-mahārāmdā(?)-nvayasambhūta-puṇyastambhakārothanāmaka śrīmanmukunda-paṇḍitātmaja-mahādeva-paṇḍitaviricitā'numānadīdhiti-bhavānandīvyākhyā-Sarvopakāriṇī sampūrṇā Sam. 1792. (=1735).

The above mentioned colophon makes it clear that Mahādeva lived at Kāśī and that the manuscript under reference was transcribed in 1735 A.D.

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[1] PP. 41, 59, 61

[2] PP. 3, 6, 15-17, 24, 43, 62, 113, 217, 256

[3] 41-42, 45, 47, 48, 58, 62

[4] PP. 53, 54, 62-63

[5] PP. 34, 39,

[6] P. 46

[7] P. 156

[8] PP. 3, 256

[9] P. 16

[10] PP. 49-50, 172, 228, 256

[11] P. 122

[12] P. 243

[13] PP. 16, 42, 52

7. NĀRĀYAṆA TĪRTHA

(17th century)

He was a *sannyāsin* and so ordinarily, he should not have written or commented upon any work on Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika. But here is an exception. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has commented upon the *Kusumāñjalikārikās*, a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Vārāṇaseya Sanskrit University*. It is incomplete. At the end of the third *stavaka* of his commentary the colophon is *paramahaṁsa-parivrājakācārya.*[1] He has also written commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti* and *Bhāṣāpariccheda* of Viśvanātha (Kṛṣṇadāsa ?). He was the pupil of Vāsudeva Tīrtha and disciple of Rāmagovinda Tīrtha as he himself says in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*—

Śrīrāmagovindasutīrthapāda—
kṛpāviśeṣādupalabhya bodham/
Śrīvāsudevādadhigatya sarva—
śāstrāṇi vaktuṁ kimapi spṛhā naḥ//

Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, the commentator on the *Siddhāntabindu* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, was his disciple. So he says in the beginning of his commentary—

śrīnārāyaṇatīrthānāṁ gurūṇāṁ caraṇāmbujam/
namāmi vāṅmanaḥkāyairananyaśaraṇaiḥ sadā//

About his time it may be said that as he has commented upon Madhusūdana's works, he must have lived later than the 16th century. He must therefore be placed in the 17th century. He must be earlier than A. D. 1701(1758 Sam.), the date of a manuscript of the *Muktāvalīprakāśa* by Dinakara Bhaṭṭa, belonging to his private collection which is now preserved in the *Sarasvatī Bhavan Sanskrit Library.*

His date

He was the son of *Nīlakaṇṭhasūri* of *Vārāṇasī* and his name, during his *gṛhasthāśrama*, was Govinda

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[1] fol. 186:

Śāstrī. So he writes at the end of his *Bhāṭṭabhāṣāprakāśa*, a Mīmāṁsā work—

iti nīlakaṇṭhasūrisūnugovindaviracite Bhāttabhāsāprakāśe prathamo'dhyāyaḥ.

Again, he says—

bhagavacchivarāmatīrthaśiṣyo
muninārāyaṇatīrthanāmadheyaḥ /
vyatanodadhikāśi bhāṭṭabhāṣā-
grathanam bhāṭṭanayapraveśahetoḥ //

From the above it appears that Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha had two teachers, Vāsudeva Tīrtha and Śivarāma Tīrtha, unless both these were the names of the same person.

8. RĀJACŪḌĀMAṆI MAKHIN

(17th century)

Rājacūḍāmaṇi was a minister of the court of Raghunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore. He wrote a commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi* called *Darpana* in 1630 A. D.[1]

9. GOPĪNĀTHA MAUNIN

(17th century)

He lived in Vārāṇasī during the time of Rājā Jayasiṁha. He is the author of *Śabdālokarahasya*, *Tarkabhāṣā-ṭīkā*, and *Padārthavivekaṭīkā*. So he says—

upadiṣṭam pitṛcaraṇaiḥ svayamapi niṣṭaṅkitam
yatnaiḥ /
sabdālokarahasyam gopīnātho vivecayati //

He was the son of Jñānapati.[2] He is placed in the 17th century A. D.

10. KṚṢṆA BHAṬṬA ĀRDE

(18th century)

Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa was the son of Raṅganātha and Kamalā, pupil of Hari and younger brother of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa—

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[1] *Indian Logic*, P. 485.

[2] *Indian Logic*, PP. 485-486.

Śrīkṛṣṇaṁ muhurānamya Kṛṣṇo nārāyaṇānujaḥ /
Gadādharamatārthānāṁ Ṭippaṇīṁ tanute'dbhutām //
Vaikuṇṭhamadhyāvasatoḥ kamalāraṅganāthayoḥ /
tanūjena kavitvānāṁ mālā bhīlā vitanyate[1]//

Again, in the *Gādādharīṭīkā*, called *Karṣikā*, he writes—

Rāṅganāthī kṛṣṇaśarmā paṇḍitebhyaḥ kṛtāñjaliḥ /
Yācate bhūya ānamya dūsyaṁ buddhvā vaco mama //

He lived at Kāśī. He was the author of a commentary on the *Jāgadīśī*, called *Jagadīśatoṣiṇī* on the *Gādādharī*, called *Kāśikā*, and also on the *Śaktivāda* of Gadādhara. He flourished in the 18th century.

11. MĀDHAVADEVA PAṆDITA

(18th century)

Mādhavadeva Paṇḍita was the son of Lakṣmaṇadeva of Dhārāpura. He lived at Kāśī. All this is evident from the following:—

natvā viśveśvaraṁ devaṁ guruṁ Śrīlakṣmaṇābhidham /
dravyādīnām padārthānāṁ vivekaḥ kriyate'dhunā[2] //
and—iti dhārāpuranivāsi-laksmanadevātmaja-mādhavadevaviracito nyāyasāraḥ.[3]

His works.

He is the author of a commentary, called *Sāramañjarī* on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra and also on the *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti* of Raghunātha. He is also the author of a Vaiśeṣika work called *Nyāyasāra* published in the *Pandit*. From this work we learn that he had written *Samavāyavāda*[4] and also *Līlāvatībhāvapariccheda* (asmatkṛtalīlāvatībhāvaparicchedoktayuktyā samavetapṛthivyādisiddhirdraṣṭavyā).[5] He also refers to his another work—*Guṇarahasyaṭippaṇī* (vistarastu asmatkṛtaguṇarahasya·ippaṇyāṁ cāvaseyaṁ.)[6]

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[1] Sarasvati Bhavan Studies Series, VII.

[2] Beginning verse of the *Nyāyasāra*, Reprint from the *Pandit*.

[3] Colophnn of the *Nyāyasāra*. Mm. Śrī Kavirājajī says that he was the grandson of Mādhavadeva of Dhārāsūrapura.

[4] P. 5 asmatkṛtasamavāyavāde draṣṭavyam.

[5] P. 25. PP. 116, 208.

In his commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā*, he refers to Rudrabhaṭṭācārya of the latter part of the 17th century and Gaurīkānta of the end of the 17th century, so he may be placed in the 18th century A. D.

12. DHARMARĀJA ADHVARĪNDRA

(18th century)

His date

Dharmarāja is well-known for his most popular work on Vedānta, named *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. From the very beginning verses of it, it is evident that his *guru* was Śrī Veṅkaṭanātha who lived in the village named Velāṅguḍi on the bank of the river Narmadā in the South. He was the inhabitant of a village called, Kandaramānikya and that he was the son of Trivedīnārāyaṇa Yajvan of the Kauṇḍinya gotra[1] as is clear from the following lines—

> yadantevāsipañcāsyairnirastā bhedivāraṇāḥ /
> tam praṇomi nṛsiṁhākhyam yatīndraṁ paramaṁ gurum //
> Śrīmadvenkaṭanāthākhyān velāṅguḍinivāsinah /
> jagadgurūnaham vande sarvatantrapravartakān //

Mm. Kavirājajī identifies Nṛsiṁha yati with the author of the *Bhedadhikkāra* (A. D. 1547). He places him somewhere in the middle of the 17th century. I would like to place him in the beginning of the 18th century.

His works

He wrote a commentary called *Tarkacūḍāmaṇi* on the *Cintāmaṇi*. He claims to have criticized ten previous commentaries on it in his commentary. So he writes—

> yena cintāmaṇau ṭīkā daśaṭīkāprabhañjanī /
> tarkacūḍāmaṇirnāma kṛtā vidvanmanoramā [2]//

It seems that he had also written a *Vivṛti* on the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa* of Rucidatta. So he says—

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[1] Vide *Tanjore Catalogue*, P. 115b.

[2] Beginning verse of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

tatra kaṇḍaramāṇikkagrāmanivāsinā /
maṇiprakāśavivṛtirdharmarājena tanyate //
daśānāmapi ṭīkānāṁ bhaṅgam kurvan kvacit kvacit /
anumānaprakāśasya vivṛtiṁ karavāṇyaham //

Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Kavirājajī says that he has also commented upon the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara, called *Nyāyaratna*.[1]

13. RĀMAKṚṢṆA ADHVARIN

(18th century)

Rāmakṛṣṇa was the son of Dharmarāja Adhvarin. He has commented upon the *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa* of Rucidatta.[2]

JAINA AND BUDDHIST CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN LOGIC

Beside what has been said before, there are other logicians who also deserve a brief mention in this place. Amongst the Jainas and so also amongst the Buddhists there were some who wrote independent works on logic and some who commented upon the works of others. In the treatment of independent writers there is no difference due to their being Jainas or Buddhists. Almost the same terminology and forms are used in their works also. But even then there exist some specialities of these writers which differentiate these schools.

JAINA LOGICIANS

Siddhasena Divākara, also called Kṣapaṇaka, was the first Jaina writer on systematic logic. He wrote his *Nyāyāvatāra*, a small treatise on Jaina logic, in thirty two short stanzas. It has been published along with a commentary called *Vivṛti* of Candraprabhasūri of the beginning of the 12th century A.D. Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan edited and translated it into English. It is a very important work on *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*. It is to be kept in mind that this *Nyāyāvatāra* is only a portion of his bigger book called *Dvātriṁśat-dvātriṁśikā*. He is said to have written 32 different works on logic, 21 of which are said to be available. All these have been discussed in the first volume.

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[1] A copy of this work is present in the Tanjore collection by Burnell, P. 119b.

[2] Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit Studies, Vol. VII.

Some of the more important Jaina writers on logic are—Akalaṅkadeva (about 750 A. D.), who is called *sakala-tārkika-cakra-cūḍāmaṇi*, Māṇikyanandī, the author of the *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*. It is divided into six sections and has been commented upon by Anantavīrya, called *Prameyaratnamālā*, or *Parīkṣāmukhalaghuvṛtti* or *Parīkṣāmukhapañcikā*. Māṇikyanandin is said to have flourished in about 800 A. D. It is said that Māṇikyanandī based his sūtra work on Akalaṅkadeva's work. So says Anantavīrya in the beginning of his commentary—

akalaṅkavaco'mbhodheruddadhre yena dhīmatā /
nyāyavidyāmṛtaṁ tasmai namo māṇikyanandine //

Again, at the end also he says—

akalaṅkaśaśāṅkairyatprakaṭīkṛtamakhilamānanibhanikaram
tatsaṅksiptam sūribhirurumatibhirvyaktametena //

Further, the same idea is found in another verse at the end—

tasyoparodhavasato viśadorukīrter—
māṇikyanandīkṛtaśāstramagādhabodham /
spaṣṭīkṛtam katipayairvacanairudārair—
bālaprabodhakarametadanantavīryaiḥ //

Pramāṇa explained

Anantavīrya explains the term *Pramāṇa* by saying that it is a *jñāna* which ascertains the nature of what is uncertain to one's self. It is capable of acquiring the desired object and also of throwing aside the undesired object[1]. This *jñāna* is expressed in the form—

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[1] PP. 9-10

ghaṭamahamātmanā vedmi (I know the jar by myself), which consists of four factors, namely, a subject, an object, an act and an instrument. *Pramāṇa* illumines both the knower as well as the thing known like a lamp.[1]

The validity of a *Pramāṇa* is both *Parataḥ* and *svataḥ*. In case of the knowledge of an object for the first time, it is *parataḥ* (through an agency different from itself), while in cases of repetition it is *svataḥ* (through the same agency which makes the object known)[2].

The Jainas refer only to broad divisions of *Pramāṇa*, namely, *Pratyakṣa* and *itara*, that is, *Parokṣa*, not known directly through sense-oragans. *Pratyaksa* is that knowledge which is not impeded by another knowledge (Viśadampratyaksam, pratītyantarāvyavadhānena viśesavattayā vā pratibhāsamānām vaiśadyam)[3]. This *Pratyakṣa* is of two kinds, *Mukhya and Sāṁvyavahārika*. The former is the same as the *Pāramārthika*. For the rest vide *History of Indian Philosophy*.[4]

Towards the end of the 10th century A. D. there flourished a very good Tārkika, named Sarvadeva, who wrote his *Pramāṇamañjarī*. The book has been published in the *Rajasthana Purātana Granthamālā Series* and has been very well edited by Vidyāvācaspati Śrī Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī. It is really a work of Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, so it will be noticed in the next volume. It will be enough to say at present that the book deals more with the seven categories than with logic proper. It is something like the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annam Bhaṭṭa in an improved form. It has been commented upon by three great scholars, namely, Advayāraṇya, Vāmana Bhaṭṭa and Balabhadra Miśra, in order of their chronology.[5]

In about 1000 A. D. there flourished Abhayadeva Sūri who wrote his *Vādamahārṇava*, wherein he has shown his great skill in Vāda, Jalpa etc. He also commented upon the *Sammatitarkasūtra*. About the same period there flourished another logician Kalyāṇacandra who commented upon the *Pramāṇavārttika* of *Dharmakīrti*. There were many more logicians amongst the Jaina scholars, but they did not add any substantial contribution to logic. They were more or less commentators.

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[1] *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, I. 8-12

[2] *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, I. 13

[3] *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, II. 3-4

[4] Vol. I, PP. 279-295

[5] *Vide* Pattabhirāma śāstri's *Introduction*, P. 6.

In modern period Dr. Jitendra Jetli in his Introduction to the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa mentions some more works by Jaina writers which I consider worth mentioning at this place.

Naracandrasūri has written a small *Ṭippaṇa* on the *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. It is written in about 2500 verses only. Rājaśekharasūri, the well-known author of the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, has written a *Pañjikā* (a particular type of commentary) on the *Nyāyakandalī*. The manuscript of this work was preserved in some Jaina Bhaṇḍāra as noticed by Dr. Peterson in his Report, but it is not traced to day. Another Jaina logician Śubhavijayagaṇi has commented upon the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra. Gunaratnasūri has commented upon the *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā* of Govardhana Miśra on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra. It is a big commentary influenced by Navyanyāya. Jinavardhanācārya has commented upon the *Saptapadārthī* of Śivāditya Miśra. It is called *Jinavardhanī*. Siddhicandragaṇi has written a commentary on the *Saptapadārthī*, on the *Nyāya-siddhāntamañjarī* of Cūḍāmaṇi Bhaṭṭācārya and also a small note on the *Maṅgalavāda*. Kṣamākalyāṇa was another reputed Jaina logician of the 19th century. He had studied under Ratnasomajī and Rāmavijayājī. He died in 1872 Vikrama era. He has written many works. A commentary on the *Tarkadīpikā* of Annambhaṭṭa has been published by the *Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute* and edited by Dr. Jitendra Jetli of Ahmedabad. It is a very elaborate commentary and explains all the difficult lines of the *Dīpikā* in easy language. There are about seven commentaries on the *Dīpikā* of which this is the best.

BUDDHIST LOGICIANS

Besides what has been said before in the first volume, there is not much to add to the contribution of Buddhists to logic proper. In the modern period I do not find any independent contribution to logic proper by the Buddhists.

This is in brief a critical survey of the contributions of scholars to Nyāyaśāstra from various parts of the country. Though I have tried to collect material from all available sources, yet I am quite confident that the survey is quite incomplete. Hundreds of works and their authors are still hidden in dark. Our manuscripts which are the only reliable sources for this work are still unnoticed. They are being destroyed every day and efforts should be made to survey and collect them for writing a complete history of literature. They are not in safe hands and are being destroyed every day by fire, floods and white-ants. If the owners are not willing to part with them, efforts should be made to get their film-photographs or photostat copies before they are lost for ever.

III. *Doctrines of the school*

Aim of Darśana.

Having surveyed the different periods of Nyāya literature, I now proceed to deal with the doctrines mainly preached by the system. Before the doctrines are discussed, it is necessary to introduce them from the common-sense view-point which the school represents. It has already been said before that the ultimate end of Indian philosophy is to get rid of pain in all its entirety and achieve bliss for ever which can be achieved only by *ātmadarśana*. It is therefore, that all the various attempts by different schools of thought in India to achieve the end, have been made only to visualize the *ātman* from the lowest angle of vision to the highest after which alone the goal is finally realized.

The above statement presupposes that there is pain in the universe and that it has its cause both of which are to be discarded. It further assumes beforehand that both the pain and its cause are destructible through the exclusive realization of the ultimate reality, for which there are means to achieve. Again, that all this is worth attempting as it necessarily leads to final emancipation, that is, *mokṣa*, called by various other names. This very idea has been elaborated by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* when he says that the *highest good* is attained when one has fully realized the real nature of that (1) which is fit to be discarded (*heyaṁ*), that is, pain along with its cause, namely, ignorance, desire, merit, or demerit all leading to pain; (2) that which is absolutely destructive of pain (*hānaṁ*), that is, true knowledge; (3) the means of its destruction (*tasyopāyaḥ*), that is, the scientific treatises; and (4) the end to be achieved (*adhigantavyaḥ*), that is, *mokṣa*[1]. This very idea has been repeated in the very beginning of the fourth chapter both by the authors of the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya*.[2]

Means to achieve the ultimate reality.

This is again, not only the opinion of this system, but the same has been expressed by the Buddha in his *Four Noble Truths*, namely, *Dukkha*, *Dukkhasamudaya*, *Dukkhanirodha* and the *Dukkhanirodhagāminīpratipada*. So has been said also in the *Āyurveda* which mentions the following four heads under which permanent cure of disease is possible, namely, disease (*roga*), its cause (*nidāna* or *rogahetu*), remedy of diseases (*hānanivrtti*) and means to achieve the end.[3] So has been said in the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra*.[4]

yathā cikitsā-śāstraṁ caturvyūham—rogaḥ, rogahetuḥ, ārogyam, bhaiṣajyam iti evamidamapi śāstram caturvyūahameva, tadyathā—saṁsāraḥ, saṁsārahetuḥ, mokṣaḥ, mokṣopāyaḥ iti/ tatra duḥkhabahulaḥ saṁsāro heyaḥ pradhānapuruṣayoḥ saṁyogo heyahetuḥ, saṁyogasyātyantikī nivṛttirhānam, hānopāyaḥ samygdarśanam.

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[1] *Nyāya*-Bhāṣya, I. i. 1.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, IV. i. 1;

Umesha Mishra, *History of Indian Philosophy*. V1 the pp. 343-45.

[3] Hemaraja Sharma—Introduction to *Kāśyapa-S*

[4] II, 15.

Translation—Just as the medical science has four sections, namely, disease, cause of disease, cure and medicine, so also has this science (of *yoga* philosophy) its four aspects, namely, *saṁsāra*, cause of *saṁsāra*,
its four aspects, namely, *saṁsāra*, cause of *saṁsāra*,
emancipation, and means of emancipation. Out of these, the *saṁsāra* is full of miseries and hence, it is to be discarded, the cause of this discarding is the contact of *Pradhāna* and *Puruṣa*, the discarding is the absolute cessation of this contact, and the means to this discarding is the right-perception(*samyagdarśana*).

From the above, it is clear that all the streams of philosophical thought of India move towards the same end and in the same manner.

Ātman is the ultimate reality.

It is also obvious from the same that true knowledge of the *ultimate reality* alone will lead to the desired end, and this *ultimate reality* is the *Ātman*. This is to be realized or visualized (*darśana*) directly. Gotama has therefore, devised means to achieve the end. So he has divided the entire universe into two types of reality—*Sat* (positive) and *asat* (negative). It has to be kept in mind that Vātsyāyana does believe in *asat* or *abhāva* as an independent reality, like the *sat*. He explains these two terms as something which *is*, that is, *exists* and is apprehended as such, and not otherwise. Similarly, that which is *non-existent* and is apprehended as such, and not otherwise, is also a reality though of negative nature. Thus, there are two kinds of reality *sat* and *asat*.[1] Moreover, in order to have a complete (*akhaṇḍa* or *Pūrṇa*) picture of anything, worldly or non-worldly, it is very necessary that both the aspects, positive and negative, are brought into light. So, though Gotama does not seem to have included in this treatise the other side, yet he has, as interpreted by Vātsyāyana, made us aware of both aspects, *sat* and *asat* which is as much real as ormer. The former is divided into sixteen categories, true knowledge of which brings the *highest good.* These sixteen categories are :

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[1] *ūtra* bhāṣya, I. 1. 1.

Scope of Nyāya

Pramāṇa (means of right knowledge), *prameya* (knowables), *saṁśaya* (doubt), *prayojana* (motive), *drsṭānta* (example), *siddhānta* (conclusion), *avayava* (factors of syllogism), *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning), *nirṇaya* (demonstrated truth), *vāda* (discussion), *jalpa* (disputation), *vitaṇḍā* (wrangling), *hetvābhāsa* (fallacious arguments), *chala* (casuistry), *jāti* (futile rejoinder), and *nigrahasthāna* (clinchers).[2]

Gradual steps leading to the realization of the *ultimate end*

But it must be kept in mind that correct knowledge of all these sixteen categories are exclusively required to have the correct knowledge of the *Ātman* which is the only object of knowledge (*prameya*) whose visualization (*ātmadarśana*) leads an enquirer to the realization of the highest aim of philosophy, life and religion. At the same time it is also to be understood that correct knowledge of all the above mentioned sixteen categories, in all its details, leads to the removal of wrong cognitions, or perverse knowledge, such as, identity of the Ātman with physical organism, sense-organs, vital-airs, *manas*, or *buddhi*, etc., or thinking non-eternal objects as eternal objects and so on. This will be followed by the removal of the defects (*doṣa*), such as, attachment, aversion and illusion which lead to meritorious or demeritorious deeds. This again, will make one free from activities (*pravṛtti*) which lead to *saṁsāra*. Then there will be no further birth and death and ultimately, the enquirer will be totally free from pain for ever. All these various steps represent stages falling between realization of the correct knowledge of the sixteen categories and the achievement of the highest end of life and philosophy,[2] that is, the *Ātmadarśana*. So says Vātsyāyana that in the present context of the

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, I. 1. 1.

[2] *Nyāysūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 2.

adhyātmavidyā, the knowledge of the reality, means the knowledge of the *Ātman*, that is, *Ātmadarśana*.[1]

Now, the next point is : after all, what was the necessity to mention the last fourteen categories separately when all these can easily be included under the first or the second categories, namely, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* alone ? The Bhāṣyakāra himself apprehendeds this very question and so he says—

Place of categories like doubt etc in the system.

"The mention of *doubt* (*saṁśaya*) and the rest apart by themselves is superfluous; because, all these, being included either among the means of congnition or among the knowables, cannot be regarded as different from these. To this objection the answer has been given that even then these are separately mentioned simply to distinguish the scope of the *Science of Reasoning* from that of other systems. It, therefore, becomes quite clear that the last fourteen categories mentioned above are the specific topics dealt with exclusively in this system alone[1].

With these few general remarks, I now proceed to deal briefly with each and every category which forms the special features of the Nyāya system.

1. PRAMĀṆA

No doubt, the ultimate end of Philosophy is to visualize the *Ātman*, which is possible only when it has been defined and thoroughly examined and verified with the help of the last fourteen categories, which again, is possible only through the means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The knowledge of the reality, or knowables depends upon the means of right knowledge; so it is necessary to deal with *pramāṇa* first. Hence, the sūtrakāra also has mentioned it first amongst the knowables which circumscribe the scope of the stage represented by Nyāya system.[2]

Gotama has not defined *Pramāṇa* separately. He

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[1] iha tvadhyātmavidyāyāṁ ātmādijñānaṁ tattvajñānam—*Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

Pramāṇa defined and classified.

has only classified it into three divisions.[1] Vātsyāyana, however, says that *Pramāṇa* is that which leads the knower (*pramātā*) to the cognition of the objects (*artha-pratipattiḥ*).[2] It is through the means of right-knowledge that verification of definitions of the object (*artha*) is done and the object is correctly known. It is again, because of this that the validity and the effectiveness of the *Pramāṇa* are established. The Bhāṣyakāra supports the above statement by saying that without *Pramāṇa* there can be no cognition of the objects and unless the objects are fully and correctly cognized, the validity and the effectiveness of the *Pramāṇa* cannot be established. He further says that a knower can desire to have an object or show hatred towards it, only when he has acquired the correct knowledge of those objects. He also says that the existence of a knower (*pramātā*), knowables (*prameya*) and the knowledge (*pramiti*) itself all depend upon the effectiveness of the *Pramāṇa*. But all the four, namely, *pramātā*, *prameya*, *pramiti* and *pramāṇa* are equally essential for acquiring correct knowledge of an object (*artha*). Of these again, *pramāṇa* is the most important factor. It brings into light both, things present and also absent, simultaneously. So says Vātsyāyana—tadevam sataḥ prakāśakaṁ pramāṇam asadapi prakāśayati.[3] It is because of the superiority of the *pramāṇa*, that it can function even independently in cognizing negation.[4] In this very connection, it has to be noted that the *vigraha* of the term *pramāṇa*, *pramīyate anena*, itself necessarily implies the existence of knowable, knower, knowledge and the means of knowledge. Hence, that is why the superiority of *pramāṇa* is established.

The term *Pramāṇa* is split up as *pramāyāḥ karaṇam*, or *pramīyate anena*. From what has been said above the former meaning does not apparently and directly seem to indicate the superiority of the *pramāṇa*. So

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[4] *vide*, tatra svatantreṇa asadbhedā na prakāśante iti nocyante-*Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 1.

Meaning of *Pramā.*

the latter is preferable for the purpose. The former needs some illucidation. It has two terms *pramā* and *karaṇa*. By the former, Vātsyāyana means 'the apprehending of the object', which is called right knowledge (yat arthavijñānaṁ sā pramitiḥ).[1] Gaṅgeśa defines it as the right knowledge of a thing as it exists, or right knowledge of a thing in the manner it exists (yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā, tadvati tatprakārakānubhavo vā). Further, he makes it clear by defining *apramā*, as—knowledge of a thing as it is not, or knowledge of a thing in the manner it is non-existent (yatra yannāsti tatra tasya jñānaṁ, tadabhāvavati tatprakārakajñānaṁ vā).[2] Others have explained it as right knowledge or direct apprehension not derived through memory (yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā).[3] Bhāsarvajña has also defined it in the same manner as samyaganubhavaḥ pramā.[4] So all the authorities mean by *pramā*, correct and direct experience. It does not depend upon anything else for its apprehension.

Karana explained.

Next, we come to the term *karana*. Pāṇini has defined it as *Sādhakatamam karaṇam*.[5] That is, a *karaṇa* is the most efficient cause to accomplish a certain end. In other words, a *karaṇa* is that the presence of which necessitates the action (yasmin sati kriyā bhavatyeva). Summing up the two, it comes to mean that a *pramāṇa* is that which leads necessarily to the accomplishment of a certain action. In any case, it is a *kāraṇa*. So Vātsyāyana has said it is that by the instrumentality of which things are rightly cognized.[6]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[2] *Tattvacintāmani*, Pratyakṣa, pramālaksaṇasiddhānta, P. 401, Bibliotheca Indica Series edition.

[3] *Tārkikarakṣā*, PP. 6, 8, Pandit edition; *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 8, Paranjape's edition; *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* of Jānakīnātha, P. 10, Benares edition.

[4] *Nyāyasāra*, Trivandrum edition P. 9.

[5] *Pāṇinisūtra*, I. iv. 42.

[6] *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 3. For the theory of Causality, see the author's—*Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, Chapter VI. It is needless to repeat it here.

Jayanta explains pramāna.

Jayanta explains *Pramāṇa* as a *sāmagrī* (totality of cause-kāraṇsamudāyaḥ), as sense-organ-contact etc. represent the *sāmagrī* in pratyakṣa of the nature of *bodha* (understanding) and *abodha* (ignorance), which is its *svarūpa* (nature), and that *sāmagrī* should lead to the cognition (*upalabdhi*) of the object which is not contrary (*avyabhicārinī*) to the reality and also which is free from doubts, which gives the real definition of a *Pramāṇa*—

avyabhicārinīmasandigdhāmarthopalabdhiṁ vidadhati bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam, bodhābodhasvabhāvā hi tasva svarūpam avyabhicārādiviśesanārthopalabdhisādhanatvaṁ laksanam[1].

By *bodhasvabhāva*, he seems to mean that while a *pramāṇa* leads to the knowledge of an object, it also brings into light the absence or negation (that is, *abodha*) of something else. It was perhaps due to this nature of the *pramāṇa* that the Bhāṣyakāra has said—sataḥ prakāśakaṁ indriyam asadapi prakāśayati. Jayanta has also said the same thing—bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇamityuktam. That the term *pramāṇa* denotes *karaṇa* is clear in the expressions, *pramīyate anena*, *anumīyate anena*, *upamīyate anena and śabdyate anena*.[3]

Use of *Pramāna* restrictive as well as overlapping.

As to the question whether the *pramāṇas* are restrictive in their use or have their objectives in common, it may be said that both are possible. For instance, we find that the cognition of *Ātman* is realized through Āgama (Śabda-pramāṇa) and also through inference (anumāna), and according to some even through direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), while in the case of the performance of *Agnihotra* to achieve heaven (*svarga*), there is only one *pramāṇa* and that is, the Āgama, and no other *pramāna*.[4]

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 12, Vizianagram sanskrit series edition.

[2] *Nyāyamañjarī*. P. 15.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 3.

[4] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 3.

Divisions of *pramāṇa.*

It is a well-known fact that the number of *pramāṇas* accepted in a system depends upon the nature of the knowables (*prameyas*) accepted by that system. *Pramāṇas* are meant to cognize the knowables. If a *prameya* is such as can be known through only one *pramāṇa*, there is no need of believing in more than one and so on. So has been said—*mānādhīnā meyasiddhiḥ*, or *prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāt.* The Nyāyaśāstra has sixteen categories already enumerated and twelve *prameyas*, namely, *Ātman*, physical organism, sense-organs and their *artha*, namely, *gandha* (smell), *rasa* (taste), *rūpa* (colour), *sparśa* (touch), and *śabda* (sound),) intelligence (*buddhi*), action (*pravṛtti*), defect (*doṣa*), existence after death (*pretyabhāva*), fruition, pain, and final emancipation (*apavarga*)[1].

Ātman is the main *prameya.*

It has to be pointed out that of these twelve *prameyas*, the ultimate object to be realized is the *Ātman* alone, so it is, in its own form, *upādeya*[2]. The *apavarga* is also *upādeya*[3] and the rest *śarīra* etc. are *heyas*. *Apavarga* is also meant for the *Ātman*. It has no independent importance. Hence, *Ātman* is the only most important *prameya* (apavargasyātmārthatvena prameyesu Ātmanaḥ prādhānyāt)[4]. All the rest are to be known simply because they are closely associated with *Ātman*, or helpful to realize its nature.

From the Nyāya stand-point, this *Ātman* and all its associates representing the *prameyas* in Nyāyadarśana are to be realized through four *pramāṇas*, namely, *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *upamāna* and *Śabda*. So they believe in four means of right cognition only.

Pure Ātman is identified with *Apavarga.*

Jayanta makes it clear by saying that *Ātman* and *Apavarga* are *upādeyas*, while other *prameyas* beginning with physical organism (*śarīra*) and ending with *duḥkha* (pain) in the *Nyāyasūtra*[5] are *heyas*. Even *Ātman*, which is of the nature of pleasure, pain and has *bhoktṛtva*, is *heya*, but that which is free from all these is *upādeya*. He also further makes it clear that the *Ātman* which is free from *sukha*, *duḥkha* etc., is identical with *apavarga* (*etadviyuktastvātmaiva apavarga ucyate*).[1] Hence, the only *prameya*, really speaking, even in Nyāya, is the *Ātman*. Even then *apavarga* has been separately mentioned simply to emphasise that it is also worth realizing—sa ca upādeyatayā bhāvanīya ityata evātmapadasaṅgṛhītasyāpyasya punarnirdeśaḥ.[2]

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 9.

[2] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, on I. i. 9.

[3] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 9.

[4] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 10.

[5] I. i. 9.

Cognition of other *Prameyas* essential.

This being so, the last eleven *prameyas* are also to be thoroughly known; as without their correct knowledge *Ātman* cannot be known. Hence, means of right cognition are required to know these *prameyas* independently. Such means of right cognition are four. With the help of these four *pramāṇas* all the twelve *prameyas* are cognized. *Ātman* is cognized by *Pratyakṣa* according to some through yogic process. (*pratyakṣaṁ*—yuñjānasya yogasamādhijamātmamanasoḥ saṁyogaviśeṣādātmā pratyakṣa it.[3]

But all cannot have a direct perception of it, so one has to either depend upon *Āgama* or *śabda*, or he has to realize it through inference. *Apavarga* is also to be conceived through *Āgama*. The rest of the *prameyas* are realized either through *pratyakṣa*, or inference; and some, for knowing the similarity between two or more things, have to take help of analogy (*upamāna*). Thus, all the twelve *prameyas* are known through the four *pramāṇas* alone and there is no need of believing in any more *pramāṇa* for acquiring knowledge of the *prameyas* according to Nyāya.

Some however, do not accept *upamāna* as an independent means of right cognition. They include

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 428.

[2] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 428.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 3.

Upamāna not accepted by some

it partly in *pratyakṣa* and partly in *vyatireki* type of inference. Thus, they hold only three *pramāṇas* even according to Nyāya.[1] It may be reminded that Nyāya being an up-holder of common-sense view needs all the four *pramāṇas*.[2]

(i) *Prātyakṣam*

Pratyakṣa explained.

Of these, *Pratyaksa* is the most important pramāṇa. It has been defined as—

—*indriyārthasannikarsotpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyaksam.*[3]

Translation—That is, direct sense-perception is that cognition which is produced by sense-organ and object contact, is not expressible by words (*avyapadeśyam*), is without any instance to the contrary (*avyabhicārī*) and is decisive (*vyavasāyātmakam*).

There are four points in this definition to be noted. (1) Sense-organ and object-contact (*indriya-artha-sannikarṣa*), (2) *avyapadeśyam*, (3) *avyabhicāri* and (4) *vyavasāyātmakam*. The *Bhāṣya* explains the first point as—*akṣasya akṣasya prativiṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*. That is, the *vṛtti* of each sense-organ upon its respective object is called *direct perception*. By *vṛtti*, Bhāsyakāra means contact (*sannikarṣa*) as well as *jñāna*. (*vṛttistu sannikarṣo jñānaṁ vā*. Here, the word *vā* does not mean *vikalpa* (optional), but it means *samuccaya* (conjoined).[4] Uddyotakara says—some consider contact alone as *pratyakṣa*, but this is not correct, as there is no proof that *sannikarṣa* alone is the *pramāṇa*. Both *sannikarṣa* (contact) and *jñāna* are *pramāṇa*—

kecittu sannikarṣameva pratyakṣam varṇayanti, na tannyāyyam, pramāṇābhāvāt, sannikarṣa eva pramāṇamiti na pramāṇamasti / ubhayantu yuktam / ubhayaṁ paricchedakaṁ sannikarṣo jñānañca.[5]

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[1] *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 56.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 3.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 4.

[4] *Kiraṇāvalī*, P. 288 Vindhyeśvarī Prasad Dvivedi edition.

[5] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 3.

Thus, the whole thing comes to mean—akṣasya akṣasya prativiṣayaṁ *sannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣam* and akṣasya akṣasya prativiṣayaṁ *jñānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ*. So the contact of the sense-organ with its respective object and the knowledge produced about that object out of that contact, both are regarded as *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. In other words, when contact alone is the *vṛtti* or *vyāpāra*, it is *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, then again, there is the resulant *jñāna*, produced out of the contact, in the form of indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*), or determinate (savikalpaka) knowledge which is also the *pratyakṣapramāṇa*. And when the *vṛtti*, that is, *jñāna*, is the *pratykṣa-pramāṇa*, then *hāna* (to set aside the object not desired), or *upādāna* (to accept the object desired), or *upekṣā buddhi* (indifference) is the resultant. It is also clear from this that according to the Bhāsyakāra, *pratyakṣa-jñāna* includes both *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*, of course, there is difference of time in their apprehension, one leading to the other.

Gotama has said that the *pratyakṣa*, thus produced, should not be expressible through words(*avyapadeśyam*). That is, according to Nyāya, whenever there is any *jñāna*, it is invariably associated with the object of that *jñāna* (viṣaya).[1]

Vācaspati quotes Bhartṛhari in its support—
na s'osti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte /
anuviddhamiva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāṣyate//

Translation—There is no cognition in this *loka*, which is dissociated with words. Every cognition is expressed through words as if the cognition is intermixed with a word (denoting the object of that cognition.)

So there is always a possibility that, because of the close relation of *artha* (object) and its *jñāna*, the *pratyakṣa-jñāna* may be taken to be indentical with *śābda-jñāna* and then pratyakṣa in its true sense may have no separate place. In order to avoid this confusion due to *ativyāpti*, Gotama wants to restrict the *Pratyakṣajñāna* to the jñāna itself and separates it from

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[1] *Vākyapadīya*, I, 124.

The process involved in a case of *pratyakṣa* may thus be explained—

Process of Pratyakṣajñāna.

It is to be kept in mind that according to Nyāya, *Ātman* is the only *dravya* (substance) which is the seat of knowledge. All cognitions are produced in that substratum alone. So when the visual sense-organ comes in contact with *rūpa* or *rūpavat*, either by sending its own rays to the object of perception, or by coming in contact with the objects' rays received by the organ in its own place, sense-organs being *prāpyakārī*, the impression (*saṁskāra*) of the object is carried through the sense-organ to *manas*, which, in its turn, comes in fresh contact with the *Ātman*[1] where the knowledge about that object of perception is produced and then it is expressed in the form—*ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi* (I know a *ghaṭa*).

Types of contact.

As regards the sense-organ and object-contact, (*sannikarṣa*), it is of two kinds, namely, ordinary (*laukika*) and extraordinary (*alaukika*). The former again, is of two types : *saṁyoga* (ordinary contact) and *samavāya* (inherence). A mere contact between two substances (*dravyas*) is called *saṁyoga* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. *Samavāya*, on the other hand, is defined as the conjunction between two *ayutasiddhas*.

Samavāya and Ayutasiddhas explained.

Ayutasiddhas are such pairs of object, between which the condition is that one, if in existence, must have the other as its substratum; so has been said—

tāvevāyutasiddhau dvau vijñātavyau yayordvayoḥ /
anaśyadekamaparāśritamevāvatiṣṭhate //[2]

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[1] Umesha Mishra, *Conception of Matter*, P. 149.

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 15.

Thus, these pairs, namely, part and whole (*avayava-avayavin*), quality and qualified (*guṇa-guṇin*), action and that which has action (*kriyā-kriyāvān*), genus and individuals (*jāti-vyakti*), specific attribute and ultimate eternal substances (*viśeṣa-nityadravya*), are *ayutasiddhas* and *avayavin*, *guṇa*, *kriyā*, *jāti* and *viśeṣa* must exist, if they exist at all, in their counterparts respectively. Relation between such pairs is called *samavāya* (inherence). In case, *avayava*, *guṇin*, *kriyāvān* and *vyakti* are destroyed, their counterpart will have to exist without any substratum. As for example, a cloth has to remain without any substratum logically, if the threads (substratum of the cloth) are destroyed, at least for a moment. The secret of this is that there exists causal relation between such pairs and the effect will be destroyed only when the cause is destroyed. So the moment the cause is destroyed, the effect will have to wait for one more moment at least to be destroyed after. This kind of relation between such pairs is inseparable, in a way, during their existence.[1]

Types of contact.

Again, for the purpose of cognizing objects through *pratyakṣa*, it is necessary that there must be some sort of contact between the sense-organ and the object of perception. Naiyāyikas have accepted six kinds of contact, namely, (1) *saṁyoga*, ordinary contact between two substances, as between a stick and a drum; (2) *saṁyukta-samavāya*, in case of the cognition of the colour of a jar, for instance, the eyes have first contact with the jar (saṁyoga) and then with its *rūpa*, as expressed in *rūpam paśyāmi*, which exists in the jar through inherence (*samavāya*). So the contact between the sense-organ and the colour of the jar through the jar, is called *saṁyukta-samavāya*. According to the Naiyāyikas, *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman* have *jāti* (genus), like *dravyatva*, *guṇatva* and *karmatva*. This *jāti* is also preceived through the same sense-organ by which the particular object, wherein that *jāti* exists, is perceived. Thus, in the above case, the eyes perceive *rūpatva* as well along with the *rūpa*. So the contact between the eyes and the *jāti-rūpatva* is cognized through contact (between eyes, a substance and the jar, a substance), then *rūpa* (*guṇa*, inhering in the *guṇin*, jar) through inherence (*samavāya*) and then with *rūpatva* which inheres in the *rūpa* through *samavāya*. Thus, the eyes come to cognize the *ghaṭarūpatva* (*jāti* is denoted by a symbol-*tva*) through the relation called (3) *Saṁyukta—Samaveta—Samavāya*.

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[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 15-17, Pandit edition.

Sound is cognized through ears (as expressed in *śabdaṁ śṛṇomi*). So, the auditory sense-organ, that is, ears, comes in contact with sound. According to Nyāya, *śabda* is a quality of *Ākāśa* and as such, there exists *samavāya* relation between the two (*guṇa* and *guṇin*); auditory sense-organ being the same as Ākāśa, limited within the ear-cavity, is therefore, the *guṇin*. Hence, the contact between sound and the auditory-organ is called (4) *samavāya*. Sound has attributes of lowness, loudness etc. The auditory-sense-organ along with the sound also cognizes its attributes. So there must be some relation between the auditory sense-organ and the attributes of sound which are in relation of inherence with the sound. Thus, the auditory-organ cognizes the attributes of sound through the relation of (5) *samavāya-samavāya*, that is, *samaveta-samavāya*, in polished logical terminology.

The Naiyāyikas hold that negation is also cognized through *pratyakṣa*. As such, there must be some type of contact between the sense-organ and the negation (*abhāva*) of a particular object. The relations of *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* do not help us in this case. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas have coined a special type of relation, called (6) *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*, through which a sense-organ cognizes a particular negation, say the absence of a pot on a particular place, as expressed in *iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*. Now, there must be some contact between the negation of the pot and the visual sense-organ, for instance. The process is—the visual sense-organ is in contact with the particular place where the negation of pot exists, through the relation of *saṁyoga*, while the negation of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva*) is the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of that is cognized through contact (between eyes, a substance and the jar, a substance), then *rūpa* (*guṇa*, inhering in the *guṇin*, jar) through inherence (*samavāya*) and then with *rūpatva* which inheres in the *rūpa* through *samavāya*. Thus, the eyes come to cognize the *ghaṭarūpatva* (*jāti* is denoted by a symbol-*tva*) through the relation called (3) *Saṁyukta—Samaveta—Samavāya*.

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The Naiyāyikas hold that negation is also cognized through *pratyakṣa*. As such, there must be some type of contact between the sense-organ and the negation (*abhāva*) of a particular object. The relations of *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* do not help us in this case. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas have coined a special type of relation, called (6) *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*, through which a sense-organ cognizes a particular negation, say the absence of a pot on a particular place, as expressed in *iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*. Now, there must be some contact between the negation of the pot and the visual sense-organ, for instance. The process is—the visual sense-organ is in contact with the particular place where the negation of pot exists, through the relation of *saṁyoga*, while the negation of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva*) is the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of that *vyavasāyātmakaṁ* has been added to the definition. Vācaspati holds that by the use of the term *Vyavasāyātmakaṁ*, the Sūtrakāra did mean *savikalpaka-jñāna* also. —vyavasāyātmakapadam sākṣāt savikalpakasya vācakaṁ, tathā hi-vyavasāyo viniścayo vikalpa ityanarthāntaram[1].

Types of direct perception.

It is to be kept in mind that the term—*prati-akṣam, akṣam akṣam prati vartate iti pratyakṣam*, indicates that it has been used only for visual sense-organ, as ordinarily the term *akṣa* (derived from *akṣū-vyāptau*, that which pervades) is primarily used for visual sense-organ alone and in the secondary sense, it is used for all the *indriyāṇi*. It is therefore, that though through the tactile sense-organ (*tvagindriya*) there can be direct perception of air, yet it is through *anumāna* that the existence of air is proved. Hence, Vaiśesikas do not believe in five types of *pratyakṣa*.[2] But Gotama does not agree to this view[3] Vātsyāyana uses the term *indriya*, meaning—Svaviṣayagrahaṇalakṣaṇāni, that is, apprehenders of their respective objects, equally applicable to all the five sense-organs. Hence, there are as many types of *pratyakṣa* as there are sense-organs. Subsequently, *manas*, also produces direct apprehension of *sukha, duḥkha* etc. Hence, it is also a sense-organ. So there are six types of direct perception, namely, *cākṣuṣa* (visual), *śrāvaṇa* (auditory), *tvāca* (tactile), *ghrāṇaja* (through the sense-organ of smelling), *rāsana* (through the sense-organ of taste) and *mānasa* (mental).

Alaukika sannikarṣa sāmānyalakṣaṇā -pratyāsatti.

Beside these six types of ordinary contact, the Naiyāyikas believe in three extraordinary types of contact in a *pratyakṣa-jñāna*, called *alaukika-sannikarṣa*. These are *sāmānyalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti, jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti* and *yogaja*. The first means—*sāmānyaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ svarūpaṁ yasya*, that is, that which has *sāmānya* (genus) as its *svarūpa*. In other words, *sāmānya* itself is the *pratyāsatti* (contact).[1] Here, in case of such direct perceptions, the connecting link is supplied by the genus (*sāmānya*). So when a person perceives a jar, for instance, his visual organ comes in contact with the *ghaṭa* as a *viśeṣyaka* which has the *sāmānya-ghaṭatva* (jarness), as its *prakāra* (adjective) and as the *ghaṭatva* is eternal and only one, the same being present in every *ghaṭa*, past, present and future, and as wherever there is a *ghaṭa*, it does possess *ghaṭatva* which had been perceived by the person, so he comes to perceive all the *ghaṭas*, past, present and future, through the same link of *ghaṭatva-sāmānya* Thus, his knowledge is *ghaṭatva-prakāraka-ghaṭa-viśeṣyaka*. The result is that even in the absence of a *ghaṭa*, he has the knowledge of *ghaṭa*. In the absence of such a contact, smoke is pervaded or caused by fire cannot be explained. This is called an extra-ordinary type of contact.

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[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 133, Chowkhamba edition.

[2] Umesha Mishra, *Conception of Matter*, p. 40.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 12.

It is to be added here that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi did not believe in *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti*. Perhaps this was the reason why his *guru* Paksadhara Miśra had to say—

> Vaksojapānakṛt kāṇa saṁśaye jāgrati sphuṭam /
> Sāmānyalakṣaṇā kasmādakasmādavalupyate //

Jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti.

In the case of *jñānalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti*, the connecting link is the knowledge. For instance, when a piece of rope is taken for a snake, really there does not exist any contact between the sense-organ and the snake at that moment, but that the person has the knowledge of a snake cannot be doubted. Again, a person has the knowledge that there is good and sweet smell in sandle-wood. So when he happens to see or even remember sandle-wood, he comes to realize the knowledge of sweet smell of the sandle-wood, though there was apparantly no contact between the sense-organ and the smell at that time. Similarly, all the cases of wrong notion in direct perception are classed under *jñānalakṣaṇā*[2].

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[1] *Dīdhiti*, as quoted by the *Nyāyakośa*, P. 934; *Muktāvalī*, under verse 63.

[2] *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Muktāvalī*, verse 65.

Yogaja.

Coming to the last type, *yogaja*, that which is produced through yogic powers, we find there are two varieties of it, *yukta* and *yuñjāna*. When a yogin perceives anything which is not in contact with his sense-organ through his advanced yogic powers, it is called *yukta* type of *vogaja-pratyakṣa*. When a yogin perceives a thing after concentrating his mind, it is known as *yuñjāna-sannikarṣa*.

(2) *Anumānam*

The next *pramāṇa* is Inference. It has been defined by Gotama as—

Anumāna

> *Atha tatpūrvakaṁ trividhamanumānaṁ*
> *pūrvavat Śeṣavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca*[1].

That is, after having defined the *Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, Inference is being defined as a knowledge which is preceded by *Pratyakṣa*. Uddyotakara explains the term *tatpūrvakaṁ* as *tāni te tat pūrvaṁ yasya tadidaṁ*[2]. If we take *tāni*, then it comes to mean that inference is preceded by all the *pramāṇas*, which, he says, in continuous order (*pāramparyeṇa*) comes to *pratyakṣa* alone. If however, we take *te*, then it means that an inference is that where a *pratyakṣa* is preceded by those two *pratyakṣas*, namely, the first *pratyakṣa* is the perception of the contact of *liṅga* (*prabans*, smoke, for instance) with *liṅgī* (fire, in the kitchen, for instance), and the second is the perception of the *liṅga* (smoke) in the mountain, for instance, in the inference-fire is in the mountain, as there is smoke in it.

Process of Inference,

As to the process of inference, Uddyotakara says that after the second perception of the *liṅga*, there is the remembrance (*smaraṇa*) roused by the manifestation of the impression of the kitchen. After the remembrance (smṛti), the person desirous to know the object perceives again, the *liṅga* (smoke) in the mountain which is expressed in the form-here is smoke (*ayaṁ dhūmaḥ*); and then, he comes to the inferential knowledge that there is fire in the mountain. The last, that is, the third perception of the *liṅga* (smoke), being led up to by the previous two *pratyakṣas* and the subsequent remembrance, is called *Parāmarśa*, which is called the *Inference itself*[1]. This is how the term *tat* is explained in plural and in dual.

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[1] I. i. 5.

[2] I.i.5.

Now, let us see what does it indicate when it is taken in singular, that is, *tat pūrvaṁ yasya*. It then means that which is preceded by only one perception. Uddyotakara explains it that in that case, we have to disregard the distinction (*bheda*) made before, between the perception of the *probans* on the one hand, and the perception of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*, on the other; and then what happens is that the *Parāmarśa* of the *probans* (the recognition of its invariable concomitance with the *probandum*, which is *Anumāna*, the means of inferential cognition) comes to represent and imply—(1) the perception of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*, (2) the subsequent perception of the *probans*, and (3) the remembrance of the relation perceived before; as it is this that is really the *tatpūrvaka*, preceded by the perception of the *probans*.[2]

Inference involves four Pramāṇas.

There is one more point to be noted that when we take the term *tat* in plural, that is, as *tāni* meaning *pramāṇāni* and when *anumāna* means that what is inferred, it shows that in the process of inference there are all the four *prmāṇāni* which have preceded the *anumāna*, that is, *anumiti*, the resultant of the process. This is also clear from the fact that the five factorred syllogism consists of all the four *pramāṇāni*.[3]

Again, it has been seen above that *tatpūrvakaṁ* includes both, *remembrance* and the perception of the *liṅga*. So the question is what is *anumāna*, the means which leads to the inferential cognition? Is it the remembrance, or the perception, or both taken together? Uddyotakara is of opinion that all the three factors mentioned above lead to *anumāna*. They are equally necessary. But of these again, *liṅga-parāmarśa* which immediately precedes the inference is the most important—

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[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 5.

[2] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 5.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 39.

yasmālliṅgaparāmarśādanantaraṁ śeṣārthapratipattiriti, tasmālliṅgaparāmarśo nyāya iti, smṛtirna pradhānam/kiṁ kāraṇaṁ ? smṛtyanantaramapratipatteh/na hi bhavati yatra dhūmamadrākṣaṁ tatrāgnimadrākṣamiti/etasyāśca smṛteranantaraṁ tasmādagniriti śeṣārthagraha iti yuktaṁ vaktum, tasmātsmṛtiranugṛhīto lingaparāmarśo'abhīṣṭārthapratipādako bhavatīti.[1]

Translation—The reason lies in the recognition of immediate sequence—As a matter of fact, we find that the inferential cognition of the *probandum* follows immediately after the *lingaparāmarśa*; and from this it naturally follows that this *parāmarśa* is what should be regarded as the means. The remembrance (of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*), on the other hand, cannot be regarded as the most predominant factor. Why? Simply because the remembrance is not immediately followed by inferential cognition; for instance, when we infer the presence of fire from smoke, it is not right to say that the conclusion embodying the cognition of the *probandum*, there is fire, follows immediately after the observer's remembrance—where I perceived smoke, I found fire. Hence, it is only right to hold that what brings about the required inferential cognition is the *liṅgaparāmarśa* as aided by the said remembrance.

Types of *Anumāna*.

Such an *anumāna* is mainly of two types—*Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna*, inference for one's own sake, that is, to convince one's own self about the existence of an object not directly visualized through sense-perception, through the perception of a *probans*, *vyāptismaraṇa* and *liṅga-parāmarśa* as mentioned above. This has been clearly explained by an illustration as follows—A person happens to see with his own eyes in kitchens and other common places smoke always accompanied by the presence of fire, by which he comes to a conclusion that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. After having thus arrived at the notion of the concomitant relation between smoke and fire, when he goes out and happens to see smoke coming out of a mountain, or any other place and perceives columns of smoke rising therefrom, his previous memory is aroused and he remembers his previous experience of the concomitant relation that wherever there is smoke there is fire and as this place also has such a smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire, he comes to a conclusion that here in this place also there is fire. This is the process of inference for *one's own sake.*

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[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 5.

Some again, who has already inferred the presence of fire from smoke and wants to make others also know it, has to follow the regular process of utilizing all the five factors involved in the process of an inference in the form of a syllogism which is as follows—

Pratijñā—Parvato'yaṁ vahnimān, (This mountain is in possession of fire),

Hetu (probans)—dhūmāt (because there is smoke),

Udāharaṇa (example)—(yo yo dhūmavān sa so vahnimān, yathā) mahānase, (wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen),

Upanaya (re-affirmation)—dhūma-vyāpya vahnimānayam parvataḥ (this mountain is in possession of smoke which is in invariable concomitant relation with fire),

Nigamana (*anumiti*—conclusion)—tasmāt parvatoyaṁ vahnimān.

Parārthānumāna represents all the four Pramāṇas

These five factors of Indian syllogism represent all the four means of cognition accepted by Naiyāyikas. Thus, the *pratijñā* represents *Āgama* (*śubd*); *hetu* is inference; *udāharaṇa* is *pratyakṣa*; and *upanaya* is analogy. In this way all the four *pramāṇas* join together to produce one common object which is expressed through the nigamana. This whole process is known as *Paramanyāya.*[1]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

Five conditions of an anumāna.

Besides, it is to be noted that this whole syllogistic process fulfils the following five conditions, namely, *pakṣadharmatva* or *pakṣe sattvam* (that is, the hetu (*probans*) should be present in the *paksa* (parvata, for instance, in the above syllogism), *sapakṣe sattvam*, that is, the *probans* should also be present in the *udāharaṇa* (example), *vipaksādvyāvṛttiḥ*, that is, the *probans* should not be present in the contrary instance, as for example, a lake, in the above syllogism; *abādhitaviṣayatvam*, that is, the presence of smoke in the parvata (*pakṣa*) should not be disproved by any stronger evidence; and *asatpratipaksatvam*, that is, which has no counter-syllogism to prove the opposite of the above syllogism.

This is the definition of *anumāna* according to *Nyāyavārttika* and others. Gaṅgeśa, however, says that *anumāna* is that which has *pratyaksa* as its *upajīvaka* (dependent upon) and is accepted by many *vādins* and is a cognition which is produced by the knowledge of *pakṣadharmatā* which is also qualified by having the invariable concomitant relation (vyāptiviśiṣṭa-Paksadharmatājñānajanyam jñānamanumitiḥ[1]).

Pakṣadharmatā explained.

So an *anumāna* has two most important factors, namely, *vyāpti* (invariable concomitant relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*) and *Pakṣadharmatā* (meaning the existence of the *probans*, which is *vyāpya* of fire, in the inference, in the *pakṣa*; or it may be said that in the inference, mountain is fiery, as it has smoke, there is the *parāmarśa* in the form—there is smoke which is *vāpya* of fire, in this mountain; here *dhūma* is the *pakṣadharmatā*).

Divisions of anumāna.

There is another division of inference into *anvaya-vyatirekī*, *kevalānvayī* and *kevalavyatirekī*. The last two have been also named *anvayī* and *vyatirekī* only respectively by Uddyotakra.[2] The first is explained as—where the concomitant relation is established with the positive example; as for instance, yatra dhūmaḥ, tatra vahniḥ, as in the *mahānasa* (kitchen). Where an inference is drawn with such positive arguments, it is called *anvayānumāna*; and if the same is proved through negative example, as yatra vahnir-nāsti, tatra dhūmo'pi nāsti, as in a lake, then this is called *vyatirekānumāna*. Thus, such an inference, where both *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are possible, is called *anvaya-vyatirekī-anumāna*. Here the *vyāpti* is established both positively and negatively. But in cases where *anvaya-vyāpti* alone is possible and no *vyatireka*, that is called *anvayī* or *kevalānvayī*. As for instance, 'śabdaḥ abhidheyaḥ, prameyatvāt, yathā ghaṭaḥ' (meaning-sound has a name, because it is an object of knowledge, as a pot); here, there is no possibility of having a negative argument like—'yatra abhidheyaṁ na, tatra prameyamapi na'. No example is available here. So, such an argument is not valid. Hence, it is called only *Kevalānvayī*. Similarly, an inference, where only negative is possible and no positive (*anvaya*), is called *kevalavyatirekī*. As for example, 'Pratyakṣādikaṁ pramāṇamiti vyavahartavyaṁ, pramākaraṇatvāt, yat pramāṇamiti na vyavahriyate tat na pramākaraṇam, yathā pratyakṣābhāsādi.' Here in this case, 'yat pramākaraṇaṁ tat pramāṇamiti vyavahartavyaṁ, yathā amukaḥ iti dṛṣṭānto nāsti,' because the entire class of *pramāṇa* has been included under the *pakṣa* and there is no *pramāna* apart from the *pakṣa* which may serve as an example. Hence, it is without any example. So it is called *Kevalavyatirekī*. Thus, there are three varieties of an inference.

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[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Anumāna, PP., 1-2 *Bibliotheca Indica* edition.

[2] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 5.

But Gotama has other divisions of inference. He divides *anumāna* into *Pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*. *Pūrvat* type of inferece is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause; as for example, when we see clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain. *Śeṣavat* type of inference is that wherein the cause is inferred from the effect; as for example, when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, and that the stream is fuller and the current swifter, we infer that there has been rain. The *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is that in which the inference is based on a general observation. As for example, we have observed in all cases of an object seen in a place different from where it was seen before, only when it has moved from one place to another; and from this fact of general observation, we infer that the sun must be moving, even though we cannot actually perceive it moving, as we find the sun in the evening in a place where it was not in the morning.

It may be observed that these three terms are very old. They are found even in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*.[1] The last variety is found in the Mīmāṁsā-*Śabarabhāṣya*[2] with a slight difference. Instead of *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, Śabara has *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-sambandha*, but there is no difference either in the meaning, or in the example.

Sāṅkhya divisions of anumāna.

Sāṅkhya, however, splits up inference into two varieties—*vīta* and *avīta* (positive—*anvaya* and negative—*vyatireka*). *Avīta* is the same as *śeṣavat*; which is the same as the *method of Residue* of the Western logic. But *vīta* is of two kinds, namely, *Pūrvavat* and *Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*.

Vācaspati Miśra's explanation.

Vācaspati Miśra explains these as—The former is that which has for its object that universal (*sāmānya*) of which a particular instance is perceived; as for instance, a particular instance of fire in the kitchen, which has *vahnitva* as its sāmānya, is *seen* (dṛṣṭa) in the kitchen. The latter is that particular instance of a *sāmānya* which is *not perceived* (adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyaviṣayam); as for instance, the inference of a sense-organ, which is not perceived (*atīndriya*) in an inference of a *karaṇa* (instrument).

Meaning of these terms not quite certain.

Again, it is to be pointed out that even Vātsyāyana was not sure of the meaning of these terms. So he says—*Pūrvavat* inference *may* be that in which out of the two things perceived together on some former occasion, the one, that is not perceived at the time of the inference, is inferred at the sight of the other. Example is the same, inference of fire from smoke. The *Śeṣavat* type may also be explained as an inference through the *method of Residue*; as for example, the inference of śabda as a *guna*. By *śeṣa* Vātsyāyana means 'remainder.' For example, as regards an object, there are certain possibilities, and out of them some possibilities are eliminated, as untenable and there being no other possibilities, when the remaining possibility is cognized in relation to the said object, it is *Śeṣa*. This cognition is said to be *śeṣavat* (prasaktaprtiṣedhe anyatrāprasaṅgāt śiṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ śeṣaḥ pariśeṣaḥ).[1] *Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* may also be interpreted, says *Vātsyāyana*, as that inference wherein the relation between the *probans* (*liṅga*) and *probandum* (*liṅgī*) being imperceptible, *probandum* is inferred from the similarity of the *probans* to something else; as for example, the inference of *ātman* through the *probans* desire (*icchā*) etc.

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[1] Kārikā 5 as interpreted by the commentators and also found in the *Ṣaṣṭhitantra*.

[2] I. i. 5.

From these various explanations it may be conjectured that these terms are very old and they seem to have lost their real significance even before Vātsyāyana. It was therefore, that Vātsyāyana could not definitely decide as to the exact sense in which these three terms have been used. So he has given alternative explanations of these three terms.

Vācaspati, while commenting on the example of the *Pariśeṣānumāna* given by Vātsyāyana, says that *idantu pariśeṣasyodāharaṇaṁ nādaraṇīyam vyatirekiṇo hi nāmāntaramidaṁ pariśeṣa iti*[2]. He means that *pariśeṣa* is only another name for the purely negative inference; while the example cited by the *Bhāṣya* is one of the positive-negative type. The example suggested is the inference of the fact that desire etc. are dependent upon the *Ātman*.

Vātsyāyana, while summing up the treatment of *anumāna*, says that the difference between direct perception and inference is that direct perception refers to things present, while inference refers to things both present and not-present (that is, past and future). As to the question why is it so? the Bhāṣyakāra says that inference refers to all the three times.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 5.

[2] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 5.

(3) *Upamānam*

The next *pramāṇa* accepted by the *Nyāya* system is *Upamāna* (analogy). It has already been said that some Naiyāyikas do not believe in *Upamāna* as a separate *Pramāṇa*. (Nyāyaikadeśinopyevaṁ)[1]. But Gotama did accept it to be an independent and separate *Pramāṇa*. So he has defined it as—

Prasiddhasādharmyātsādhyasādhanamupamānam,[2]

meaning that *Analogy* is that which proves the thing to be proved (sādhya), through the similarity to a known object. Vātsyāyana explains it as that which makes known what is to be made known, through similarity to an object that is already well-known; as for example—as the cow so the *gavaya*, that is, the animal called *gavaya* is like the cow.

Dr. Ganganatha Jha remarks here in this connection, in the foot-note of his English translation—

> "There is some difference between the *Bhāṣya* on the one hand and the *Vārttika* and the *Tātparya* on the other. As regards the object of analogical cognition and the exact form of that cognition, there is no difference; as according to both, the object is the connection of the name with the object; the form of the cognition being-this object is what is named *gavaya*. There is however a marked difference of opinion as to the means of the cognition; that it is the similarity between the two objects that is the means, on this also all are agreed; but according to the *Bhāṣya*, it is this similarity as expressed in the assertion 'the *gavaya* is like the cow',—which assertion is remembered at the time that the man sees the animal resembling the cow, while according to the *Vārttika* and the *Tātparya* it is the similarity that is actually seen when the animal is seen to resemble the cow,—this perceived similarity being aided by the remembrance of the similarity expressed in the assertion, 'the *gavaya* is like the cow'. Says the *Pariśuddhi*,—*Sādṛśyasyaiva prajñāyamānasya karaṇatvamabhipraiti*.

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[1] *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 56 Pandita edition.

[2] I. i. 6.

The *Tātparya* interprets the *Bhāṣya* passage '*yathā gauḥ tathā gavayaḥ*'[1] to mean that the similarity should be one that is already known by means of such assertions. But we find the *Bhāṣya*[2] calling this assertion itself *upamāna*.

There is no doubt, that the view of the *Vārttika* and the *Tātparya* is more logical. The latter rightly remarks that for the cognition that 'this animal is what is called *gavaya*', it is necessary that the observer should know of the assertion—'the *gavaya* is similar to the cow', and also that he should perceive the similarity to the cow in the animal concerned. If the analogical cognition had for its means only this remembered similarity, then its validity would be as doubtful as that of the remembrance itself".

Vātsyāyana while explaining this *Pramāṇa* says—by means of this analogy when a person finds similarity to the cow, then he actually perceives the object that had been referred to in the analogy; and thence he comes to cognize the connection of that object with the name mentioned in the analogy; so that it is this latter cognition that is the purpose achieved through analogy. As for instance, when the analogy, in the form —'the animal called *gavaya* is like the cow', has been put forward, and the person who has heard this, happens, subsequently, to perceive through the contact of his sense-organ, an object similar to the cow, he then realizes that the word *gavaya* is the name of this object, and comes to cognize the connection of that particular name with that particular object.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that according to old Naiyāyikas analogy is the *atideśavākya* (direction of the forester that a *gavaya* is like a cow, which expresses similarity between a well-known object, and an object not so well-known which again, is the resultant of the cognition of the relation of a name with the object having that name (saṁjñāsaṁjñipratītiphalaṁ prasiddhetarayoḥ sārūpyapratipādakaṁ atideśavākyamevopamānam). That is, a person not knowing the form of a *gavaya* and being desirous to know about it, makes an enquiry about it from a forester who is in the know of it—*what is gavaya ?* Thereupon the forester tells him—*yādṛśo gauḥ tādṛśo gavayaḥ*

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[1] II. i. 2.

[2] I. i. 4.

(*gavaya* is just like a cow). Such a statement about an object *not-known* through the similarity of a *well-known* (animal) cow, and through it he helps the enquirer know that the *not-known* animal is that which is called by the name *gavaya*. This is what is meant by *upamāna*.[1]

Utility of upamāna.

As to the query about the utility of this means of right knowledge, Jayanta points out that no doubt, through *Āgama*, which is the means to achieve emancipation, we realize the knowledge of the *Ātman*, through *Anumāna* the validity of *Āgama* is decided, and through *Pratyakṣa*, the invariable concomitant relation in an inference is established; so we should not understand that there are only three *pramāṇas* accepted by the system. There is the fourth *pramāṇa* called *Upamāna* which is useful in the performance of *dharma* (a dhārmic action), like the *gavayālambhana* (killing a *gavaya* in a sacrifice) though there is no utility of it for *Mokṣa*. So it should be regarded as a separate means of knowledge.[2] Hence, there are four types of *Pramāṇa* in Nyāya, neither less nor more.

Types of upamāna.

The *Siddhāntacandrodaya*, as referred to by the *Nyāyakośa*[3], says that there are three types of *upamāna*, namely, *Sādṛśyaviśiṣṭapiṇḍajñānam*, *asādhāraṇadharmaviśiṣṭapiṇḍajñānam* and *vaidharmyaviśiṣṭapiṇḍajñānam*; as for instance, *gosādṛśyaviśiṣṭapiṇḍajñānam*, *khaḍgamṛgajñānam* and *uṣṭrajñānam* respectively.Again, the *Nyāyakośa*[4] refers to another three types of upamāna, namely, *Sādharmyopamānam* as in 'ayam (gavayaḥ) gavayapadavācyaḥ; *Vaidharmyopamānam*, as in 'iyam (pṛthivī), pṛthivīpadavācyā; *Dharmamātropamānam*, as in 'iyam pṛthivīpadavācyā.'

(4) *Āgama or Śabda*

The last means of cognition is the *Āgama-Pramāṇa*, also called *Śabda-Pramāṇa*. It has been defined by Gotama as—

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 141.

[2] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 145.

[3] p. 148.

[4] Page 148.

Āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ.[1]

That is, the assertion of a reliable person is what is meant by *śabda.* Here, not only the assertion in the form of a sentence or the thought expressed through that assertion is meant by *Śabda*, but both are included under the term *śabda.* By the word *āpta*, the *Bhāṣya* means one who possesses the direct and right knowledge of things, who is moved by a desire to make known to others the thing as he knows it, and who is fully capable of speaking of it.

Divisions of Śabda.

It is of two kinds, —*dṛṣṭārtha*, that of which the thing spoken of is *perceived*; and *adṛṣṭārtha*, that of which the thing spoken of is *not perceived*; for instance, Iśvara, svarga etc.

Conditions for Śābdabodha.

The author of the *Tarkabhāṣā* has defined *Śabdapramāṇa* as *āptavākyam śabdaḥ*. The term *āpta* has already been explained above. By *Vākya*, he means a collection of words which are mutually so related as to give some complete idea. As for instance, the sentence *Puruṣaḥ asti* is a collection of two words. The word *Puruṣa* possesses a sort of longing (*ākāṅkṣā*) to get its meaning accomplished by having some other word like *asti*, without which the word *Puruṣa* singly cannot convey any sense. So in a sentence the words must have some sort of mutual relation so as to accomplish the meaning of each of the words.

Besides, it is also to be seen whether the accomplishing word has the capacity to complete any desired sensible meaning or not. For instance, in the sentence-*agninā siñcati* (he sprinkles the land with fire), the sprinkling is not possible with fire. It is water alone which can sprinkle. So the *sentence-agninā siñcati* does not give any desired sensible meaning. Hence, there should be *yogyatā* (capacity to accomplish the act).

Then, it is also necessary that the words in a sentence should be uttered closely and not at long intervals, otherwise those words cannot be joined together so as to give any connected idea. Thus, it comes to mean that a sentence is that collection of words which possesses *ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and Āsatti* (nearness).

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[1] I. i. 7.

Besides, there is one more condition called *Tātparya*, intention of the speaker. As for instance, in the sentence—*saindhavamānaya* (bring the product of Sindhu), it is to be decided whether the speaker uses the term *saindhava* in the sense of a horse of *sindhudeśa*, which is wanted by the speaker for his going to a place with great swiftness, or he needs more salt in his food which is tasteless without it. So the attendent of the speaker, should know the intention (*tātparya*) of the speaker in uttering that sentence.

It has to be kept in mind that the words enter into the ears of the hearer and then it creates a desire in his mind to join together those words in such a way as to give a complete desired sensible idea. Thus, it is the hearer who is *Sākāṅkṣa*, but through the words entering into his ears thoughts are aroused in him, so both, words and thoughts, are also called *Sākāṅkṣa* by imposition.

This is in brief a description of the four kinds of *pramāṇa* accepted by Nyāyaśāstra through which the *prameyas* as circumscribed by it are cognized.

Validity of Pramāṇas.

The next, rather the most important problem of Nyāya, is the *Prāmāṇyavāda* (validity of the pramāṇas). After a cognition is achieved through any of the means of right knowledge, a question is raised, whether the cognition thus arrived at is to be taken independently as valid beyond any doubt, or it is necessary to take help of some other source to ascertain its validity. In other words, the question is—whether the *pramāṇas* are self-valid, or that its validity depends upon something other than itself.

There are two independent views amongst the philosophers. The Naiyāyikas are of opinion that (a) due to the sense-organ and object-contact a simple cognition is produced in the *Ātman* in the form *ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ* (this is a jar) which is called, in the Naiyāyika terminology *vyavasāyātmakajñāna*, after the *nirvikalpakajñāna* of the same ; (b) then there is the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of the same knowledge which is expressed in the form of a judgement—'I possess the knowledge of a *ghaṭa*;' (c) then follows the remembrance of the two possibilities—*Prāmāṇya* and *Aprāmāṇya*; (d) then a doubt (*saṁśaya*), as to whether the cognition produced in the Ātman is valid or not, comes up; (e) and lastly, after the perception of the distinguishing feature (*viśeṣa*), the validity is cognized and expressed in the form—'*idaṁ jñānam pramā, samarthapravṛttijanakatvāt, jñānāntaravat*' (meaning, this knowledge is valid, as it leads to effective activities, like any other knowledge).[1] In brief, it is to be said that *vyavasāya* is the knowledge where its object is some object (*viṣayiviṣayaṁ jñānaṁ vyavasāyaḥ*) as for example, *idam jalaṁ* (this is water); while *anuvyavasāya* is the knowledge where the object is the knowledge (*viṣayi*) itself (*viṣayiviṣayaṁ jñānamanuvyavasāyaḥ*), as for example—*jalamahaṁ jānāmi* (I know water). It is evident that a knowledge is obtained, through *mānasika pratyakṣa*, while its validity is attained through inference of the type of *kevalavyatirekī*—

I would like to quote here from the notes of M. R. Bodas based on the *Tarkadīpikā* of Annambhaṭṭa about the self-validity or otherwise of *Pramāṇas* which is a good summary of the relative views.

> "We see a jar and have the cognition *ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ*, or *ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi*; but how do we know that we really see the jar, and that our perceptive knowledge is not a misapprehension of something that is not a jar ? That is, how do we in practice distinguish a *Pramā* from *bhrama* ? We may or we may not see the reality of *ghaṭa*, but what test is there to prove that we see the reality and not a shadow ? A *Pramā* has been defined as *tadvati tatprakārakaṁ jñānaṁ* (meaning—a knowledge of a thing possessing any property as possessed of that property). It is thus comparatively easy to define what *Pramā* is; but how are we to ascertain whether a given piece of knowledge is a *pramā*

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[1] Jagadīśa, *Tarkāmṛta*, P. 16, Calcutta edition.

or *aprama*? The necessity of this ascertainment is obvious, for without it there can be no certainty of knowledge and all human intercourse would be impossible The question, therefore, how to determine the truth of our cognitions becomes a necessary corollary to any theory of knowledge.

The question is resolved into the alternative whether right-knowledge is *svataḥpramāṇa* (self-proved) or *parataḥpramāṇa* (proved by something else) Mādhavācārya quotes two verses which summarize the four principal views on this point–

pramānatvāpramāṇatve svatah sāṅkhyāh samāśṛtāḥ /
naiyāyikāste paratah saugatāścaramam svataḥ //
prathamam paratah prāhuh prāmāṇyam vedavādinaḥ /
pramānatvaṁ svatah prāhuh parataścāpramānatāṁ //

Translation—Of the two things, authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) and non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya*), the Sāṅkhyas consider both to be self-proved; the Naiyāyikas hold both to be known externally; the Bauddhas think that non-authoritativeness is self-proved, but the other is proved externally. Lastly, teachers of the *Vedas*, that is, the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that *prāmāṇya* is self-proved but *aprāmāṇya* requires external proof.

This diversity of opinions about *prāmāṇya* may be stated briefly by saying that according to Sānkhyas both the truth and falsity of a cognition are known *intuitively*, according to the Naiyāyikas both are proved by *independent reasoning* and therefore neither can be presumed until thus proved, according to the Bauddhas a cognition is *prima facie* incorrect and true if only proved to be so by special evidence, while the Mīmāṁsakas regard a cognition as presumably correct, but false when actually proved to be so '[1]

As this is one of the most important problems of Nyāya which can be better understood along with the views of the rival schools I would like to add the following from my old article.[2]

Coming to the Mīmāṁsakas, we find that they have their independent views about this problem, which may be classed under three different sections, attributed to the three distinguished exponents of the theory, namely, Kumārila, Prabhākara and Murāri.

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[1] Bodas, *notes* PP. 356-57.

[2] *Murārestṛtīyaḥ panthāḥ*, All India Oriental Conference, Fifth Session, Lahore.

Kumārila school.

Kumārila holds that a *jñāna* is supersensuous (*atīndriya*) and its presence is inferred from a *dharma*, called *Jñātatā*, which is produced in that jñāna after the latter has been produced through sense-organ and object contact as usual, and then with that *Jñātatā* the validity of that *jñāna* is also inferred simultaneously In other words, according to him, after the cognition, expressed in the form of a judgment—*ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ* (this is a jar), a kind of *dharma* (attribute), called *jñātatā*, is produced in that *ghata* and then we have the direct perception of this *jñātatā* whereafter the cognition is expressed in the form of a judgment—*jñāto mayā ghaṭaḥ* (a jar has been known by me), after which the presence of the cognition which was produced by the sense-organ and object-contact is inferred and is expressed in the form—*ahaṁ ghaṭatvaprakārakajñānavān, ghaṭatvaprakārakajñātatāvatvāt*; and along with this inference the validity of that inferred *jñāna* is also arrived at[1]. It is evident from this that Kumārila has not to depend upon the effectiveness of the effort (*samarthapravṛtti*) to prove the validity of the *jñāna*, like the Naiyāyikas. So in this case, the validity is not to depend upon any external agency (*parataḥ*).

Prabhākara school.

According to Prabhākara after the sense-organ-and object-contact a determinate (*savikalpaka*) knowsledge is produced which is afterward expressed in the form of a judgment which includes an object of *jñāna* (that is, *ghaṭa*), a subject of *jñāna* (that is, *Ātman*)[2] and *jñāna* is, of course, there already. *Jñāna*, according to him, being self-illumined (*svaprakāśa*) reveals itself along with its object and subject as well as the validity of its own-self.[3] Thus, it is through the first *jñāna* (*vyavasāya*) itself (*svataḥ*) that the validity of the *jñāna* is cognized. In other words, according to this school, the implements which lead to the production of *jñāna* also prove the validity of that *jñāna* (*svajanakasāmagrītaḥ*)[1]

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[1] *Tarkāmṛta*, P. 16.

[2] It is to be noted here that according to Prabhākara the *Ātman* is essentially *jaḍa*, like that of the Naiyāyikas, but it becomes conscious (*cetana*) when jñāna is produced in it by the external source, as an adventitious quality.

[3] *Trkāmṛta*, p. 16.

Murāri Miśra school

Coming to the last exponent of the theory, we find that the school of Murāri Miśra holds that after the sense-organ and object-contact a *jñāna* is produced, which is expressed in the form of a judgment—*ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ*, after which comes the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of the same *jñāna*, in the form of a judgment, 'I possess the knowledge of the *ghaṭa*.' This very *anuvyavasāya* gives us the validity of the *jñāna* expressed in the form of a judgment—'*ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ*'.[2] Here also, for the validity of the first *jñāna*, Murāri Miśra does not depend upon any other external source, but he depends upon the second *jñāna* itself. So it is also called *svataḥ pramāṇa*.

Now, we see that the line of thought adopted by Murāri Miśra closely resembles that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But on close observation it is quite clear that there is a clear difference between the two schools. In the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, we have seen above that there is a *doubt* regarding the validity of the *jñāna*, which doubt is not present in Murāri's view. The reason is that in his case, the implement arriving at the validity (*prāmāṇyasāmagrī*) is the very presence of the *jñānendriya*, that is, *manas* (manasaiva jñānasvarūpavat tatprāmāṇyagrahaḥ iti murārimiśrāḥ)[3], which is ever present (Miśramuddiśyāha—jñānasyeti—tanmate jñānendriyasannidhireva prāmāṇyagrahasāmagrītvena tatpratibandhādeva saṁśayānutpattirityarthaḥ).[4] In other words, it is through the recognition

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[1] *Vide*—Mathurānātha, *Rahasya* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Pratyaksa, P. 126, Bibliotheca edition.

[2] Jayadeva Miśra, *Āloka*, Pratyakṣa, Ms. fols. 14a-15a; *Tarkāmṛta*, P. 16; *Bhāskarodayā* on the *Nīlakaṇṭhī* on the *Tarkadīpikā* of Annambhaṭṭa, p. 154, Bombay ed.; Jānakīnātha, *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, PP. 345-48.

[3] Varddhamāna in his *prakāśa* on the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 219.

[4] *Āloka*, Pratyakṣa Ms Fol. 25b.

(*anuvyavasāya*) that the validity is arrived at and hence, in the unrepeated case (*anabhyāsadaśāyāṁ*), no *doubt* arises as to whether, for instance, the cognition of water is valid or not.[1] So it is clear that according to Murāri Miśra, it is through the *sāmagrī* of the direct perception of the cognition (*anuvyavasāya*), which is produced by a *jñāna* (*vyavasāya*), that the validity of the *vyavasāya* is cognized [2]

Summary of the three views

Keeping aside the details of the three views, we find that (a) *Prabhākara* holds that the *same thing* which produces *jñāna* also proves the validity of that *jñāna*; (b) *Kumārila* holds that it is through the *jñātatā* which is produced by *jñāna* that the validity of that *jñāna* which has produced that *jñātatā*, is inferred and not through the *jñāna* itself; (c) *Murāri Miśra*, on the other hand, is of opinion that the validity is arrived at through the *anuvyavasāya* (recognition), the *mānasika jñāna* of the first *jñāna* (*vyavasāya*).[3]

A critical analysis of the views of the three schools given above shows that the view of Prabhākara alone is very rigidly the expounder of the *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, according to whom the validity is known through the very instrument which produces the *jñāna* (that is, *svajanakajñānasāmagrītaḥ*), in the true sense of the term. According to Kumārila, it is not directly through the *jñāna*, or the *jñāna* of the first *jñāna*, that the validity is cognized but through *jñātatā* which is not the same. So the rigid implication of the term *svataḥ* is not possible here. In his opinion the *jñāna* is produced through the sense-organ and object-contact as usual, although we are not aware of the *jñāna* before the establishment of the validity of that *jñāna* through the *pratyakṣa* of the *jñātatā*. It is to be kept in mind that according to Kumārila; *jñāna* is supersensuous and it is through the *jñātatā* produced by that very *jñāna* and which is sensuous, that the existence of the cause of the *jñātatā*, namely, the *jñāna* is inferred. In other words, the *jñāna* is produced by one kind of instrument, while the validity of it is cognized by another kind of instrument of right knowledge. Hence, Kumārila should not claim to be a true exponent of the theory of the *svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda*, though there is, undoubtedly, a relative *svatastva*.

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[1] *Bhāskarodayā*, P. 154 Nirnayasagar edition.

[2] Mathurānātha, *Rahasya* on the *Cintāmaṇi*, p. 126.

[3] Mathurānātha, *Rahasya* a commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*, p. 126

Similarly, the view of Murāri Miśra is far from being a supporter of the *svataḥ-Prāmāṇyavāda*. In his case also the means of right knowledge is not the same for proving the validity of knowledge also So he is also more of a *Parataḥ Prāmāṇyavādin*

It is clear from the above that the entire discussion rests with the interpretation of the term *svataḥ* or *sva*. If rightly explained and understood, it means, as has been interpreted before, that the instrument of knowledge, through which a cognition is arrived at, should also prove the validity of that cognition without the help of any other agency. It is found that this condition is found fulfilled by Prabhākara's interpretation alone. Thus, it will not be improper to repeat that Kumārila, Murāri and the Naiyāyikas are, more or less, the exponents of the *Parataḥ-Prāmāṇyavāda*, while Prabhākara alone is the upholder of the *Svataḥprāmaṇyavāda*. This view has been expounded by Mathurānātha also in his commentary, *Rahasya*, on the *Cintāmaṇi—svataḥ svāśrayajanakasāmagrītaḥ| svaṁ pramātvam| etaccu gurumate| parataḥ-tadanyasāmagrītaḥ| etacca miśramata-bhaṭṭamata-nyāyamateṣu.*[1]

Nature of jñāna

It will not be out of place to mention here that according to Prabhākara all knowledge is true, of course, so far as it goes, and consequently, the distinction between *pramā* and *apramā* does not arise. If *pravṛttijanakatva* (leading to action) is the test for the reality of knowledge, then the erroneous apprehension of silver on mother-o'pearl also sometimes produces a *pravṛtti*, and will therefore, be *pramā*, while that *pravṛtti* can be fully accounted for by the recollection of the previous perception of silver and the percept of the object present. This, according to the Naiyāyikas, is not possible, because there is much *lāghava* in ascribing *pravṛttijanakatva* to the actual *pramā* itself. The erroneous apprehension of silver in *śukti* may appear to be true so long as it lasts, but it is not *pramā*, as it is not *tadvati tatprakāraka-jñāna*.

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[1] P. 117, also see-Umesha Mishra, *Murārestṛtīyaḥ Panthāḥ*

Nyāya position

To make the position of Nyāya quite clear, I repeat it here. After the usual sense-organ and object-contact with water at a distance, for instance, the person starts to fetch it with a doubtful mind, and if he gets water there, his *pravṛtti* (moving towards the well to get water) is effective (*saphala*), and if he does not get water, his *pravṛtti* is *niṣphala*. So from the success of the *pravṛtti* or otherwise, the validity or otherwise of the previous cognition is realized Hence, it is through the *kevala-vyatirekī* form of *anumāna* that the validity or otherwise of the cognition is achieved. This is what is called *Parataḥ-Prāmānyavāda* But it is to be kept in mind that the Naiyāyikas accept the theory of *Parataḥa* only in the case of *jñāna* realized for the first time (*anabyhāsadaśāyām*). It means that the Naiyāyikas also believe in *svataḥ prāmānya* in cases of repitition.

Conclusion.

From the common-sense point of view it is true that we do not realize validity along with the cognition itself. But from a higher stratum we cannot deny the *svatastva* of the validity of any cognition. The Mīmāṁsakas have to be very rigid, simply because they hold that *Śabda-Pramāṇa*, which is identified with the *Veda*, is self-valid; otherwise, *Veda*, which is *apauruṣeya* and hence, *svataḥ pramāṇa*, will have to be *pauruṣeya* and dependent upon *Īśvara* for its validity, as the Naiyāyikas hold. This, the Mīmāṁsakas cannot tolerate. This is in brief the substance of the *Prāmāṇyavāda* of the Naiyāyikas.

Lastly, it may be said at the end of the treatment of the *Pramāṇas* that from the point of the view held by the Naiyāyikas, it is quite correct to say that there are four means of right cognition. But on a very critical examination, it seems that really speaking there is only one *pramāṇa*, namely, *Pratyakṣa*, which has been accepted as the most reliable one. Thus, *anumāna* cannot even take place, nor can it be relied upon without *Pratyakṣa*. It is the *Pratyakṣa* alone which, really speaking, gives to it any reliability. Moreover, *anumāna* is a means for carrying on the day to day usage in the world, which will not be possible if we entirely depend upon the *Pratyakṣa*. But it is a fact that the conclusions arrived at through *anumāna*, cannot be free from doubts. The worldly usage may be carried on, but there is every chance of the conclusions being upset at any moment The reason is that an inference mainly depends upon *hetu* which may change and be found faulty by subsequent stronger *hetus*. No doubt, the aspect which is based exclusively on *Pratyakṣa* will be correct but conclusions drawn afterwards based on *hetus* which are again, dependent upon intelligence of the person using the probans cannot garanty their validity for ever, as it is in the case of things known through *Pratyakṣa*. It was therefore, that Bhartṛhari said—

Pratyakṣa alone is the valid pramāṇa

> yatnenānumitopyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ/
> abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapādyate//[1]

Translation—Even that which has been inferred with great precautions, is upset and explained otherwise by more intelligent persons.

Moreover, every school of thought does accept *Pratyakṣa* as the most reliable means of right cognition. No school denies its validity.

Coming to the *upamāna*, we know that it is partly based on *Śabda* (*āpta-vākya*) and partly on *Pratyakṣa*. The information received from the forester is really the *āptavacana*. The knower has full faith and confidence in the words of the forester who has direct perception of the *gavaya* and also of the cow. In other words, the knower is so much confident of the information given by the forester, as if, he had himself seen it. That is to say, the *Śabda-pramāṇa* is, in a way, not different from the *pratyakṣa*. Then the knowledge of the similarity (*sādṛśyajñāna*) is also, really speaking, a *Pratyakṣa-jñāna*. Thus, the *upamāna* also fully depends upon *pratyakṣa*. As for the *Āgama*, or the *Śabda-Pramāṇa*, it is nothing but a *pratyakṣa-jñāna*. The *āpta-puruṣa* has *pratyakṣa* of the object at issue (sāksāt kṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya,—one who has the direct and right knowledge of things as seen). The enquirer, that is, the knower, has so much confidence in the *Āpta* that he has practically identified himself with him and he has not an *iota* of doubt about the correctness of the information given by the *Āpta* about the particular object. In other words, he considers it to be like his own *pratyakṣa* and takes his words as correct as if, he himself has cognized the object directly. It is a fact which has already been said that *Pratyakṣa* is the only cognition which gives a correct and precisive knowledge of a thing. It was therefore, that even Śaṅkarācārya had to admit that *aparokṣa-jñāna* alone leads to the *Brahma-jñāna*. So says Citsukhācārya—*vedāntavākyaṁ nirapavādameva advitīye Brahmaṇi aparokṣa-jñānaṁ janayatīti*. It was with this view before him that Bhartṛhari has said—

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[1] *Vākyapadīya*, I. 34.

Superiority of Pratyakṣa

āvirbhūtaprakāśānāmanupadrutacetasām/
atītānāgatajñānaṁ pratyakṣānna viśiṣyate//
yo yasya svamiva jñānaṁ darśanaṁ nābhiśaṅkate/
sthitaṁ pratyakṣapakṣe taṁ kathamanyo nivartayet//

Translation—To whom light has manifested itself and whose *citta* is not perturbed, to them knowledge referring to past and future does not differ from *Pratyakṣa*. Again, he, whose knowledge is just like his own direct perception when takes his stand on

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[1] *Citsukhī*, end of Chapter II. P. 332 Nirnayasagar, Bombay edition.

the view that there is only *Pratyakṣa*, no other means of knowledge can frustrate his view[1].

Inference cannot throw aside direct perceptions of objects supersensous and unintelligible through the eyes of great *ṛṣis*. In other words, *Pratyakṣa* alone is the right type of cognition. But as such, *pratyakṣa* is not always possible for the common usage, so we have to believe in other means of cognition also according to our needs.

Śaṅkara-Vedānta believes in Pratyakṣa alone

We know that the utility of *pramāṇa* is only to know the *prameya* advocated in a system of thought, and as such, in Śaṅkara-Vedānta there being only one *Prameya*, that is, *Brahman* whose existence is proved ordinarily through *āgama*, that is, *Śruti*, there is no need of believing in any other Pramāṇa. And again, as *Āgama* is, as has been said above, in a way, *Pratyakṣa* of the *Āpta* and as we have full confidence in him, we almost identify ourselves with the *Āpta* and take his *pratyakṣa* as our own *pratyakṣa*, we may say that Śaṅkara-Vedānta believes in *Pratyakṣa* alone for the system.

Justification for believing in six Pramāṇas

But even then in order to know Brahman which is *avāṅmanasagocara* and is not realized directly, six types of *Pramāṇas* have been accepted by the Śāṅkara-Vedānta to know the constituents of *Māyā* and then to realize Brahman through the method of elimination which is possible only through as many *Pramāṇas* as are found necessary, to cognize the consituents of *Māyā*. Hence, they hold that there are six *Pramāṇas* in Śaṅkara Vedānta; othersise, there, is only one *Pramāṇa* to realize the only *Prameya* of Vedānta.

Moreover, Vātsyāyana himself has said that *Pratyakṣa* is the most important of the *pramāṇas*. For instance, if when a person is told something about a particular object by an *Āpta* person, he desires, to ascertain the same through inference as well. In other words, his desire to know the thing correctly is not satisfied by what the reliable person has said, so he wants to get the same proved through inference. But even with the conclusion so derived from the inference he is not fully satisfied and his desire to get the correct and undoubtful conclusion is not satisfied till he happens to perceive the same with his own eyes. This makes it quite clear that *Pratyakṣa* is the only *Pramāṇa* which can remove doubts and give a correct apprehension of an object. Other *Pramāṇas* are not capable of removing the doubts and hence, they are meant only to carry on the worldly usage somehow. But for right knowledge *Pratyakṣa* alone has been recognized, hence it is the most important *prāmana*[1].

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[1] *Vākyapadīya*, I. 37-39.

PRAMEYA

Meaning of Prameya.

Coming to the next category of Nyāya, namely, *Prameya*, we find Gotama not giving any defintion of it, perhaps due to its meaning being very clear from the very word *Prameya*. But Vātsyāyana makes it clear by explaining it as *yo'rthaḥ pramīyate tat prameyam*, that is, that object which is rightly cognized is called *prameya*[2]. Jayanta makes it quite clear. He says that *Prameya* is that for the knowledge of which *Pramāṇas* have been accepted and explained. (yadarthaṁ tatparīkṣaṇaṁ tat prameyam)[3]. But he further has specified that the term here in the Nyāyaśastra, is limited to only those objects of knowledge which Gotama has mentioned, namely, *Ātman*, *Śarīra*, *indriya*, *artha*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *pravṛtti*, *doṣa*, *pretyabhāva*, *phala*, *duḥkha* and *apavarga*,[4] and does not include any other item (teṣāmeva prameyatvaṁ nānyasyeti niyacchati). This has been said by Vātsyāyana also—

> asyatu tattvajñānādapavargo mithyājñānat saṁsāra ityata etadupadiṣṭam[5].

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[1] *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya*, I. i. 3, along with the *Vārttika* and *Tātparya*.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya* I. i. 1.

[3] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 427.

[4] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 9.

[5] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 9.

Again, Jayanta further adds that by the term *Prameya* any and every object realized through *Pramāṇa* is not meant here, but only those which, when known thoroughly or partially, lead to emancipation (*mokṣāya*), or to confinement (*bhavāya*)—

> jñātaṁ samyagasamyagvā yanmokṣāya bhavāya ca/
> tatprameyamihābhiṣṭaṁ na pramāṇārthamātrakaṁ//

Why the term *prameya* as used here, has been so limited in its implication is due to the fact that this Nyāya-śāstra is itself a mokṣa-śāstra and as such, it is not meant for any purpose other than being an independent means leading to *apavarga* through the removal of wrong notions etc., as expressed by Gotama in his *sūtra*,[1]—

Duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānāmuttarottarāpāye tadantarāpāyādapavargaḥ.

Process of realizing Apavarga

It has to be kept in mind that as far as this system is concerned and as far as the ultimate end of this system has been kept in view by Gotama, the correct knowledge of these twelve knowables alone will lead to final emancipation. That the Sūtrakāra does not, however, deny the knowability of any other object beside these twelve prameyas, is evident from the term *Tu* used in the sūtra[2]. So, the seeker after *mokṣa* should know at this stage, only these twelve *prameyas*[3]. The *Vārttika* makes it clear that for the purpose of achieving *mokṣa*, Ātman etc., are the only *prameyas*, but thereby, the knowability of other objects for worldly purposes is not denied. Hence, keeping in mind the aim of the system, *ātman* etc., alone have been accepted as *prameyas*.[4] Uddyotakara however, adds that the remaining two prameyas ordinarily accepted in the system, namely, *dik* and *kāla* are implied in the sūtra itself due to there being *pravṛtti* and *saṁskārakatva* in these.[5]

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[1] I. i. 2. [2] I. i. 9. [3] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 9.
[4] I. i. 9.
[5] *Nyāyavārttika and Tātparya*, I. i. 9.

General characteristics of prameya

Of these twelve kinds of knowables, as has been already pointed out, some are *upādeya*, while others are *heya*. That is, *śarīra*, *indriya*, *artha*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *doṣa*, *pretyabhāva*, *phala* and *duḥkha* are *heya* (to be discarded), while *Ātman* and *apavarga* are *upādeya* (worth acquiring). Again, of the *Ātman* also, that which is of the nature of *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *bhoktṛtva*, that is, which is worldly in nature, is to be discarded (heya), while that which is aversed (*parāṅmukha*) from experiencing worldly pleasure and pain, is to be realized (*upādeya*).[1]

(i) *Ātman*

General nature of the Ātman and other prameyas

Coming to the details of the above mentioned twelve kinds of knowables, *Ātman* comes first. It is to be noted that the *Ātman* has two aspects in this system, *heyatva* and *upādeyatva*. The former refers to the *Jīvātman* which is the observer (*draṣṭṛ*) of all the means of pleasure and pain, is one which experiences (*bhoktā*) all pleasure and pain and their causes, and as it apprehends all pleasure and pain and their causes which constitute this universe, it is all-knowing (*sarvajña*) and it has personal experience also of all the pleasure and pain and their causes, hence, it is *sarvānubhāvī*.[2] From the above description it appears that the author speaks of the *Jīvātman* in the present context. Hence, in this form it is not worth realizing and is not much different from physical organism, etc. It is however, worth realization in its other aspect.

This *physical organism* (*śarīra*) of ours is its abode to experience pleasure and pain; the *sense-organs* (*indriyāṇi*) are its means to experience the same; the *objects* of sense-organs, that is, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound, are objects to be experienced; *apprehension* (*Buddhi*) consists of the experience itself. It is a fact that the external sense-organs are not capable of cognizing all the objects, hence, the existence of *manas*, which has everything as its object, is accepted for the cognition of everything, past, present and future. Then there is *pravṛtti* (action) and *doṣas* (defects) which are the causes for the existence of physical organism, sense-organs and their objects, knowledge, pleasure and pain. It is to be understood that the present organism of a *Jīvātman* is not its first organism, nor is it necessarily the last, so there is no beginning of its previous births, but there is the end of the future birth. That is, there will be a day whereafter there will be no more birth and the *Jīva* will achieve final emancipation (*apavarga*). This means that there was a series of births and re-births prior to the present one. This is called existence after death (*pretyabhāva*).

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī, P. 428.*

[2] *Bhāṣya, I. i.9.*

The experience of pleasure and pain along with their causes, namely, organism, sense-organ, etc., represent fruition (*phala*). There is no mention of pleasure in the *sūtra*, but it should not be taken to mean that there is its total negation and so the sūtrakāra has left it out. What it means is that there is no pleasure in this universe which is not mixed with pain in some form or the other. This has been intentionally said so, because the ultimate end of our life and also of this system of philosophy is to achieve freedom from worldly attachments, which is possible only when the *Jīva* experiences that everything in this universe is mixed with pain, which alone will lead it to become disgusted with this world and become indifferent to every worldly object, and will ultimately, achieve final emancipaton.

By *apavarga* is meant the absolute cessation of deaths and births and subsequently, the achievement of absolute cessation of all pains by the *Jīva*. It is also evident from the above that during *mokṣa*, according to this system, there is no feeling of any sort in the *Ātman*. It is free from all knowledge. It has been therefore loosely compared with a piece of stone or a log of wood. It is therefore that Jayanta has even identified such an *Ātman* with *apavarga* itself[1]

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 428.

Realization of Ātman.

This Ātman is directly cognized by a particular type of contact of the *Ātman* with the particular *manas* produced by the yogic *samādhi* of the *yuñjāna* type of yogins[1]. So through the *yogic pratyakṣa*, *Ātman* is directly realized. Again, the notion of *ahaṁ* expressed in cognitions like, *ahaṁ jānāmi*, also shows that *Ātman* is directly realized. They misunderstand the implication of the term *ahaṁ* in various ways according to their *buddhi*, so for ordinary average class of people, it is through inference that its existence is proved. The *probans* to prove its existence are-*icchā* (desire), *dveṣa* (hatred), *prayatna* (effort), pleasure, pain and knowledge[2]. Vātsyāyana elaborates it through an illustration; thus—"The *Ātman*, having experienced pleasure by coming in contact with a particular type of object, whenever, comes to see in future that very kind of object, it wishes to acquire that object; and this desire to acquire the same thing, is possible only in one who, while remaining one and the same, perceives several things at different times, as it arises from his remembrance of a previous perception. It is thus, that the desire becomes an indicative of the existence of the *Jīvātman*. This is how through inference the existence of the *Jīvātman* is proved."

Vācaspati's view regarding the realization of Ātman.

Vācaspati adds the following to clarify the same in the following way. He says—having found a certain kind of thing to give pleasure, the person expresses his judgment in the form of an expression—'*this kind of thing gives me pleasure.*' This forms the major premiss; when he perceives that kind of thing again, he has the idea—'*this is that kind of thing which gave me pleasure*'. This forms the minor premiss. From these two premisses, he concludes that '*this will give (me) pleasure* (even now), *as it has done in the past;*' and then, he comes to have a *desire* to acquire that thing. Thus, this desire proves that the agent who has this desire must be the same, who already has the three cognitions presented to him by the two premisses and the resultant conclusion, there being a common agent for all the four; if the agent were not the same, there could be no such recollection, or fusion of the several cognitions involved; and it is this common agent, who is the perceiver of the thing, the experiencer of that pleasure, the rememberer of the thing being the source of pleasure, and the desirer of the thing, which is the *Jīvātman*[1].—

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[1] *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 3.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 10.

yajjātīyasyeti vyāptismṛtikathanam, tajjātīyam paśyanniti pakṣadharmopanayaḥ/tasmādayaṁ sukhaheturityanumāyādātumicchati, seyamicchedṛśī vyāptigrahaṇa-tatsmaraṇa-pakṣadharmatāgrahanānumānecchādīnāmekakartṛtvaṁ sūcayati, bhede pratisandhānābhāvena tadanupapatteḥ; tadidamuktam-*ekasyeti*; yaścāsāveko'nubhavitā ca smarttā cānumātā ceṣitā ca sa ātmā, na ca śarīramevambhavitumarhati, tasya bālyakaumārayauvanavārdhakabhedenānyatvāt/nendriyam, indriyāntaragṛhīta indriyāntarenāpratisandhānaprasaṅgāt/ yamahamadrākṣaṁ taṁ spṛśāmīti/nāpi manaḥ, tasya karanatvenaivānumānāt.

Existence of Ātman proved

In the same way, the existence of *Jīvātman* can be proved through hatred, effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge. Thus, when one and the same person perceives several objects, that, on recollecting a previous perception, he comes to have *hatred* towards that thing that has been the cause of pain to him. Again, when a certain object has been found to be the cause of pleasure, on subsequently seeing an object of that kind, the man makes an attempt to obtain that thing; and this *effort* would not be possible if there were not one agent perceiving a number of objects and recollecting his past perceptions. This common agent is the *Jīvātman*.

Similarly, the effort which is made to get rid of pain proves the existence of an agent called *jīvātman*. Again, a man, by remembering his previous experience of *pleasure* and *pain* from a particular object, happens to derive pleasure and pain at the sight of that object at any other time. This is possible only when there is a common agent for both the experiences. Lastly, when a man is desirous of *knowing* the real nature of a certain thing, at first he thinks over it in the form, what may this be? and after thinking over it, he comes to know it that it is so and so. This knowing of the object is by the same agent as the previous one who had desired and had thought over it. Thus, this knowledge becomes the *probans* of the existence of the *Jīvātman*.

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[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 10.

Udayana on direct perception of the Ātman.

It will not be out of place to note here that according to Udayanācārya and some other Naiyāyikas[1] also the *Jīvātman* is an object of direct individual perception. Even then to the question why Gotama has adduced proofs to prove its existence through inference?, Udayana says that inferences are required to cognize the *Jīvātman* in the body of another person and not for cognizing his own *Jīvātman* within his own body which is always directly perceived. Further, Udayana continues that no doubt, *Ātman* is directly cognized through *Pratyakṣa*, as is clear in the expression *ahamiti*, but as this expression is also attributed to the physical organism, it may be said, as is declared by the materialists, to be referring to the physical organism itself and not to the *Ātman* within it; so this expression of *ahamiti* cannot distinctly prove the existence of the *Ātman* within the organism, unless the former's existence as distinct from physical organism etc. is also proved through other means of knowledge; hence, it is necessary to adduce inferences to prove the existence of the *Ātman* existing apart from the physical organism etc.,—

ahamiti yadyapi savastuko'yaṁ tathāpi śarirapratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyāt tadvastuka evāhamityapi syāt/ato na tadatirikte vastuni pramāṇayituṁ śakyate tāvad vāvad dehādibhyo bhinna ātmā pramāṇāntareṇa na sādhyate.

Udayana in his *Pariśuddhi*[2] while commenting upon the *Tātparya's* line—

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[1] svayūthyā api kecana-*Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 429

[2] *Pariśuddhi* Ms. P. 633 with the author.

ahamiti jñānam gaurādyākāraṁ śarīrāvabhāsanaṁ na śakyaṁ ghaṭādijñānavad drāgātmani pramāṇayitumityabhiprāyaḥ, paradehavartyātmābhiprāyam vā—[1]

Ātman is distinct from organism, etc.

This *Ātman* is distinct from physical organism, sense-organs, *manas*, intellect and feelings of pleasure and pain (*vedanā*) taken separately and also from their aggregate. The reason is obvious. If sense-organs are separately regarded as the *Ātman*, then there will be as many as six *Ātmans* in a single body and consequently, there will be six agents of action in one single organism at one time. In that case, our experience expressed in the form, *what I have cognized through my visual senseorgan is also cognized through my tactile sense-organ* will not be correct. But such an experienced expression cannot be denied; it is apprehended by all to be a valid cognition. It is clear in the above expression that both the object of cognition and the apprehending agent are one and the same. Such a common apprehension cannot be possible, if it were due to either the aggregate of the various constituents of our organism, such as, sense-organs, *manas*, intellect etc., or to the sense-organs taken separately. Hence, the agent who is the perceiver of the said one thing through the visual sense-organ and by the tactile sense-organ, and who in the manner shown above cognizes the two perceptions as apprenending the same object, as having an agent and as brought about by different instruments, is something entirely different from the aggregate and the sense-organs; and this is the *Ātman*.[2]

Again, that *Ātman* is distinct from the physical organism is proved from the fact that had the body been identical with the *Ātman*, then an assassinator of the body would not have incurred any sin[3]; for the assassinating body, having been burnt after death, would not have stayed at the time of the fruition of that sin, that is, in future birth. So the question of merit and demerit would not have arisen.

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[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, P. 210, chowkhamba edition; for further arguments in this connection refer to Umesha Mishra, *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, Chapter XI.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. i. 1-2.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 4.

Similarly, a sense-organ cannot be identical with the *Ātman*. The reason is that in our ordinary expression we say that whatever I have seen with one eye, is also being visualized by my other eye. If an eye were identical with the conscious agent, namely, the *Ātman*, then the same object would not have been seen by the other eye; for another agent cannot recognize the same which has been cognized by the other[1].

Again, through inference also it is proved that the *Ātman* is distinct from the aggregate of the body, etc. In other words, when a person, for instance, has tasted a sour fruit and found that its taste is con-comitant with a certain colour and smell, if, at some future time he happens to perceive its colour or smell, by means of a sense-organ (of vision or odour), there appears a change in the organ of taste, which is totally different from the organ that has apprehended the colour or smell; that is, there is remembrance through association of the taste of the fruit which gives rise to a longing for that taste which brings about the flow of the liquid (saliva) from the roots of the teeth. This phenomenon would not be possible if the sense-organs themselves were the conscious agent (*Ātman*); as an agent can never remember or recall what has been perceived by another[2].

In the same manner, it is proved that *Ātman* is different from the *manas*. It is a fact that the means of cognition (*jñānasādhanāni*) belong to the conscious agent (*jñātā*), as is clear from the expressions—he sees with his eyes, he smells with his nose, he touches with the tactile organ. Similarly, there is the *antaḥkaraṇa* (*manas*), which is the means of cognition of every object by which the cognizer (*mantā*, the agent), who does the seeing, smelling etc., with the visual and other sense-organs, does the cognizing of all objects. On that account the means of congnizing also operates naturally on all objects, and it is by means of this *manas* that the *mantā* (the cognizing agent) does the conceiving. Such being the case, it seems that while admitting the existence of the cognizer, its being called the *Ātman* alone is being denied and its being called *manas* is accepted. Similarly, though admitting that there is an instrument of cognition, its being called *manas* alone is being denied. So the quarrel is merely in the name and that there is difference of opinion in having the two objects, a conscious agent and a means to cognize the objects.[1] Thus, it is obvious that there is a conscious agent, called *Ātman*, quite distinct from body, sense-organs, *manas*, intellect and the feelings of pleasure and pain.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, III. i. 7; *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, I. 15.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 12.

Eternality of Ātman discussed.

That such an *Ātman* is eternal, that is, prior to its assuming the extant physical organism, it had its existence and that it will have its existence even after its death, is not quite clear from the above reasons. All that has been said above in support of a separate existence of the *Ātman* is possible within the span of one life, from birth to death. But this cannot prove its prior and future existence leading to its eternality for ever. This is a problem to which an answer is given below :

Previous births proved.

As a matter of fact, it is found that when an infant is born, he actually experiences the feelings of joy, fear and sorrow, even though during his shortest span of present life he has not experienced anything that could give rise to joy, fear and sorrow in him ; and that he actually experiences these is inferred from certain clear indications of child's movements, smiling and crying. These experiences could proceed only from the continuity of remembrance, and not from any other source; this continuity of remembrance again, could not but be due to previous repeated experiences. This previous experience cannot be of the present birth. It naturally refers to the child's past life or lives. This proves that there is something which exists even after the body is destroyed after death. This continuous entity is the *Ātman*. Thus, it is proved that the *Ātman* is eternal and it continues life after life[1].

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III, i. 16.

Again, in the infant just born we see a desire for the mother's milk, the presence of such a desire being indicated by the child's activities in the shape of the moving of its hands and mouth towards the mother's breasts. This desire could not arise except from repeated experiences in the past. It is found in the case of all living beings that when they are afflicted with hunger, there appears in them a desire to take some food, which desire arises from continuity of remembrance due to repeated experiences in the past. Now in the case of the newly born infant, the appearance of such a desire cannot but be explained as being due to repeated experiences in a previous body. From this it is inferred that the infant had a body previous to this present one, in which body, it had gone through repeated experiences of feeding which have given rise to its present desire for sucking the milk from its mother's breasts. From all this it follows that what happens is that the *Jīvātman*, having, at death, departed from his previous body, has become endowed with a new body and on being afflicted with hunger, remembers his repeated feedings in the past birth and accordingly, desires the milk from the breast of the mother. Hence, it cannot be true that there is a different *Ātman* attached to each of these bodies. It must be the same *Jīvātman* that continues to exist even after the perishing of its former body. It must be kept in mind that this is not true of human beings alone, but it is so in case of every being.[2]

This is further supported by the fact that persons free from longings are never found to be born again. In other words, when a person is born, he is born as beset with longings. This longing could be due only to the recalling to the mind of things previously experienced; and this previous experience of things in a preceding life could not be possible without a body; hence, what happens is that the *Ātman*, remembering the things experienced and found pleasant by him in his previous body, comes to have longings for them in the newly obtained body. This is what forms the connecting link between his two lives. There are similar links between his previous life and his life preceding that and between that and a life preceding that, and so on and on, to infinity. This shows that the connection of the *Ātman* with bodies has been without any beginning, and without beginning has been its connection with longings. From this beginningless series of attachments and subsequent bodies, it is evident that the *Jīvātman* is eternal.[1] From what has been proved above, it also follows that the *Jīvātman* also is beginningless and that its connection with some physical organism is also without any beginning. Besides, it is also clear that the creation itself is also beginningless. It is not possible to explain various problems of the universe, ulness the beginninglessness of creation is also accepted. No doubt, after every deluge(*pralaya*) there is a creation and this may be called its beginning, but then it is not correct to say that there was no creation prior to the present one. The *saṁskāras* of the past deeds of the last creation remain dormant during the period of deluge and when all those *saṁskāras* become ready to yield fruits (*Pākonmukha*), then another fresh creation begins based on the *saṁskāras* of the past creation. Similarly, one creation is preceded by another, which again, was preceded by another and so on till eternity. This is how we say that the creation also has no beginning.[2]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 18. [2] *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, III. i. 21.

Connecting link between previous and present births.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, III. i. 24.

[2] For the rest of the aspects of the *Jīvātman* and also *Paramātman* the reader is advised to read the 11th chapter of the author's *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*.

(ii) *Śarīra*

Now, we come to the second *Prameya* (knowable), called *Śarīra* (physical organism). It is the abode of *Jīvātman* to stay for reaping the fruits of its past deeds. It has been said before that its connection with the *Jīvātman* has been from time immemorial for experiencing pleasure and pain within its limitations[1] due to its past deeds. Here, a question may be raised how do the deeds of the past life produce the body to reap their fruits in the next birth ? This can be fully explained by referring to the functioning of the *law of karman* which has been already dealt with[2] and need not be repeated.

Law of karman.

Physical organism has been defined as—

Ceṣṭendriyārthāśrayaḥ Śarīram.[3]

That is to say, a physical organism is that which is the substratum of *ceṣṭā*, meaning, actions leading to the attainment of desired objects, or to the discarding of the undesired objects. In other words, when one comes across something which has been the source of pleasure in the past, he is moved by a desire to obtain that thing, and the movement that follows from this desire is what is meant by *ceṣṭā* (action); similarly, when one comes across something which has been the source of pain in the past, there is an activity in the shape of a movement towards the abandonment of that object, and this movement constitutes what is called *ceṣṭā*.[4] Physical organism is that which is a substratum of such activities.

Physical organism explained.

Similarly, it is defined as the substratum of sense-organs. In other words, that thing alone can be regarded as the substratum of sense-organs by whose benefit the sense-organs are benefitted and by whose injury they are injured; and it is according to this benefit or injury, that they act upon their objects, good and bad; and such a thing is the physical organism.[1]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 27.

[2] Umesha Mishra—*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. PP. 150—160.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 11.

[4] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 11.

Again, that wherein the feelings of pleasure and pain, caused by the contact of sense-organ and object, appear is the substratum of *artha* (meaning-smell, taste, colour, touch and sound). That is to say, these feelings are found only in a physical organism and not anywhere else. Hence, a physical organism is said to be the *āśraya* of *artha*.[2] It is to be made clear here that the words, *ceṣṭā* etc. have been used not in ordinary sense, but due to their particular context, in special sense. Even in common parlance, the word *ceṣṭā* is not used in the sense of every kind of action, but only in special type of action.[3]

For *bhoga* body is necessary.

It has to be kept in mind that as the physical organism has been regarded as the receptacle of the experiences of the feelings of pleasure and pain and as the experiences are possible only through action, means of experience and objects of experiences, it is but natural to have defined the physical organism to be the *āśraya* of *ceṣṭā*, *indriya* and *artha* without which no *bhoga* is possible and these again, must be in the same abode, that is, the body.

Bhoga is possible through *Ceṣṭā*, *Indriya* and *artha*.

Contact of Jīvātman with a physical organism from eternality.

The universe exists only for reaping the fruits of the past and also in some cases, present actions which are, really speaking, naturally connected with every *Jīva*. No *Jīva* can ever remain without any action at any time. This itself presupposes the existence of the *Jīva* even prior to a particular birth. This is also without any beginning, like the beginninglessness of the universe. This being so, it is also presumed that as the experiences of pleasure and pain are without any beginning, the receptacle of these feelings also must be without any beginning. Again, on the same ground, we have to admit that the contact of a *Jīva* with a particular organism is also without any beginning. So says Vātsyāyana that the connection of an organism with the *cetana* is *anādi*.[1]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 11.

[2] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 11.

[3] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 11.

It is to be kept in mind that the organism is the receptacle of pleasure and pain only in the sense that they serve the purpose of qualifying and differentiating it; it is the *Jīvātman* which is really the receptacle of pleasure and pain; as a receptacle of a thing, in the proper sense of the term, must be such as forms its substratum, that in which the thing subsists by inherence, and not merely the container.[2] And that a particular *Jīva* becomes connected with a particular organism is also due to a particular kind of action done by the *Jīva* in the past births, in order to reap the fruit for which that particular type of organism alone was essential.

It is also to be noted here that the physical organism is produced under the influence of the merit and demerit accrued from the deeds of the person concerned done in his previous birth or births.

Formation of the physical organism.

Vātsyāyana discusses this point in his *Bhāṣya* thus[3],— The *manas*, along with the sense-organs, is found to operate only within the body and not outside the body[4] of the cognizing person, so also all experiencing of objects, consisting of apprehension etc., is found to occur only in the body and likewise, his acquiring of the desired and abandoning of the undesired things and all other similar operations carried on by the man are found within the body.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 27.

[2] *Bhāṣyacandra*, on III. i. 27.

[3] III. ii. 60.

[4] It is the rays emanating from the sense-organs which go out of the body and come in contact with the object and assume its form and through those very rays the form of the object enters into the body and then through the *manas* the cognition also takes place within the body in the substratum of knowledge, the Ātman.

With regard to the formation of the body, there is a diversity of opinion, which gives rise to the following doubts: Is the formation of the man's body due to his past *karmans*, or is it the product of the *Bhūtas* (material substances), independently of any *karman*?

We have several views on this point expressed from different angles of vision, but the reality from the Nyāya point of view is given by Gotama in his *Sūtra*[1].

The formation of the physical organism is due to the persistence of the effect of previous deeds. Vardhamāna in his commentary on the *Nyāyavārttika* says, man's experiences occur in the body and so also the *manas*, like all sense-organs, functions within the body; and these facts can be explained only on the basis of man's body being produced due to his past deeds.

Again, some people think that the body of the child is due to the *karmans*, not of the child itself, but of the father and the mother of the child. But this is not wholly correct; because the body of the man must be the product of the acts of that very person who regards that body as his own self, and acts for the expreriences obtained through and in that body. But in some aspect the parent's *karman* also is responsible for the child's body.

Vātsyāyana explains the position of Gotama as follows,—

He says that the previous deeds of the person are in the form of activity of speech, thought, and physical activity, that were done by the person in his previous body (birth); the effect of the said acts consists of merit and demerit produced by them; the persistence (*anubandha*) of that effect, means the continuing of it as subsisting in the *Ātman*, and the formation of the body is out of the material substances as operated upon by the said persistence of merit and demerit, and not out of the material substances by themselves. That particular body belongs to the *Ātman* subsisting in which the *Ātman* regards it as '*I*', attached to which and desiring experiences in which, that *Ātman* obtains the various kinds of objects and acquires merit and demerit; and when this body falls off on death, another is brought into existence by the force of the *saṁskāra* in the shape of the said merit and demerit along with and operating upon the material substances; when this second body has come into existence, there go on again, actions for the fulfilment of the man's purpose, just as in the previous body; and the man's activities also go on as in the previous body. All this phenomenon is possible only on the basis of the assumption that the production of the body is out of the material substances as operated upon the Ātman's acts. In the case of such objects, as the chariot and the like, we find that being intended for the accomplishment of man's purpose, they are brought into existence out of such material substances as are operated upon by man's quality in the shape of effort; and on the analogy of this we can infer that the body, being meant to accomplish the man's purposes, comes into existence out of such material substances as are operated upon by some qualities belonging to the man, such for instance as his merit and demerit[1].

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[1] III. ii. 60.

Further, Gotama makes it quite clear that the parents are the cause of the formation of the physical organism[2]. Vātsyāyana elucidates it still further and says that every physical organism is produced from seeds in the form of ovule (*lohita*) and semen (*retas*) which constitute the seeds of the body and what brings about the birth of the body out of the material substances in the mother's womb are, (1) that *karman* of the personality himself, which is conducive to the experiences to be gone through by him in the mother's womb and (2) the *karman* of the parents which is conducive to the experiences resulting from the birth of the child. In other words, when the *semen* of the father comes in contact with the *ovule* present in the mother's womb, it is all due to the *karman* of the father. This *karman* leads to the experiences of pleasure and pain to be experienced by the would be child in the womb of the mother and also the *karman* is the cause of the experiences of the parent's pleasure and pain due to the birth of the would be child.

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[1] *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 60.

[2] *Sūtra*, III. ii. 63.

Besides, it is also necessary to point out that similarly the cause of the formation of the physical organism is the food (*āhāra*). Food (*āhāra*) stands for both solid and liquid substances; and the juices, brought about by the digestion of the *āhāra*, entering into the seed embedded in the mother's womb, undergo development along with that seed; and in that seed there is as much development as suffices for the accretion of the necessary aggregate; the accretion thus formed goes on to develop into such aggregates as (1) the cell, (2) the mass, (3) the foetus, (4) the embryo, which are all the various developing stages of the foetus, (5) the arteries, (6) the head, (7) the feet, etc.,[1] and ultimately, into what comes to be the substratum of the sense-organs. When the foetus has been formed, the juices of the food are absorbed by it through the umbilical cord, and it continues to grow till it becomes fit for being born. No such development is found to occur in the case of food lying in the dish (and not eaten by a person). From all this follows that the development of the body. of the child depends upon the past *karman* and the *saṁskāra* produced thereby of the parents[2].

This is further supported by the fact that every connection of the parents does not bring about conception; and the only explanation of this is that there is no conception when the necessary influence of past deeds of the parents is absent; and when this influence is present conception does take place. This is the only explanation possible of the said uncertainty of conception. If the material substances alone were independent (of any such influence as past *karman*), there should be no obstacle in the way of conception; for, under that hypothesis, there would be no element wanting in the causes necessary for the formation of the physical organism.[1]

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[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā* on III. ii. 64.

[2] *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 64.

Connection of Jīva with a particular body.

Then, there is another question as to how does a particular body become connected with a particular *Jīva* in order to come to the world? To this both Gotama and Vātsyāyana say that as a physical organism consists of an aggregation, brought about by means of an arrangement or disposition, most difficult to encompass, of such (heterogeneous) components as the arteries through which the bodily humours and life-breath flow, the humours of the body culminating in the semen; the tenden, skin, bones, veins, muscle, embryo and foetus; head, arms and belly; the thighs, wind, bile and phlegm permeating the body; and the mouth, throat, chest, stomach, intestines and bowels; we conclude that its formation is also due to the past deeds of the *Jīva* (parents) concerned. In the same manner, if among the causes, bringing about the body, there is nothing that is related to any particular *Jīva*, the earth and other material substances that would constitute the body would be equally related to all the *Jīvas*, among whom there would be nothing to distinguish one from the other, and there being nothing in the earth etc., themselves that would connect them with any one *Jīva*, and not with the rest, the body formed out of these would be the common substratum for the pleasure, pain and cognition of all the *Jīvas*. As a matter of fact, however, each body is found to be connected with only one particular *Jīva*; and the only explanation of this restriction is that *karman* of the past life or lives is the cause that brings about the formation of the body, so that the *kārmic* residuum of each *Jīva* being restricted to itself, it produces a body fit for being the substratum of the experiences of that particular *Jīva* in which the residuum subsists, and connects that body with that *Jīva*. Thus, it is found that just as *karman* and its *saṁskāras* of the past life are the causes of the formation of the body, so is also the connection of that body with a particular *Jīva*.[1]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. ii. 65.

The question may be further elucidated thus—When a body is born, it comes in contact with all the jīvas, since all are equally ommipresent, so that a body should belong to all the jīvas equally. To this in the light of what Gotama has said, it may be pointed out that though in a general way, all the jīvas are in contact with each and every body, yet a particular jīva alone is in contact with a particular body because of the influence of the past deeds and their *Saṁskāra* of the particular jīva, the fruition of which is possible in that particular body alone Then again, the fruition of the parent's deeds also requires that their child must have that particular type of body and no one else.

Composition of an organism-earth material cause.

Now, a further question is raised : whether the physical organism is composed of one single element or of more than one element? In reply to this Gotama says that the physical organism is mainly made of earthly elements, as the distinctive quality of earth, that is, smell, alone is found in it.[2] Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti* includes blue colour, etc., solidity and others also as the distinctive quality of earth. But this is not the place to enumerate all that is found in earth. It is necessary to mention only that which differentiates earth from other substances, like water etc.

Other elements required for body.

It is to be added that though the physical organism has earth alone as its material cause, yet it is to be understood that the earthly body can be the *adhikaraṇa* of the feelings of pleasure and pain for the *Jīva* only when other substances, like water, air, fire and *ākāśa* also constitute the earthly body; otherwise, *bhoga* cannot be possible in that body. And if the body be not an abode of *bhoga*, then it cannot be called a physical organism, nor is then there any utility of the body.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. ii. 66.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 27.

This again, is quite obvious; for the *bhoga* is possible through the instrumentality of all the five elements of this world. This is also supported by the fact that in the heavenly regions of Varuṇa, Sūrya and Vāyu though the organisms are mainly of water, fire and air respectively, as the material cause, yet those bodies also in order that *bhoga* may take place there, possess the other elements also. In order to experience pleasure and pain, it is very necessary that there must be *sthairya* (stability) in the organism, which is possible only when there is in it earthly element.[1]

Composition of paramāṇus in a body.

Uddyotakara makes full analysis of this theory of composition of an organism. He says—an object composed of earth and water would be without any smell; because, smell subsisting in a single constituent is not capable of producing smell in the product, the single element possessing smell and if it be a cause, it cannot produce any product.

Vācaspati makes this point very clear when he says that in the first place no single *dvyaṇuka* (diad) can be produced out of the combination of one earthly *paramāṇu* and one watery *paramāṇu*, as there can be no production out of one single element of one nature. Further, he says that even suppose some product is produced out of the combination of the two *paramāṇus*, earthly and watery, and as they have colour, taste and touch, even then the product cannot have smell, so it cannot be an earthly product. Again, nor can there be any product out of two earthly atoms and one single watery atom; that is, out of such three *paramāṇus*; because, many *paramāṇus* together do not produce any effect; the plurality of number in *paramāṇus* does not produce any effect, just as, it is found in the case of the production of a jar constituted of a collection (*pracaya*) of *paramāṇus*.

It is to be noted here that the order of the destruction of an object should also be in the same manner as its creation. Now, in the present case, if a jar, for instance, is produced out of the three *paramāṇus* alone, then when it is destroyed, there should be no destruction into parts,like *kapāla*, *śarkarā*, *cūrṇa* etc.. The destruction should be only, at once simultaneously, into so many *paramāṇus*, which is not a fact. So out of merely three *paramāṇus* there can be no creation.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 27—30.

Composition of body and its attributes.

Again, an object composed of earth and fire would be without smell and without any taste; the reason is the same, that is, the smell and the taste of the single component *paramāṇus* would not be productive of anything; again, an object composed of earth and air would be without smell, taste and colour; because, air is without smell; and object composed of earth and *Ākāśa* would be without smell, taste, colour and touch; because, *Ākāśa* is devoid of all these. The principle underlying all these cases is the same, that is, the quality of any single component cannot be productive of any effect.

Again, he continues, an object composed of water and fire would be without any smell and without any taste; that composed of water and air would be without any smell and without any taste and also without any colour; that composed of water and *Ākāśa* would be odourless, tasteless, colourless and touchless; that composed of fire and air would be odourless, tasteless and colourless; that composed of fire and *Ākāśa* would be odourless, tasteless, colourless and touchless; similarly, also that composed of air and *Ākāśa*; as also that composed of earth, water and fire; and also of earth, water and air; and also of earth, water and *Ākāśa*; and again, that object which is composed of earth, air and fire would be odourless and tasteless; so also that composed of earth, air and *Ākāśa* would be odourless, tasteless and colourless; that composed of earth, air and *Ākāśa* would be odourless and tasteless; so also that composed of water, fire and *Ākāśa* would be odourless, tasteless and colourless; so also that composed of fire, air and *Ākāśa*; and that composed of earth, water, fire and air would be odourless; so also that composed of earth, water, fire and *Ākāśa* and that composed of earth, water and *Ākāśa*; that composed of earth, air, fire and *Ākāśa* and that composed of earth, water and *Ākāśa*; that composed of earth, air, fire and *Ākāśa* would be odourless and colourless; so also that composed of water, air, fire and *Ākāśa*; that composed of earth, water, fire and air would be odourless; *for the simple reason that the quality of any single constituent is incapable of producing any effect.*[1]

Single Paramāṇu cannot produce anything.

It is further to be kept in mind that if any single component (*paramāṇu*) were the productive cause of anything, then there would be either constant production, or constant non-production; and the product would be eternal.[2]

Vācaspati makes this point still clear by saying that a single (*paramāṇu*) being by itself sufficient to produce its effect, and it being eternal, it would go on, without ceasing, producing its effect; or if it were non-active, then the effect would never be produced; and the destruction of an effect can be brought about either by the destruction of the constituent cause, or by the destruction and disruption of its several components; and in the event of a single *paramāṇu* being the cause, neither of these contingencies would be possible; being eternal, it cannot be destroyed; and being single, there can be no disruption of components, so that the product would be indestructible, and eternal.[3]

So it is clear that the physical organism has only earth as its material cause, while connection with other four elements is also essential as its instrumental cause for the production of the body. It is to be also noted that an earthly product is produced out of two earthly *paramāṇus* and one watery *paramāṇu.*

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[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, III. i. 28.

[2] *Nyāyavārttika*, III. i. 28.

[3] *Tātparyaṭīkā* on the *Nyāyavārttika*, III. i. 28.

Of these again, earthly *paramāṇu* alone will be the material cause, while the watery one will be the *nimitta-kāraṇa.*

Then there is also the Śruti to support the above fact. It says —*pṛthivīṁ te śarīraṁ spṛṇomi* (I create thy body out of earth); and so about the body after death, the Śruti says, *pṛthivīṁ te śarīraṁ gacchatāt* (may thy body go to earth).

(iii) *Sense-organ* (*Indriyam*)

Sense-organs explained.

Next, we come to the fourth *prameya*, namely, the *sense-organ.* It is to be always kept in mind that this world exists only for reaping the fruits of the past deeds by the *Jīvas.* The constituents of the world accordingly are also only to help the *bhoga.* Consequently, there should be means to experience the feelings of pleasure and pain through various ways. These means of *bhoga* are called sense-organs. These are also of the same nature as the objects of *bhoga.* The objects of *bhoga* are the five substances (*bhūtas*), namely, earth, water, fire, air and *Ākāśa.* So these are the five sense-organs produced out of the five substances mentioned above, that is, the sense-organs of odour, taste, vision, touch and hearing. So says the *Nyāyasūtra*—the sense-organs are regarded as being of the same nature as the *bhūtas*, because there is cognition through them of the specific qualities of these substances.[1]

Functions of the sense-organs.

Vātsyāyana explains the functions of these sense-organs thus—that by whose instrumentality one smells things is the *olfactory organ*; so called because it apprehends odour. That by whose instrumentality one tastes things is the *gestatory organ*; so called because it experiences taste. That by whose instrumentality one sees things is the *visual organ*; so called because it perceives colour. That which is located in the skin is the *cutaneous organ*; so called indirectly, because of its location. It is to be noted here that the other sense-organs are named after what is apprehended by them; while the cutaneous organ apprehends the touch of things; hence, the name *cutaneous organ* applies to it, not directly, in the sense in which the names of other organs apply, but only indirectly, in the sense that the skin is the locus of that organ.[1] That by whose instrumentality one hears sound is the *auditory organ*; so called because it apprehends sound. Thus, from the force of the literal significance of the names, the sense-organs are to be defined as the apprehenders of their respective objects.

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[1] III. i. 61.

Sense-organs are *bhautika*.

That each of the five sense-organs performs its respective function is due to the fact that each one has its separate function due to the fact that each one has its separate material cause,[2] namely the five *bhūtas*. Then, this is also to be pointed out that as the cause of the various sense-organs is the five *bhūtas* respectively, all of them are *bhautikas*, that is, products of *bhūtas*. As for instance, the pupil (*kṛṣṇasāra*) is the eye-ball which is made of fiery elements, which is a *bhūta*. Again, it is to be noted that the centre of *tejas* is within the body which sends its rays through the two eye-balls. Eye-balls are not the visual organ. Same is the case with the rest of the four substances. Hence, all the five sense-organs are material (*bhautika*).

These sense-organs come in contact with their respective objects either by sending their rays to the object or by receiving their material contact in their own place. On account of the five-foldness of the processes also there is diversity in the sense-organs : namely, in visual perception, the visual organ encased in the pupil issues rays outside and then gets at the object possessed of colour and assumes the form of the object; the organs of touch, taste and odour, on the other hand, are themselves got at by the objects, which latter reach the organs by the movements of the body in which the organs exist; while the contact of the auditory organ with the sound (heard) is obtained by reason of this latter proceedings in a series.[1] Hence, they are called *prāpyakārins*.

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[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 12.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 12.

Sense-organs are super-sensuous.

It may also be pointed out here that the visual sense-organ being a product of fiery elements, possesses rays through which the sense-organ comes in contact with its objects far or near, small and big. Then there is the direct perception of the object. In *tejas* there are *rūpa* and *sparśa* (colour and touch). But the visual organ is not visible. Like other sense-organs, it is supersensuous. But this is somewhat strange that in spite of the fact that visual-sense-organ is a product of fiery elements which has colour and touch and through which objects are perceived, it itself is super-sensuous.

To clarify this point Vātsyāyana says, that in order to have direct perception of colour it is necessary that the colour to be perceived is manifest and not unmanifest. The visual organ, no doubt, possesses *rūpa*, but it is unmanifest. The reason why it is so is that the formation of the sense-organs, being due to merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*) (which are unmanifest) is subservient to the purposes of man (*puruṣārthatantra*).[2] In other words, as a matter of fact, these sense-organs are produced due to the merits and demerits of a man for his *bhoga*. Each and every sense-organ is so formed under the influence of a particular type of merit or demerit, as to facilitate the *bhoga* of the deeds of a man's past life. This is again, possible only when a sense-organ comes in contact with its object. It is therefore, that the sense-organs are called *prāpyakārins*.

One sense-organ alone is in a body or five discussed.

Then, the next question is whether there is only one sense-organ pervading throughout the body and due to its different locations the single sense-organ performs different functions, or that there are several sense-organs in a physical organism? For instance, there is only one sense-organ namely, *tactile organ* (*tvag-indriya*), which is present every-where in the body and as without its aid no sense-organ can function, it may be presumed that the tactile sense-organ is the only sense-organ pervading throughout a body.[1] Hence, it follows that there is a single sense-organ, namely, the tactile organ, by which all sense substrata are pervaded, and in whose presence alone the perception of things is possible and all other cognitions through sense-organs take place.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 60.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 39.

But this is a wrong view, says the Bhāṣyakāra; because, there is really no perception by the tactile organ of the objects of other sense-organs. The distinctive feature of the tactile organ is that it is the instrument of the perception of touch alone; and when by means of this tactile organ, the touch of a certain object is experienced, there is no experience of the objects of other sense-organs, such for instance, as colour, etc., by such persons as are devoid of the visual organ, even though endowed with an efficient tactile-organ. Again, it is to be noted that the blind man should have perceived colour as well as he can feel touch, but this is not a fact. He never perceives colour though there is the tactile organ throughout his whole body even in the substratum of his eyes. Hence, it is concluded that it is not true that there is only one sense-organ; because, several objects are not cognized simultaneously.[2]

Criticism of ekendriyavāda.

Vātsyāyana makes the point more lucid when he says that according to the view that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all objects, what would happen is that the *Ātman* would come in contact with the *manas*, the *manas* with the single is only one sense-organ namely, *tactile organ* (*tvag-indriya*), which is present every-where in the body and as without its aid no sense-organ can function, it may be presumed that the tactile sense-organ is the only sense-organ pervading throughout a body.[1] Hence, it follows that there is a single sense-organ, namely, the tactile organ, by which all sense substrata are pervaded, and in whose presence alone the perception of things is possible and all other cognitions through sense-organs take place.

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[1] This *ekendriyavāda* is an old Sāṅkhya view as has been mentioned in the *Sāṅkarabhāṣya* (II. ii. 10) upon which the *Ratna-prabhā* says—tvaṅmātrameva jñānendriyaṁ ekamanekaśabdādi-jñānakāraṇam. It is therefore, that they believe in seven sense-organs namely, the five usually recognized sense-organs and *manas* and *Buddhi*. *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya* III. i. 53.

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Nyāyasūtra and *Bhāṣya*, III, i. 53.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III, i. 54.

Sāṅkhya has for the first time recognized the other six sense-organs.

By the way, it is to be mentioned that it is at the stage of the Sāṅkhya system alone that the rest of the six sense-organs have been accepted as sense-organs and not in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Jayanta also holds the same view[2]. Again, it is further said that the five sense-organs being the means of cognition and as these are the means to lead to the existence of *indra* (*Ātman*), these are called *indriyāṇi*.

(iv) *Artha*

By *artha* the Nyāya system understands the specific qualities of earth, water, fire, air and *Ākāśa*, namely, odour, taste, colour, touch and sound respectively; which are the objects of *bhoga* through the five sense-organs.[3] So really speaking, by *artha* is meant the objects of the five sense-organs only (indriyāṇāmarthāḥ).

It has to be pointed out at this place that though there can be *ṣaṣṭhī samāsa* in *pṛthivyādiguṇāḥ*, *pṛthivyā-*

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[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, III. i. 61. [2] *Nyāyamañjarī*, PP. 483-484.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 14.

dīnāṁ guṇāḥ, *dvandva* as *pṛthivyādīni ca guṇāśceti*, and also *bahuvrīhi* as *prthivyādayo guṇā yeṣāmiti*, yet Uddyotakara takes it as a case of *dvandva-samāsa* and rejects the possibility of other *samāsas*. This interpretation is supported both by reason and authority, says Uddyotakara. He quotes the *Gotamasūtra-darśanasparśanābhyāmekārthagrahanāt*,[1] where the author has used the word *artha* in the sense of any cognizable object. This same sūtra also gives the reason that, as a matter of fact, we recognize the organs of both vision and touch as apprehending the same thing; as we have such a notion as 'I am touching the same thing which I had seen' and this experience supplies the *reason* as regards sight and touch bearing upon earth; and the sūtra quoted above supplies the *authority* and the requisite *authority* is also afforded by the fact that the Nyāya-śāstra declares that *Sāmānya* is perceptible by the senses, and *Sāmānya* belongs to earth, etc., also, and not only to odour and the other qualities. So, it is proved that there is *dvandva-samāsa* in the term *pṛthivyādiguṇāḥ*, meaning, earth etc., and their qualities.[2]

Uddyotakara's view.

But it appears that Uddyotakara has misunderstood the meaning of the term *artha* used in the *Sūtra*[3] quoted above. In this place, the word *artha* is used in ordinary sense, meaning *objects*; while in the *Sūtra*[4] under reference, the term *artha* has been used in the technical Nyāya-sense. So in this context, the specific qualities of each of the five *bhūtas* separately have been mentioned.

Uddyotakara's view not correct.

Moreover, the direct realization of the five specific qualities, namely, odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, of the five *bhūtas* respectively, is a direct cause of *apavarga*; and it is therefore, that they alone have been used here in this sense. Hence, the term *artha* has been used here in this particular *Sūtra* in the special sense and not in ordinary sense.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 1.

[2] *Nyāyavārttika* on I. i. 14.

[3] III. i. 1.

[4] I. i. 14.

(v) *Buddhi*

Buddhi (cognition) has been defined as *bhoga*.[1] It means direct experience of pleasure and pain. It is a quality of the *Ātman* and not of the sense-organs, nor of the objects (*artha*).[2] As cognition or experience is possible even if the sense-organs are destroyed, as when we say that *we have seen a particular object even when the organ of vision is destroyed*, or the object of perception is destroyed, it cannot be said to be a quality of the sense-organ, or of objects. Nor can it be a quality of *manas*, whose existence is inferred from the fact that *jñāna* of objects is not simultaneous and also because the cognition of things is not simultaneous, and again, also because the simultaneous cognition of things actually appearing in mystics would be inexiplicable, if cognition belonged to *manas*.[3]

Buddhi explained.

It has been variously defined. Some define it as light (*prakāśa*) which has *Ātman* as its *āśraya* (substratum),[4] while some hold it as light (cognition) of objects (*arthaprakāśaḥ*). The *Siddhāntacandrikā*, however, defines it as *jnāna* which is the cause of all our day-to-day actions[6]. Buddhi has no form. It is always to be expressed through some object alone. Thus, the cognition in the form—*I possess the knowledge of a jar*, alone is correct.[7]

Divisions of Buddhi.

This *Buddhi* (cognition) is of two types—*smṛti* and *anubhava* (remembrance and experience.) Both these forms are attributed to non-eternal type of cognition, while the eternal cognition (*nitya-jñāna*) is attributed to the *Paramātman* alone. Non-eternal form of *Buddhi* belongs to the *Jīvātman*. Again, this is either correct or erroneous. All cases of *smṛti* are non-eternal and belongs to the *Jīvātman* alone. *Anubhava* is also eternal and non-eternal. Eternal form of *anubhava* belongs to the *Paramātman* and is only of one type, that is, direct perception (*sākṣātkārī*). Non-eternal forms of *anubhava* belongs to the *Jīvātman* and is of four types according to Nyāya, namely, Pratyaksa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda. All these are *Pramāṇas* and have been already discussed before. As regards the *smṛti* all that the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools have to say are given below :

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 9. [2] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. ii. 18.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. ii. 19.

[4] *Padārthacandrikā*, a com. on the *Saptapadārthī*, P. 30; *Saptapadārthi*, p. 47.

[5] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 149; *Tārkikarakṣā*, P. 124; Reprint from the Pandit.

[6] *Nyāyakośa*, P. 557; *Tarkasaṅgraha*, P. 173 Bodas edition.

[7] *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 150-51.

Nature of universe

It is a fact that nothing is lost in the universe. It is only a change of form that takes place, while the essentials remain the same. Each and every form that appears before us retains its individuality and retires in the same form in some other corner of the mental world after giving rise to another form in succession. This is not only true of the material substances but also of the mental objects, such as, cognition, desire, will, etc. Thus, when a man perceives something, no doubt, that actual perception vanishes from the sight in the next moment giving place to another cognition, but nevertheless, it is retained in some subtler form somewhere else. In other words, it can be said, with certain confidence, that everything, whether mental or extra-mental, that comes to exist once, does remain in some subtler form in the Ātman although new forms spring up out of it in succession. It is, therefore, true to say that everything and anything of the past experience, either of this life or of the previous life or lives, can very well be recalled in some other form, without changing it in essence. This is a fact which cannot be gainsaid. If the experience had entirely changed or lost, it would not have been possible to *recall* and *recognize* it even after a short interval and express it as 'I had cognized it even

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As there is not much difference between the views of the two schools on *smṛti*, I treat the problem from both the points together at this place.

before.' So has been said—'*nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*.

Smṛti defined.

The mental faculty which is responsible for the above statement is *Smṛti*. About the definition of this term no clear idea is found in either the *Nyāya* works or the *Vaiśeṣika* works. The little that we know of it is that *Smṛti* is an attribute of the *Ātman*,[1] and that it cannot be anything else.[2] This being a fact, *Smṛti* can be included in the *Buddhi* or *Jñāna* only. In other words, we can define *Smṛti* as a form of *Buddhi* which inheres in the *Ātman* by *Samavāya* relation. It is that faculty of living beings upon which worldly *vyavahāra* (usage) entirely depends.[3] It is generally expressed in the following forms of judgment :—(a) I knew that thing; (b) I had cognized that thing; (c) That thing had been cognized by me; and (d) I had a cognition in regard to that thing.[4] From all these it is clear that the act of *Smaraṇa* is a *recognition* of what had been already cognized.

Difference between Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

[Similar idea is found in the *Vaiśeṣika* works also.[5] *Praśastapāda* makes it more clear and says that *Buddhi* is of two kinds—*Vidyā* and *Avidyā*. *Smṛti* is one of the four sub-divisions of the former.[6] *Vidyā* has been characterised as a cognition which is free from doubts and contradictions and is decisive; hence, *Smṛti* is also of the same nature.][7]

Almost all the later writers on *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* hold a similar view about the meaning and classification of *Smṛti*. The only difference is that they differ from *Praśastapāda* in sub-dividing *Buddhi*. They hold that *Buddhi* is sub-divided into *Anubhava* and *Smṛti*; and the former is again sub-divided into *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *Upamāna*, and *Śabda*, while the latter is left alone. In other words, *Smṛti* is not classified under the same head along with *Pratyakṣa* etc. by the later writers, as has been done by *Praśastapāda*.[1] This shows that according to *Praśastapāda*, *Smṛti* is a separate means of right cognition like *Pratyakṣa* etc. This view has found its support in the *Nyāya-līlāvatī*. *Vallabhācārya* says that its being a separate means of cognition should not be denied on the ground that it is not used as *Pramā*; for, when it tallies with the actual past experience, it is clear that there is the use of *Pramā* as regards *Smṛti*. *Gautama* and *Kaṇāda* and their followers do not hold this view.[2] Later on, the author of the *Kandalī* refutes it.[3] The position of *Vallabhācārya* is clear; for, according to him, it appears, *Pramā* is that which corresponds to the reality.

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[1] *Nyāya-Sūtra*, III. i. 14; I ii. 40

[2] *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya* on *Ibid*.

[3] *Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya*, III. i. 4. p. 455, Dr. Jha's Edition.

[4] *Nyāya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, III. i. 14. p. 456.

[5] *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, 9. ii 6.

[6] *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. pp. 172 and 186, Vizianagaram Series Ed.

[7] *Kandalī* p. 172.

Process of Smṛti-formation

After the usual process of cognition, when the result is obtained, a kind of impression (*Saṁskāra*) is left behind by that resultant cognition which itself vanishes afterwards. Such an impression, which is the exact copy of that cognition, has got the *Ātman* as its substratum. Every piece of cognition leaves behind it an impression. But those which are due to (a) intensified (*Paṭu*) cognitions, (b) repeated cognitions, and (c) impressive (*ādara*) cognitions produced by special efforts, are more vivid and are easily recalled.[4] This has been explained by *Śrīdhara*,[5] as :—

(a) *Paṭupratyayaja*—We find that a *forcible mental impression* is produced when the *Ātma-Manas-contact* is influenced by the *intensified cognition* of an object that excites the wonder of the observer; as for instance, the man of the South having never seen a camel finds it a wonderful object; hence, when he perceives it, his cognition of it is so intensified that it leaves behind it a lasting impression on his *Ātman* and thus, it makes him vividly remember it later on.

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[1] *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, p. 186.

[2] *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, pp. 67-68, Nirnayasagara Ed. 1915.

[3] *Kandalī*, p. 257.

[4] *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, p. 267; Dr. Jha's Trans. pp 573-74.

[5] *Kandalī*, pp. 267-268.

(2) *Abhyāsapratyayaja*—In regard to such things, as (a) *study* : learning of the śāstras and *Āgama* etc.; (b) *arts* : painting of pictures etc., and (c) *physical exercise* : practice of the use of the weapons etc., we find that these are regularly practised with reference to one and the same object, and the impression produced on the *Ātman* remains for a long time and thus, the *Smṛti*, due to this, is extremely vivid.

(3) *Ādarapratyayaja*—When a man puts forth special efforts to perceive an object never seen before, the cognition, that he has, is as impressive as the perception of the flash of lightning; and it is such a cognition that is meant by the term *ādarapratyayaja*, and when the *Ātma-Manas-contact* is aided by such a cognition, there appears a peculiarly intensified impression on the *Ātman*; this character is indicated by the fact of its not disappearing even after the interval of a long time. For example, on the full-moon day of the month of *Caitra*, which has come in contact with the *spica-star* (*Citrā-nakṣatra*), at midnight are seen silver and golden lotuses in the *Deva-hrada*. Having heard this, many people gather on that day on the banks of the lake, with a view to witness the phenomenon, and when the middle of the night is about to arrive, they fix their eyes and their *Manas* intently on the lake. The lotuses actually appear and even though they are perceived but for a moment, the sight is so impressive that the impression created on the *Ātman* is very vivid and tends to the fact being remembered very distinctly even after a lapse of time.

Such an impression is left behind, by the cognition, on the *Ātman*. After the cognition and the impression of that cognition have been stamped on the *Ātman*, the man who had that cognition forgets altogether that act of cognition. He is also not aware of the fact that any impression had been produced and left behind on the *Ātman*, for the impression was not perceptible to our external sense-organs.

After this when the same man, who had the cognition and on whose *Ātman* the impression was stamped, desires to recollect his particular cognition of the past through some associations, he makes an effort by directing his *Manas*[1] towards it, and with the help of the following causes, *Praṇidhāna* etc., the impressions are aroused and through the *Law of Association* and the resemblance of the charcteristics of the particular thing to be remembered, recollection of the desired object takes place.

Causes which arouse Smṛti

The following are some of the causes by which *Smṛti* takes place[2]:—

1. *Praṇidhāna*—when we desire to remember anything, we withdraw our *Manas* from all other things and direct it towards that very thing which we want to recollect or towards the attributes of that very thing which will finally lead us to the desired object. This act of concentrating the *Manas* is called *Praṇidhāna.*
2. *Nibandha*—when a number of topics are treated in one book, those topics become mutually related so much so that when one of these is seen, others are also remembered. For instance, says Vācaspati Miśra,[3] in this very *Bhāṣya* of *Vātsyāyana*, the *Pramāṇa* and *Prameya* etc. are arranged in one connection, so that when a man cognises *Pramāṇa* he also remembers *Prameya* and *Vice Versa.*
3. *Abhyāsa*—is an attribute of the *Ātman* produced by the repetitions of the same object.[4]

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[1] *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya* on *Nyāya-Sūtra*, III. ii. 30, p. 582, Dr. Jha's Ed.

[2] *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 41.

[3] *Tātparya-ṭīkā*, p. 574, Kashi-Sanskrit Series, Benares, Ed.

[4] This *Abhyāsa* produces *Saṁskāra* which then produces *Smṛti.*

4. *Liṅga*—is of four kinds—(a) *Saṁyogi*, as for instance, smoke is the *Saṁyogi-Liṅga* of fire; (b) *Samavāyi*, as for instance, the horn is the *Samavāyi-Liṅga* of the cow; (c) *Ekārtha-Samavāyi* (co-inherence in one substratum), for instance (1) the hand is the *Ekārtha-Samavāyi-Liṅga* of the feet;[1] (2) and the colour is the *Ekārtha-Samavāyi-Liṅga* of touch[2]; and (d) *Virodhi*—for example, non-*bhūtas* are the *Virodhi* (*contradictory*)-*Liṅga* of the *Bhūtas*.

5. *Lakṣaṇa*—as the limb of an animal reminds us of the class of that animal.

6. *Sādṛśya*—the resemblances of *Devadatta* seen in the picture remind us of *Devadatta*.

7. *Parigraha*—ownership—as the servant reminds us of the master and *Vice Versa*.

8-9. *Āśraya* and *Āśrita*—as the sight of the leader reminds us of his subordinates and *Vice Versa*.

10. *Sambandha*[3]—the pupil reminds us of the teacher and the priest of the *Yajamāna*.

11. *Ānantarya*—sequence—where the first act reminds us of the consequent acts.

12. *Viyoga*—separation—when a man is separated from another and feels the separation, he remembers the other and *Vice Versa*.

13. *Ekakārya*—co-profession, as for instance, one cutter reminds us of another cutter.

14. *Virodha*—of two rivals. The sight of one reminds us of the other.

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[1] This illustration is possible when the *Samāsa* of the term is as—

ekasyāvayavinorthasya samavāyotra.

[2] In this case the *Samāsa* would be—ekasminnarthe Samavāyo yasya.

[3] Some sort of relationship is involved in all that is enumerated here. Hence, *Sambandha* here stands for other than that which is specially enumerated—*Tātparya*, p. 575.

15. *Atiśaya*[1]—Greatness reminds us of that which produced it.

16. *Prāpti*—when one has either acquired a thing, or wishes to acquire it, he is frequently reminded of the thing to be acquired.

17. *Vyavadhāna*—Cover reminds us of that which is hidden under it; as the sheath reminds us of the sword.

18-19. *Sukha* and *Duḥkha*—Pleasure and pain remind us of their causes.

20-21. *Icchā* and *Dveṣa*—Desire and Aversion remind us of that which is desired or hated.

22. *Bhaya*—Fear reminds us of its cause.

23. *Arthitva*—reminds us of the objects which are required.

24. *Kriyā*—The action of a man reminds us of that man; as the movement of a chariot reminds us of its maker.

25. *Rāga*—Love reminds us of the beloved.

26. *Dharma*—Merit reminds us of our castes of previous births.

27. *Adharma*—Demerit reminds us of the causes of pain experienced before.

These are some of the causes which according to the *Nyāya-Sūtra* lead to *Smṛti*. A careful study of these shows that all these are so many phases of one and the same general law-the *Law of Association* which is stated as—ekasambandhijñānamaparasambadhinaṁ smārayati.

Thus, the directed *Manas* comes in contact with the *Ātman* which possesses that impression of particular cognition which is to be remembered; and through the *Ātman* the *Manas* comes in contact with the particular impression by the relation of *Saṁyukta*-

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[1] It also means *Saṁskāra*. In that case the *Upanayana-Sāṁskāra* reminds us of the *Ācārya*.

Samavāya and then that impression is revived and the past experience is recalled. Sometimes recollection takes place very soon while in some cases, it takes time. In the former case, it is due to the intensity and the vividness of the impression. In the latter case, there are two reasons : (a) a very simple reason is that the impression is very dull due to the unforcible nature of the cognition; (b) the *Ātman* is *Vibhu.* It extends even outside the limitations of our body. Impressions find their place on the *Ātman* both in and out of the organism; for, no two impressions can exist together in the same place. In case the impression, for the revival of which an effort is to be made, be on the *Ātman* which is not within the limitation of the organism, the *Manas* has to go out of the organism, to come in contact with the *Ātman* on which that impression is stamped; and it is, therefore, that the *Smṛti* takes place after a long lapse of time.[1]

Causes of delay in recollection

This view has been refuted by *Gotama* and his followers. They hold that (a) the *Manas* cannot go out of the organism as long as the particular man who is to remember is living. If the *Manas* goes out, the body will fall down as dead. (b) If at all, the *Manas* goes out, the *Ātman-Manas-contact* thus brought about cannot produce any cognition; for, cognition being a form of *Bhoga* must take place and be felt in the *Bhogāyatana*, that is, the organism.[2]

The opponent holds against the above that the organism will not fall down; for, the *Manas*, being very swift in moving, can go out of the organism. With the revival of the impressions, it returns so quickly and gives rise to that *Prayatna* which will allow the organism not to fall down. It may be just the otherwise also. That is, the *Manas* after producing the *Prayatna*, goes out and returns very swiftly. Hence, the *Manas* can arouse the impressions outside the organism as well as can cause the organism to be retained also.[1]

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[1] *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 25. and 29.

[2] *Nyāya-sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 26-28 pp. 578-81; *Tātparya*, p. 567.

This has been also rejected.[2] *Vātsyāyana* gives his own explanation for the delay in recollecting. Thus, he says that the *Manas* is held concentrated with a desire to remember and there appears a series of thoughts; and when of those thoughts, there appears the thought of object which serves to be the specific characteristic of the thing to be remembered, then *Smṛti* takes place.[3] This whole process takes some time which causes delay in *Smṛti*.

Simultaneity of recollection discussed

As to the question of simultaneity of *Smṛti*, we know that the *Ātma-Manas-contact* is an essential factor of a cognition. *Manas*, being atomic, cannot come in contact with more than one point on the *Ātman*, at a time. Thus, there is no possibility of simultaneity of any cognition. But this does not put an end to our query; for, even this being a fact, the seat of *Smṛti*, which is the *Ātman*, is not a material substance and hence, we cannot speak of there being points (*Pradeśas*) on the *Ātman*, and also of the fact that impressions occupy separate place on the *Ātman*. That is, all the impressions may co-inhere in the same substratum without there being any overlapping.

This being the fact, when the *Manas* comes in contact with the *Ātman* and through it with the impressions, why does not the *Manas* come in contact with all the impressions inherent there and cause the *Smṛti* of all the impressions simultaneously?

The answer is that no doubt, the *Manas* can come in contact with all the impressions but that is not the only cause of cognition. There are other *auxiliary causes* which being absent do not make the simultaneity of cognition possible. It is, therefore, that the word *Pratyāsatti* has been explained by *Uddyota-*

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[1] *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 29, PP. 581-2

[2] *Nyāya-sūtra and Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 30

[3] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 30.

kara as meaning "*The presence of auxiliary causes.*" The case is the same as that of sound. It is this : all the several sounds appearing in a series inhere in *Ākāśa*, a common substratum, yet only those of them are actually heard the *auxiliary causes* of whose cognition are present, and others are not heard. Similarly, in the present case, those impressions alone lead to *Smṛti* which have for their revival their *auxiliary causes* present.[1] Hence, like all other cognitions, *Smṛti* also does not happen simultaneously.

Smṛti and Anubhava

Smṛti and *Anubhava* have been separated under two distinct heads by the later *Naiyāyikas*. But *Anubhava*, used in its widest sense, meaning cognition, can include the former under it. This is clear from the treatment of it by *Praśastapāda*.

Pratyabhijñā and Smṛti.

Pratyabhijñā and Smṛti :—These are two different processes of our mental faculty. In the case of *Smṛti*, it is not at all necessary that the thing which is to be remembered should be present before our sense-organs, while in the case of *Pratyabhijñā* it is essential that the thing which is to be recognized should be perceived by the external sense-organ at the time of its recognition. When a man, for instance, who has seen a tree with a monkey on it, sees either the tree or the monkey alone, he at once remembers the other one, through the *Law of Association*. This is a case of *Smṛti*. In the case of *Pratyabhijñā*, the object which is recognized is actually present before the external sense-organs. Thus, in *Pratyabhijñā* the impression as well as the actual perception of the thing perceived before are equally important. As for instance, on seeing *Devadatta* who had been seen before, one recognizes that he is the same *Devadatta* whom one had seen before.

Some are of opinion that impression is the direct cause of *Smṛti*, while in *Pratyabhijñā*, *Smṛti* produces remembrance of identity, which, in its turn, is the direct cause of *Pratyabhijñā.* Truly speaking, *Pratyabhijñā* depends upon *Smṛti* for its existence.

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[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 427, Benares edition.

Smṛti and Svapna.

Smṛti and Svapna :—Some identify these two terms. The reason is that there is some resemblance between the two, as some of their causes are, in several respects, common.[1] But they are two different things of our mental world. *Smṛti,* which tallies with the actual occurrence, is not included under *avidyā*— false knowledge—while *Svapna*[2] is generally false except in some case of "*Prophetic dreams*" etc. which always refer to the future. *Smṛti* is only a *reproduction* of the past experience ordinarily without any addition of novelty. There is no *displacement* in it. In the case of *Svapna,* the displacement and novelty are mostly found.

Smṛti and Anuvyavasāya

Smṛti and Anuvyavasāya :—These are also two different processes. According to *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* when any cognition takes place, there is a desire in the mind of the cognizer to know whether the cognition has really taken place. Hence, just after the cognition the cognizer has to direct his *Manas* towards that cognition and then he perceives through his *Manas* the previous cognition and expresses within himself in the form "I possess the knowledge of a jar." This *Mānasika* perception of the previous cognition is called *anuvyavasāya.* It should be treated as different from *Smṛti* for following reasons : (a) there is no lapse of time; and (b) there is no necessity of the revival of the impression. The common points are : (a) both are objects of our *Mānasika* perception; and (b) a desire to direct the *Manas* towards the bringing up of the previous cognition is also common.

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[1] *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. ii. 34; *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, IX.ii. 6-7; Umesha Mishra—*Dream Theory in Indian Thought*, pp. 273-85, Allahabad University Studies, Vol. 5.

[2] For further details *vide*—Umesha Mishra—*Dream Theory in Indian Thought*, Allahabad University Studies, Vol. 5.

Erroneus cognitions explained.

About the erroneous type of *anubhava* Uddyotakara has defined it as *atasmin tat iti pratyayaḥ* (that which it is not, knowing it to be that)[1]. In other words, erroneous cognition is that which is not proved through any means of right knowledge and is contrary to the reality.[2] As for instance, cognizing a piece of rope as snake, or a piece of *śukti* as silver.

Divisions of erroneous cognition

Wrong cognition is of three types—doubt (*saṁśaya*), *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning) and perverse knowledge (*viparyaya*). Doubt has a special place in this system. It distinguishes the Nyāyaśāstra from its being identified merely with *adhyātma-vidyā* (metaphysical science).[3] No *Science of Reasoning* can be possible without believing in *doubt*, nor any conclusion can be arrived at without *doubt*; so says the *Gotamasūtra*,[4] which means—on any matter held in suspence, that is, it is doutful, when the reality of sides things is ascertained by means of considering the two of the quetion, we have what is called *demonstrated truth* (*nirṇaya*).

Doubt and its causes.

Doubt is that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any object is wanting, and which arises either, (1) from cognition of the characters common to the objects concerned, or (2) from the cognition of characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects, or (3) from the presence of contradictory opinions; and the appearing of such wavering judgments is due to the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions.

Vātsyāyana explains these three along with the other two with the following illustrations. For instance, he says, (1) when a man perceives the qualities of length and breadth which are common to a man and a post, and is desirous of detecting the previously perceived characters that would distinguish the one from the other, there arises in his mind the idea whether it is this or that; and he cannot ascertain whether it is the one or the other; it is this uncertain cognition that constitutes *doubt*; and what raises the doubt is the *want*, appearing in the form,—I can perceive only such characters as are common to the two things, and do not perceive the distinctive features of either.

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[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 2, P. 72 Calcutta edition.

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 150 Pandit edition.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[4] 1. i. 41.

(2) The second type of *doubt* is illustrated thus—Sound is found to be endowed with a specific property, in the form of being produced by disjunction; and the cognition of this character gives rise to the *doubt* as to whether sound is a substance, a quality, or an action. Inasmuch as the specific characters of things are found to serve both purposes of distinguishing from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things, there naturally arises a doubt as to whether, (a) being an entity, sound is a *substance* distinguished by the said specific character from qualities and actions, or (b) being an entity, it is a *quality* distinguished by that character, or (c) being an entity, it is an *action* distinguished by that character. And in this case the *want* of the cognition of the specific property (*viśeṣāpekṣā*) is in the form of the idea,—I do not preceive any such character as would definitely indicate any one of the three (substance, quality and action).

(3) The third type of *doubt* is thus explained by Vātsyāyana—One system of philosophy asserts that the *Ātman* exists, while another declares that there is no such thing as the *Ātman*; and when no proof. one way or the other, is available, there is an uncertainty as to the truth; and this constitutes *doubt*.

(4) The fourth type of *doubt* is caused by the uncertainty attaching to perceptions. As a matter of fact, there is perception of really existing water, as in the tank and such other reservoirs; there is perception also of non-existent water, in the rays of the sun appearing in the mirage; so that when in any

particular case there is perception of water, and yet there is no proof available which would determine the real character of what is perceived, there arises *doubt* as to whether the water perceived is really existent or non-existent (*upalabdhi-avyavasthā*).

(5) The fifth type of cause which creates *doubt* is thus explained :—As a matter of fact we find that even really existing things are not perceived; as for example, we do not perceive the water within the roots and branches of trees; and there is non-perception also of what is non-existent, that is, of what is not produced at all; or what has been destroyed; so that whenever there is non-perception of a thing there arises *doubt* as to whether what is not perceived really exists or it does not exist at all.

Vātsyāyana gives reason as to why has he separated the last two types of *doubt* as quite distinct. He says in the first two kinds of *doubt*, the common properties and the property distinguishing particular object from diverse (*aneka*) objects are such as subsist in the object cognized itself, while in the fourth kind, the perception and the non-perception subsist in the cognizing person; and it is only by reason of this difference or peculiarity that these have been mentioned separately.

View of Vārttika and Tātparya about the divisions.

It is to be pointed out here that the *Vārttika* and the *Tātparya* both defer from the above view and hold that there are only *three* types of doubt and not five as the *Bhāsya* explains. So says the *Vārttika*—Some (which includes the *Bhāṣya* as well) take the words of the sūtra to mean that there are five kinds of *doubt*; they construe the sūtra as—*doubt* is that wavering judgment in which the cognition of the specific character of any object is wanting and which arises from the cognition of common characteristics, and so on also with each of the remaining terms. But this interpretation is not correct. The *Vārttika* discusses this point at great length and ends with a clear remark that, thus, it is established that there are only *three* kinds of *doubt.*[1]

Tarka explained.

The next erroneos cognition is known as *Tarka.* It has been defined and explained by the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya* as—When the real character of a thing is not well-known, there is put forward, for the purpose of ascertaining that real character, a reasoning in support of a certain conclusion, which indicates the presence of proof showing the undesirability or absurdity of a contrary conclusion This is called *Tarka.*[2] It is thus illustrated—As an example of this *Tarka,* we have the following in regard to the cognitive *Ātman* being a product and having a beginning, or being beginningless. First of all there arises a desire to know the real character of the cognizer, the agent, who cognizes what is to be cognized; this desire being in the form—may I know the real character of the cognizer? Then comes the doubt in the form, has this cognizer a beginning, or is it beginningless? Thus, the real character of the thing being in doubt, and not well-known, the enquirer accepts and assents to that particular character in support of which he finds proofs and grounds for acceptance. For instance, in the particular case, the proof would be in the following form—If the cognizer (*jñātā*) were beginningless, then alone would birth and rebirth and release be possible for him; birth and rebirth consisting in the functioning, one after the other, of pain, birth, activity, defect and ignorance, among whom that which follows is the cause of that which precedes it; and release consisting in the disappearance, one after the other, of these same and both of these would be impossible for him, if the cognizer had a beginning; for in that case the cognizer would be connected with a particular set of body, sense-organs, intellect (*buddhi*) and feelings (*vedanā*), only when he would come into existence for the first time; so that these body and the rest could not be the product of his own past actions; and further, anything that is born also ceases to exist very soon after; so that, becoming non-existent or destroyed, he would not be these to undergo the experiences resulting from his actions; thus, then for any one cognizer, it would be absolutely impossible to have either connection with more than one body or disconnection from any body at all. If in another instance, the reasoner finds no such proof forthcoming, he does not accept or assent to the conclusion. It is a reasoning of this kind which is called *Tarka*.

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[1] PP. 249—53, *Calcutta Sanskrit series edition*

[2] I. i. 40.

Tarka cannot be said to be embodying the *knowledge* itself; because, as a matter of fact, it is indecisive, being purely permissive in its character, the reasoner simply asserting to the assertion of one of the two suspected characters, on the strength of the proof adduced; and one cannot by this reasoning alone accurately determine that the thing must be so and so. So *Tarka* only helps the *Pramānas* to acquire knowledge and is not a *Pramāna* itself (*pramānānāmanugrāhakastarkaḥ, na pramānam*).[1]

Viparyaya is the third type of wrong notion. It has been explained as taking a thing to be some particular thing which it is not; as for example, taking a piece of *śukti* which is not silver, to be a piece of silver.[2]

(vi) *Manas*

Existence of *manas* proved

We now come to the sixth *prameya*, called *Manas* translated as mind in the absence of a more accurate term. It has been defined by Gotama as— *Yugapajñānānutpattirmanasoliṅgam*:[3] Meaning-as it is not directly perceived, its existence is proved through the non-simultaneous production of knowledge. That is, it is not perceived through *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, so its existence in only inferred. For inferring its existence, the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions is the probans.[1] Vātsyāyana explains it as—inasmuch as remembrance and the rest like inference, verbal cognition, doubt, intuition, dream, imagination, perception of pleasure, existence of which cannot be denied, are not brought about by the instrumentality of the external sense-organs, they must be due to some other organ. As a matter of fact, we find that even though at one and the same time several perceptible objects, like odour and the rest, are in close proximity to the respectively perceptive sense-organs, the visual organ and the rest, yet there is no simultaneous cognition of them; and from this we infer that there is no other cause, by whose proximity cognition appears, and on account of whose non-proximity cognition does not appear; this other organ being in contact with the several sense-organs, and helping them, and being non-pervasive in its dimension. If the proximity of sense-organs to their objects, by themselves, independently of the contact of the *manas*, were the sole cause of cognitions, then it would be quite possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously.[2]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 40.

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 150.

[3] I. i. 16.

It is atomic in dimension and thus, eternal, and is in contact with the pervasive *Ātman*. By atomic the science means that particular element which does not occupy any space and is the smallest particle, smaller than which no element exists. It is the inner sense-organ. It is eternal and possesses *saṅkhyā* (number), dimension (*parimāṇa*), *pṛthaktva* (separateness), contact and disjunction, *paratva*, *aparatva* and velocity (*vega*).[3]

Attributes of manas.

As there is no simultaneous cognitions, it is proved that there is only one *manas* is one organism.[4] Vātsyāyana explains it thus,—there are two kinds of non-simultaneity of cognitions-(1) The non-simultaneity of several cognitions produced through the same sense-organ, and (2) the non-simultaneity of cognitions of

Number of manas in an organism.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 16.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 16.

[3] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 126.

[4] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. ii. 56.

several things produced through several sense-organs. Of these, the former is not what is spoken of as indicating the singleness of *manas*; this non-simultaneity being due to the fact that one instrument, such as sense-organs are, can, by its very nature, accomplish only one thing at a time; it is therefore, the latter simultaneity of the cognitions of several things through several sense-organs that is regarded as indicating the singleness of *manas*.

If there were several *manas*, it would have been possible for several sense-organs to be in contact with all *manas* simultaneously; whereby there should have been several cognitions appearing through their contacts at one and the same time; but this never happens. So it is concluded that there is only one *manas*. Non-simultaneity of cognitions also proves the atomic nature of the *manas*.

Manas is inner sense-organ in Nyāya.

It has to be also pointed out that though in the treatment of *manas*, Nyāya system has accepted it to be an inner sense-organ, yet it has not been included in the enumeraion of the sense-organs by Gotama in his *Sūtra* work.[1] Vātsyāyana gives an answer to this that because the sister system, that is, Vaiśeṣika, has already accepted *manas* as an inner sense-organ, and it is a convention with all the systems that those doctrines of other allied systems which are not directly negatived are meant to be approved as accepted facts. Then again, as to the question why it has been omitted from the Sūtra, Vātsyāyana says that as there are certain marked differences between the character of the *manas* and those of other sense-organs, such às other sense-organs are composed of material particles, are effective upon only a few specific objects and are capable of acting as organs only as endowed with certain specific qualities, while the *manas* is immaterial, effective on all objects, and capable of acting as an organ without being endowed with any quality, *manas* has not been included in the

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[1] I. i. 12.

Sūtra enumerating the sense-organs. Thus, the Nyāya system also accepts *manas* as a sense-organ.[1]

Manas exists even after death, and due to *adṛṣṭa* it enters into a fresh body after death when it goes out.[2] In the śrutis *manas* has been described as created, that is, it is not eternal. But the Naiyāyikas take it to be eternal, of course, from their own common-sense point of view. So what the śruti means is, hold some Naiyāyikas, that by creation of *manas* we should mean the first contact of the *manas* with the particular fresh body with which it has come in contact for the first time. Again, with the help of *manas* alone the Jīva takes another birth.[3]

(vii) *Pravṛtti*

Pravrtti explained.

Now, we come to the seventh *prameya*, called *Pravṛtti*, which has been defined by Gotama as—

Pravṛttirvāgbuddhiśarīrārambhaḥ.[4]

It means activity which consists in the operation (*ārambha*) of *Vāc* (speech), *Buddhi* (manas) and *Śarīra* (physical organism). In other words, by *Pravṛtti* is meant all actions, good and bad, leading to merit and demerit. This *Pravṛtti* is of two kinds, namely, *jñānajanaka* (leading to cognitions) and *kriyājanaka* (leading to actions). In other words, the term *vāc* here stands for those things which produces *jnāna*. Again, even meditation on one's own *iṣṭadeva* (particular personal deity) through *manas* and also cognition of good and bad objects through the sense-organs, like the organ of vision etc., are all is included under *jñānajanaka*.

Kriyājanaka pravṛtti is again, of two kinds, *śarīrajanya* and *manojanya*. Through the body protection (paritrāṇa), service (paricaryā) and giving gift (dāna) are performed; through speech *satya* (truthfulness), *hita* (beneficial) and *priya* (agreeable) and *svādhyāya* (study) type of actions are done; through *manas* sympathy (*dayā*), desirelessness (*aspṛhā*), and faith (*śraddhā*) are shown. These are the ten kinds of *pravṛtti* leading to merit (dharma). Similarly, there are ten demeritorious actions opposed to all the ten meritorious acts mentioned just above.[1] It is also to be added that all the three varieties of *pravṛtti* belong to the *Jīvātman*. *Pravṛtti* is the cause of good and mean births.[2]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 4.

[2] *Tarkavāgīśa*, III. ii. 60.

[3] *Tarkavāgīśa*, p. 330.

[4] *Gotamasūtra*, I. i. 17.

(viii) *Doṣa*

Doṣa and its functions explained

Like *pravṛtti*, *doṣa* (defects) also is the cause of physical organism, sense-organs, things (*artha*), like odour etc., *buddhi* (jñāna), pleasure and pain.[3] It has been defined by Gotama as—

Pravartanālakṣaṇā doṣāḥ.[4]

It is that which makes the *Jīvātman* move towards meritorious or demeritorious deeds. This defect is of three types, namely, attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and ignorance (*moha*). These three incite the *Jīvātman* towards activity. These are differentiated by their action : the man who has attachments does that action whereby he experiences pleasure or pain; similarly, the man who has aversion, or one who has ignorance does similar action. It is necessary to make it clear that attachment etc. are causes of activity in order to produce disgust against them, which fact could not have been brought about by the mere mention of attachment and other defects. Both attachment and aversion are produced out of *moha* and urge a man to activity.

All these three subsist in the *Jīvātman*, as its attributes. These are the causes of the universe, as these are the sources of activity and as they have the force to bring about re-birth. Since this series of births and re-births is beginningless, *defects* are regarded as operating in a continuous series and also have no beginning Wrong knowledge ceases when right knowledge is attained; and on the cessation of wrong knowledge the whole series of affections and aversions drop off, whereupon follows final release and from this it is clear that *defects* are liable to appearance and disappearance.[1] Attachment and aversion are found where there is nescience.[2] When the three *defects* drop, then there is no Action (*pravṛtti*) to take another birth after the previous birth.[3] Rebirth is caused by *tṛṣṇā* (desire), and when desire is destroyed, there is no re-birth and then he gets emancipation.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 2.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 2.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 10.

[4] I. i. 18

Three groups of defect and their functions.

There are further, three groups of *defect* : (1) *Desire-type* (*rāgapakṣa*)—under this are included love (*kāma*), selfishness (*matsaratā*), longing for acquiring desired objects (*spṛhā*, in a lawful manner, what belongs to another). hankering (for re-birth, *tṛṣṇā*) and greed (*lobha*, desire for obtaining, in an unlawful manner, what belongs to another); (2) *Hatred-type* (*dveṣapakṣa*) which includes anger (*krodha*), jealousy (*īrṣyā*), envy (*asūyā*), malice (*droha*), and resentment (*amarṣa*); (3) *Illusion-type* (*mohapakṣa*) under which are included error (*mithyājñāna*), suspicion (*vicikitsā*), pride (*māna*), and negligence (*pramāda*). Of these three, illusion (*moha*) is the worser evil (*pāpīyān*) and one who is not under illusion, the other two do not appear in him; that is, unless one is affected by illusion, desire and hatred do not appear in him; and when a man has become influenced by illusion, one or the other, of the other two types, does appear in him in accordance with the man's *saṅkalpa* (notions) when the man's impressions in regard to a thing are attractive, such as create attachment, they produce in him desire for that thing; while when his notions are repulsive, such as create aversion, they produce hatred. Both these notions are nothing other than illusion (*moha*) which consists of wrong notions. Thus, it is that desire and hatred have their source in illusion. When illusion is destroyed by right knowledge, both desire and hatred cease to appear; this is what accounts for their having one and the same thing for their antithesis. This is all what has been described in the *Gotamasūtra* of the first adhyāya and first āhnika.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, IV. i. 2.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 18.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 64.

(ix) *Pretyabhāva*

Pretyabhāva

It has been defined by Gotama as—

Punarutypattih pretyabhāvaḥ[1].

That is, existence after death, meaning being born again. In other words, it means giving up of the already assumed body etc. and taking up another fresh body etc. in their place in the world which is a continuous series of causality between pain etc. and upto wrong notions as enumerated by Gotama in the second Sūtra.

As regards the question of re-birth, it is said, that re-birth belongs to the *Jīvātman* which is eternal. But there can be no re-birth of the *Jīvātman*, as no eternal thing is ever found to be born or to die, and as the *Ātman*, that is, the *Jīvātman*, is eternal there is no possibility of its birth or death.

Possibility of re-birth discussed.

Vācaspati makes this point very clear in his *Tātparya*. Thus, he says, the doubt in regard to *re-birth* is as to its belonging to the *Ātman* or to apprehension (buddhi), or to the body. To this form of doubt, the objection is raised in Varddhamāna's *Prakāśa* that, it having been already determined[2] that re-birth is of the *Ātman*, there can be no room for such a doubt. The answer given is that from the definition provided[3] re-birth appears to consist in death and birth; hence, the further question naturally arises, how can death and birth belong to the *Ātman*, which, being eternal, cannot die or be born?

To this Gotama says—Rebirth is possible only because the *Ātman* is eternal.[4] What the Sūtrakāra

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 19,

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, i. 1. 19.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.19.

[4] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. 1. 10.

Re-birth possible.

means is that since time immemorial the same *Jīvātman* assumes another organism after having given up the previous one. This continues from time immemorial to *ad infinitum*. This is what is meant by *Pretyabhāva*. It is the body with which the connection of the *Jīvātman* is dropped and again, taken up afresh. So says Vātsyāyana, it is the eternal *Jīvātman* that departs (*praiti*), that is, abandons the former body, dies and goes out; and having departed (*pretya*), that is, having abandoned the former body at death, comes to exist (*bhavati*) again, that is, be born, takes up another body. It is these two *departing and coming again* that have been spoken of as *pretyabhāva* (re-birth).

Production of physical organism.

By the way, this question of re-birth leads us to discuss how according to Nyāya system a physical organisn is produced? This very question has been raised by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya*.[1] He also supplies the following answer after Gotama, who says, the production of perceptible (*vyakta*) things is from perceptible objects, which is obviously proved by *Pratyakṣa*.[2] It has to be noted that Uddyotakara in his *Vārttika* says that *vyakta* is that substance (*dravya*) which possesses colour etc. and hence, due to the similarity, the cause of earth etc., such as, *Paramāṇu*, is also called *vyakta*. Further he says *rūpādisāmānyāt paramāṇavo vyaktā ityucyante*, that is, *Paramāṇus* are called *vyaktas*, because they possess the qualities of colour etc. in common with earth etc. So jar, cow, etc., which possess perceptible qualities of colour etc., and are perceptible (*vyaktas*), are produced out of *Paramāṇus* which possess qualities of colour etc. This is proved through direct perception. So whatever substance is produced, which is *vyakta*, is produced out of the similar substance alone. Hence, from the *vyakta*, *kapāla* (part of the jar), a jar is produced, both being *vyaktas*.[3]

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[1] IV. i. 11.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 11.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 13. There are several views about the cause of production given the *Nyāyasūtra* and the Bhāṣya, but as they are not acceptable from the Nyāya point of view, they have been omitted here.

Isvara is not an independent cause of the universe.

One more point regarding the causality of the universe attributed to *Iśvara* is to be noted at this place. Whether *Iśvara* is the cause of the universe independently or does he depend upon the merit and demerit of the things or creatures to be created to produce the things or create the universe? The *siddhānta* view is that *Iśvara*, independent of the *karman* of the would be created beings, is not the cause of the universe for various reasons[1].

(x) *Phala*

Meaning and scope of *Phala*.

Phala (fruition) consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain, as every action leads to either pleasure or pain. It has been defined by Gotama as—

Pravṛttidoṣajanitorthaḥ phalam[2].

That is, fruition is the *artha* which is produced due to action and defects. And as pleasure and pain appear only when the body, the sense-organs, objects and apprehension (*bu dhi*) are present, these are also regarded as fruition. In other words, due to his meritorious or demeritorious acts a *Jīva* gets pleasure and pain in his next or even in the present birth. In order to reap those fruits, as results of his past deeds, he has to get a body, sense-organ etc., which alone would help the *Jīva* to experience such pleasure and pain which his past deeds demand for their fruition. So it has been defined as a thing (*artha*) produced by activity and defect[3]. In ordinary course, the fruition of the past or even of the present deeds is received by a man who performed them and it is relinquished by him; and each time it is relinquished, it is again, received by him; so the process goes on continuously without any break. Hence, there is no end or absolute cessation of these *receivings* and *relinquishings*; and it is by this unceasing current of receivings and relinquishings that the entire worldly process is carried on[4].

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhaṣya*, IV. i. 19—21.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 20. [3] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 20.

[4] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 20.

Fruition is immediate or takes some time to appear, discussed.

Now, a question is raised whether fruition of a deed takes place immediately after the deed is performed, or it takes some time to appear? It is found when a man cooks rice or milks cow, the result, in the shape of rice and milk respectively, appears immediately; whereas when he ploughs the field and sows the seeds, the result, in the shape of the harvest, accrues to him after some time. From this it is assumed that though the action stops, yet some sort of activity in some other form continues till the result accrues. For instance, when a man who desires fruits renders such services to the tree, as pouring water at its roots, and so forth; and it is only after the actual act of watering has ceased to exist that the earthly particles, under the tree's roots, become lumped together by the particles of water, and becoming heated with the heat underground, they produce a juicy substance, as modified by the heat, comes into contact with the tree and, in a peculiarly modified form enters into it and produces leaf etc., and the fruit. In this manner the action of watering etc. is fruitful and yet the result does not quite follow from a cause that has entirely ceased to exist. In the same manner, actions produce in the *Jīvātman* a *saṁskāra* in the shape of *dharma* and *adharma* (merit and demerit). And this *saṁskāra*, after being produced, comes to be helped by other causes, such as time, place etc., and thus, brings about the results at a later time[1]. So it is evident that the fruition is not necessarily immediate; it is such as can be experienced only at a later time.[2] Again, of the action (*karman*), some directly precedes the effect, while some again, precedes its effect indirectly through some other form (as has been already explained above). It may also be further illustrated by the example of the performance of a *agnihotra* sacrifice for attaining heaven, which when it is complete does not take the performer of the *agnihotra* to heaven at once. The action ceases, it leads to some merit, which remains with the *Jīva* in the form of *saṁskāra*. The man dies. He attains another body which is capable of taking him to the heaven or to any other place. At that time though the action is not present yet the *saṁskāra* of that act remains functioning which ultimately takes the man to heaven. Thus, he attains the fruit of his action which remains prior to the fruition in some other form, but does not give any fruit immediately.[1]

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 47.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 45.

(xi) *Duḥkha*

Duḥkha means suffering, injury, pain. So says Gotama—

Bādhanālakṣaṇam duḥkham[2].

Meaning of *Duhkha* and its scope

Anything and everything inseparably connected with the feelings of pain, such as physical organism etc. and also pleasure and pain, are all included under *duḥkha*. Finding everything to be intermingled with pain, when one desires to get rid of it, he finds that life itself is nothing but pain, and thus, becomes disgusted with the life itself and being disgusted, he loses all attachment and being free from attachment, he becomes finally released.[3]

Pleasure is not dissociated with pain.

It is to be noted here that in this system there is no separate mention of *pleasure* (*sukha*). It has been included under *pain* itself, as there is nothing in this world which is not mixed up with pain, and so the Sūtrakāra has not mentioned it as a separate entity. But it should not be therefore, taken to mean that the author totally denies the very existence of pleasure. It does exist in some form or other. It is not permanent and eternal, but even then it does exist. So says Vātsyāyana—it is not possible totally to deny *pleasure*, to whose existence testimony is borne by all men. The teaching that pleasure

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, IV. i. 44—47.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 21.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 21.

Reason why pleasure is looked upon as pain.

should be looked upon as *pain* is meant for the removal of all pain, for the person who has become disgusted with the sufferings caused by the experiences undergone during a series of births and deaths and is anxious to get rid of all similar experiences. It is further found that the bodies of all living beings, of all the regions where people are born, all re-births (all conditions of life), every one of these is beset with annoyance, being inseparable from pain; and it is in view of this fact that the sages have tendered the advice that pain is that which is connected with annoyance.[1] And the meaning of this is that all the aforesaid things should be looked upon as pain.[2] Again, the *Bhāṣya* continues that the term *janma* in the *Sūtra*[3] stands for that which is produced, that is, body, the sense-organs and so forth; and the *utpatti* or *janma* in the same *Sūtra* (*vividhabādhanāyogāt duḥkhameva janmotpattiḥ*)[4] is the coming into existence of the body etc., in their various forms.

Degrees of *Duḥkha*

Feelings of pain lead to absolute freedom from world.

It is to be further added that the several annoyances (*bādhanā*) are distinguished as—the *least*, the *medium* and the *greatest* (*utkṛṣṭa*). The greatest annoance is of those who are in hell; the *medium* (*madhyama*) is of that of the lower animals; and the *least* (*hīna*) is that of human beings. Of the divine beings, as of those who have got rid of all attachments, it is still less. When a person perceives that every condition of life is beset with annoyance (*bādhanā*), he becomes confirmed in his experience that pleasure and its causes, in the shape of the body, sense-organs, and cognitions, are all to be regarded as *Pain*, and when he has come to look upon all these as *pain*, he loses all attachment to all things of the world, and after he has formed this dis-attachment, all his longings for worldly things come to an end; and his longings having come to an end, he becomes freed from all sufferings, just as, when one understands that by the contact of poison, milk becomes poison, he no longer seeks to obtain milk, and by not obtaining it, does not suffer the pangs of death.[1]

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[1] *Sūtra*, I. i. 21.

[2] *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 54.

[3] IV. i. 55.

[4] IV. i. 55.

During intervals wordly pleasure is felt.

Again, it has to be kept in mind that worldly pleasure also is felt during intervals. Hence, it cannot be denied entirely. So says Gotama—

bādhanānivṛttervedayataḥ paryeṣaṇadoṣādapratiṣedhaḥ.[2]

That is, there is no denial of pleasure; because all that is meant is that inasmuch as the man experiencing pleasure is oppressed with the fraility of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him. Vātsyāyana makes it clear and says, *longing* is wish, the eager desire for acquiring a thing; and the frailty of this longing is as follows :—when a man experiences pleasure from a certain thing, he desires that thing, and sometimes the desire is not fulfilled, or if fulfilled, it is fulfilled only in part, or is fulfilled in such form as is beset with obstacles; and from this fraility of longing, there arise various kinds of mental sufferings; so that the man experiencing pleasure, being oppressed with the fraility of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him; and it is because there is no cessation of annoyance, that it has been taught that pleasure should be looked upon as pain, and not because there is no pleasure at all. This is what has been expressed in the following verses :—

Longings are augumented by *bhoga.*

kāmaṁ kāmayamānasya yadā kāmaḥ samṛddhyati /
athainamaparaḥ kāmaḥ kṣiprameva prabādhate //

Translation.—For the man who desires a desirable thing, as soon as that desire is fulfilled, another desire quickly besets him.

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[1] *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 55.

[2] IV. i. 57.

apicedudanemi samantād-
bhūmimimāṁ labhate sagavāśvāṁ,
na sa tena dhanena dhanaiṣī
tṛpyati kinnu sukhaṁ dhanakāma iti.[1]

Translation.—Even though a man obtains the entire sea-girt earth, along with all cows and horses, that seeker after wealth does not become satisfied with that wealth; what pleasure, then, can there be for one who desires wealth ?

A similar idea is expressed in the following verse also—

na jātu kāmaḥ kāmānāmupabhogena śāmyati /
haviṣā kṛṣṇavartmeva bhūya evābhivarddhate //

Translation.—By the experiencing of longings, longing (for wordly enjoyment) is never exhausted or satiated, just as fire is never extinguished by pouring *ghī* into it, rather it becomes augmented more and more.

Pains are wrongly regarded as pleasure.

Again, there are several kinds of pain which people wrongly regard as pleasure, says Gotama.[2] The *Bhāṣya* elaborates the idea and says, the ordinary man, addicted to pleasure, regards pleasure as the highest end of man, and feels that there is nothing better than pleasure; and hence, when pleasure has been attained, he feels happy and contended, feeling that all he had to attain had been attained; and under the influence of illusion, he becomes attached to that pleasure, as also to the things that bring about its accomplishment; becoming so attached, he makes an attempt to obtain the pleasure; and while he is trying for it, there come down upon him several kinds of pain, in the form of birth, old age, disease, death, the contact of disagreeable things, separation from agreeable things, the non-fulfilment of desires and so forth; and yet all these several kinds of pain he regards as *Pleasure*.

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[1] *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya*, IV. i. 57.

[2] *Sūtra*, IV. i. 58.

In fact, pain is a necessary factor in pleasure; without suffering some pain, no pleasure can be obtained or experienced; hence, as leading to pleasure, this pain is regarded by the man as *pleasure*; and such a man, having his mind obsessed by this notion of pleasure, never escapes from metempsychosis, which consists of a running series of births and deaths. And it is an antidote of this notion of pleasure that we have the teaching that all this should be looked upon as *Pain*.

Pain is a necessary factor in pleasure.

Similarly, birth has been called pain, because of its being beset with pain, and not because there is no such thing as pleasure.

(xii) *Apavarga*

Apavarga (final release) is the last *prameya* according to the system. It has been defined as—

Tadatyantavimokṣopavargaḥ,[1]

meaning, absolute freedom from pain which has been just discussed above. All the types of pain and the so-called pleasure including birth have been explained above and absolute freedom from these is called *apavarga*. Vātsyāyana explains it thus, when there is a relinquishing of the birth that has been taken and the non-resumption of another, this condition, which is without end or limit, is known as *final release*, by those who know what final release is. This condition of immortality, free from fear, imperishable (unchanging), consisting in the attainment of bliss is called *Brahman*. (*tadabhayamajaramamṛtyupadaṁ brahma kṣemaprāptiḥ*).

Apavarga explained

Others have even said that absolute freedom from the twentyone types of pain, namely, physical organism, six kinds of sense-organs (olfactory, gestatory, visual, cutaneous and the auditory and

Absolute freedom from twenty-one kinds of pain.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 22.

manas), six types of their specific objects, six types of cognitions attained from these six sense-organs, and pleasure and pain is called *apavarga*. Of these twenty-one kinds of pain, some are major, while others are minor. It has already been explained that pleasure is also a kind of pain, as it is always associated with pain.

Process of attainment of apavarga

Keśava Miśra explains the process of its attainment. Thus, one who becomes disgusted with the world after having found defects in everything, due to the attainment of the correct knowledge of things, becomes desirous of attaining final emancipation. He attains direct perception of the *Ātman* through the process of *Śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*; and when he attains perfect *samādhi* and perceives the *Ātman*, all his pains disappear. But even then, as he is maintaining his physical organism, he continues to perform action, but those acts of his then are not aimed at any particular achievement, so no merit or demerit accrues to him thereafter.

Process of kāyavyūha to exhaust past karmans.

Then he, through his yogic powers, comes to know of all the *saṁskāras* of the deeds of his previous births. He thereafter assumes various physical forms without destroying the present one, within himself, through the process of *kāyavyūha* and exhausts the results of all his past deeds by experiencing pleasure and pain due to accrue to all of them. He thus, becomes free from the *saṁskāras* of his previous births and so after he exhausts the *prārabdha-karman* and when his present body falls as dead, he does not assume another body after that for the simple reason of his having exhausted the fruits of the deeds of all his previous births through *kāyavyūha*. So he becomes absolutely free from all the types of pain and becomes *mukta*.[1]

Viśvakarmā, in his commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā*, says that the process of *kāyavyūha* as described below is to be adopted only if one is very eager to achieve *mokṣa* after having attained *tattvajñāna* and not otherwise. He quotes the following lines from some *Āgama* explaining the process of *kāyavyūha* :

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[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 153—55 ; Pandit reprint.

> ātmano vai śarīrāṇi bahūni manujeśvara/
> prāpya yogabalaṁ kuryāt taiśca sarvamihācaret//
> bhuñjīta viṣayān kaiścit kaiścidugraṁ tapaścaret//
> saṅgrahecca punastāni sūryastejogaṇāniva//

Translation—O King ! A *mumukṣu* should collect all his bodies which his previous *karmans* enjoin on him for reaping the fruits of the deeds of all his previous births (within himself). In the extant body itself he should undergo all the *bhogas* of those births. Through some bodies he should experience pleasure and pain, through others he should perform hard penance and so on. After that he should collect them again together like the Sun collecting his rays after having them allowed to stay in the universe in the day (and finish them for ever. Thereafter, he attains final release).

This finishes a brief treatment of the *prameyas* according to Nyāya.

Besides these objects of cognition there are others, like *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*,[1] and also negation (*abhāva*) which though belong to Vaiśeṣika are also accepted by Nyāya and which have been dealt with by me in the *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and will be treated briefly in the next volume, so, they are omitted here.

Some other *prameyas* which are also accepted by Nyāya.

These are the doctrines which the Nyāya system has to discuss at great length in relation to other views held by different schools of thought. As my aim has been throughout to present to my readers exclusively what a particular system has to say from a particular angle of vision in order to get a clear and exclusive knowledge of the *Ātman* which is the ultimate end of the *jijñāsu*, I have made no attempt to give any comparative idea about these *prameyas* at this place. It is for the purpose of realizing the correct vision of these *prameyas* that the system has dealt with the means of cognition *pramāṇas* as discussed before.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 9.

(iv). *Integral factors of the Science of Reasoning*

Other categories accepted by Nyāya

The two fundamental categories of the system have been discussed above, but there are other categories accepted by the system which are regarded as the integral factors of the system. In fact, all the topics of discussion included in the system for *Ātmadarśana*, can easily be included under the two categories of *Pramāna* and *Prameya* only. So there is no need of dealing with the rest of the of fourteen categories mentioned by Gotama in his *Sūtra.*[1] To this we have already said that as these are the specific categories of the *Science of Reasoning* which alone distinguish the system from other systems, they have been mentioned here to give a correct vision of the *Ātman.*

(a) *Prayojana*

Of these fourteen categories, some have been already discussed above, so we will take up only those which are not yet dealt with. I now start with *Prayojana.* It has been defined by Gotama[2] as—

yamarthamadhikṛtya pravartate tatprayojanam

It is that, on being urged by which man has recourse to activity, that is to say, it is that, desiring either to obtain or reject which, a man has recourse to action. This is common to every system and every being. It forms the basis of all reasoning. In other words, it is for the attainment of pleasure and for getting rid of pain that there is the need of *pravṛtti,* which makes a man do some action.[3]

(b) *Dṛṣṭānta*

Meaning and need of dṛṣṭānta.

Dṛṣṭānta (example) is something that is directly perceived, that is, which cannot fail to be perceived by all enquirers, ordinary persons and also learned and which needs no further proof. So it has been defined by

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[1] I. i. 1.

[2] I. i. 24.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya,* I. i. 24; *Tarkabhāṣā,* PP. 139-40.

Gotama[1] as—

laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṁ yasminnarthe buddhisāmyaṁ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ.

That is, example is that with regard to which both parties, the ordinary man and the trained investigator, entertain similar ideas.

It is self-evident. It is only when there is an example to corroborate the premiss, for instance, and not otherwise, that there can be a valid inference, or verbal (*Āgama*) cognition. It is thus, the basis of all our reasonings. It is also to be kept in mind that an example must be agreeable to both the parties, *vādī* and *prativādī*.[2] In refuting the opponent's position, it is necessary to show that it is opposed to an example admitted by both the parties and in establishing ones own position also, it is necessary to show that it is corroborated by an example. Again, through an example, the position of the Buddhists, who believe in the theory of flux or momentariness, becomes untenable. If an atheist admits a corroborative example, he renounces his nihilistic position, as by nihilism all things have merely momentary existence; and hence, it is not possible for the example, which must be in the form of something that existed in the past, to be present at the time, that it is put forward; if on the other hand, he does not admit an example, on the basis of what could he attack the position of his opponent? It is all due to such reasons that it has been included amongst the categories by Gotama[3].

Types of example.

There are two types of example, positive and negative (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), that is, in the case of an inference, like mountain is fiery, because it possesses smoke, as for example-in the kitchen. Here, there is a similarity between the case under question and the instance put forth, so it is called *sādharmya* or *anvaya-dṛṣṭānta*; while in the case of the same inference, if the *hetu* be put in the form, *yatra dhūmo nāsti, tatra vahnirnāsti*, as for example, a lake; it is called *vaidharmya* or *vyatireka-dṛṣṭānta*.

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[1] I. i. 25. [2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 160. [3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

(c) *Siddhānta*

Siddhānta, its meaning and importance.

Siddhānta is a statement of facts in the form that *it is so.* It is accepted as most valid. Gotama has defined it[1] as—

tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasaṁsthitiḥ,

meaning, *Siddhānta* is a theory (*saṁsthiti*, *vyavasthā*), or conviction in regard to the exact nature of a thing dealt with by *tantra* (science or *śāstra*). It is of four types—(1) Doctrine common to all the schools of śāstra (*sarvatantra*), (2) Doctrine peculiar to one school (*pratitantra*), (3) Doctrine resting on implication (*adhikaraṇa*), and (4) Hypothetical doctrine (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*).

Varieties of *Siddhānta* explained.

Thus, that scientific conviction which is not incompatible with any school of thought is called *sarvatantra-siddhānta*. As for instance, the opinions like, the olfactory-organ and the rest are sense-organs; odour and the rest are the objects cognized by means of these sense-organs; the earth and the rest are material substances; things are cognized by means of the instruments of cognition.[2]

Pratitantrasiddhānta is that which is accepted only by one school of science; as for instance, the following doctrines are peculiar to *Sāṅkhyas*, that which is absolutely non-existent can never come into existence; that which is real and existent can never be non-existent; intelligence (*Puruṣa* or *cetana*) is without any attribute and unchanging; modification belongs to the three gross products, like, body, sense-organs and *manas* and also to the subtle causes of these, that is, *Buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and the five *tanmātrās*. Again, the following which are peculiar to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy,—the material creation is due to the past deeds of the *Jīva*; the defects of men and also their activities are the causes of *karman*; intelligent beings are endowed with their own respective qualities; that thing alone is produced which had no existence before and that which is produced is destroyed.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i 26.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 28.

Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta is that on the knowledge or acceptance of which depends the knowledge or acceptance of another fact; as for instance, the fact that the cognizer is distinct from the body and the sense-organs is proved or indicated by the fact of one and the same object being apprehended by the organs of vision and touch. The facts implied in the above are : that there are more sense-organs than one; that the sense-organs operate upon particular kinds of objects; that they have their existence indicated by the apprehension of their objects; that they are the instruments bringing about the cognitions of the cognizer; that the substratum of qualities is a substance other than the qualities of odour and the rest and that intelligent beings cognize only particular objects. All these facts are included in the aforesaid fact of the cognizer being distinct from the body etc., as this fact would not be possible without all those other facts.[1]

The *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is described, as when a fact is taken for granted without investigation, and thence proceeds the examination of its particular details. As for instance, it is taken for granted without any investigation that sound is a substance, and thence proceeds an investigation as to whether sound is eternal, or non-eternal, in which investigation are examined such details of sound as its eternality or non-eternality.

(d) *Avayava*

Avayavas are the factors of a syllogistic argument. It consists of five factors, namely, (1) *Pratijñā* (statement of the proposition). It consists in the assertion of what is to be proved (probandum). That is, it is that assertion which speaks of the subject which is intended to be qualified by that property which has to be made known or proved by the reasoning. As for instance, *Sound is non-eternal.*

Factors of syllogism are explained and illustrated.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 30.

(2) *Hetu* (probans) is that which demonstrates the probandum (*sādhya*), through its similarity, that is, a property common to it and to the corroborative instance. That is to say, when one notices a certain property in the subject with regard to which the conclusion is to be demonstrated and notices the same property also in the corroborative instance, and then puts forward that property as demonstrating, or proving the probandum (*sādhya*). This putting forward of the said property constitutes the statement of the probans.

As for example, in the above quoted instance, sound is non-eternal, *because sound has the character of being a product* is the *hetu*; as a matter of fact, everything that is a product is non-eternal.

This very statement of probans is also proved through dissimilarity (*vyatireka-hetu*) to the corroborative instance.

As for example, sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced; that which has *not* the character of being produced is always eternal, like *Ātman* etc.[1]

(3) *Udāharaṇa* (example) is that instance which, through similarity to what is to be proved (*sādhya*) is possessed of a property of that (*sādhya*), constitutes the statement of the corroborative instance. This is preceded by the statement of invariable concommitant relation (*savyāptikam*); as for instance, all the cases of possessing smoke are the cases of possessing fire, as the kitchen.[2]

As already pointed out, there is also a dissimilar statement of corroborative instance (*vyatireka-dṛṣṭānta*).

The other kind of statement of corroborative instance is that which is contrary to what has been described above. In other words, the other kind of statement of the instance consists in that familiar instance which, through dissimilarity to what is to be proved, is not possessed of a property of that subject; that is, sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced; everything not having the character of being produced is eternal, as the *Ātman* etc. Here the Ātman etc. constitute the required familiar instance, which through their dissimilarity to what is to be proved, that is, on account of their not having the character of being produced, are not possessed of the property of the subject, that is, the property of non-eternality. When we find that in the case of the *Ātman*, the character of being produced being absent, it does not possess non-eternality, we infer the contrary in the case of sound, because sound is possessed of the character of being produced, so sound is non-eternal.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 34-35.

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 162.

To make the above further clear, it is said that when the probans is stated with a view to similarity, that is, in the affirmative form, what constitutes the statement of the instance is that familiar instance, which through its similarity to what is to be proved, is possessed of a property of the subject, and when the probans is stated with a view to dissimilarity, that is, in the negative form, the statement of the instance consists of that familiar instance which, through its dissimilarity to what is to be proved, does not possess the property of the subject. In the former case, the observer perceives, in the instance, that it possesses two properties so related that the presence of the one proves the presence of the other, and from this he comes to infer that in the case of the subject also, the presence of the one should prove the presence of the other; and in the latter case, he observes in regard to instance that there are two properties so related that the absence of the one proves the absence of another; and from this, he comes to infer that in the case of the subject also, the said properties are similarly related, the absence of one proving the absence of the other.[1]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 37.

(4) *Upanaya*—Coming to the fourth factor, namely, *upanaya*, Gotama says—

udāharaṇāpekṣastathetyupasaṁhāro
na tatheti vā sādhyasyopanayaḥ[1].

That is, the re-affirmation which, on the strength of the instance, re-asserts the subject as being *so*, that is, as possessing the character which has been found, in the instance (*udāharaṇa*), to be concomitant with the probandum; or as being *not so*, that is, as not possessing the character which has been found, in the instance, to be concomitant with the negation of the probandum. In other words, the reaffirmation of the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* (subject) is what is called *upanaya*. As for instance, in the example :

(1) Sound is non-eternal;

(2) Because it possesses the character of being a product;

(3) all that possess the character of being a product are non-eternal, like a dish (*sthālī*);

(4) the character of being a product which is established through a concomitant relation between the probans and the probandum, is found in sound.

This fourth factor is what is called *upanaya*. This factor is really the most important one and so is the probans also.

Again, the re-affirmation is also proved through *vyatireka*, that is, where there is absence of possessing the character of being a product, there is eternality, just as in the *Ātman*. In this way, through re-affirmation a syllogistic argument is established.[2]

(5) *Nigamana*—The last factor is what is called *nigamana*. Gotama defines it as—

hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanam nigamanam.

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[1] I. i. 38.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 38.

It means the re-statement of the proposition on the basis of the statement of the probans.[1] The probans having been stated either *per* similarity, or *per* dissimilarity, we have a re-capitulation of the entire syllogism in accordance with the instance; and this recapitulation constitutes the final conclusion. Which is in the form,—*therefore, having the character of the product, soun is non-eternal.*

Utility of each factor.

The *Bhāṣya* discusses the utility of each and every factor. Thus, in every inferential statement, which consists of the five factors, several distinct *pramānas* commingle and co-operate towards the accomplishment of the end in the shape of inferential cognition. There is commingling in the following cases; (a) in the inference bearing on sound, the proposition, (*pratijñā*) in the form —sound is non-eternal, comes under verbal cognition (*Śabda*); and verbal assertion, unless it is heard directly from a *ṛṣi*, cannot by itself be accepted as trust-worthy, and it stands in need of corroboration by perception and inference; (b) in the statement of the probans (*hetu*) we have an inference, being deduced, as it is, from the cognition of similarity by the statement of the instance ; (c) the statement of the instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) represents *perception*; the deduction of the unseen from the seen being only natural; (d) the re-affirmation (*upanaya*) is in the form of the denial of the contrary character; (e) the final conclusion (*nigamana*) serves to show how all the factors combined together are capable of bringing about the cognition of a single object.

Mutual co-operation among factors

There is mutual co-operation also among the five factors; namely, (a) if there were no Proposition (*pratijñā*), there would be no basis on which the statement of the probans and other factors could proceed; (b) if there were no statement of the probans (*hetu*), the instrumental efficiency of what, towards the bringing about of the cognition, could be shown by the inference? What again would that be whose connection with the instance and the probandum could be shown? On the basis of what again, could there be the final conclusion consisting in the re-statement of the proposition? (c) If there were no statement of the instance (*udāharaṇa*), what would that be to which there would be similarity, or dissimilarity, of what is put forward as the means (probans) of proving the probandum? On the strength of similarity to what too would be final recapitulation proceed? (d) If there were no reaffirmation (*upanaya*), the character put forward as proving the probandum, not having its presence in the probandum reasserted, could not accomplish its purpose; (e) lastly, in the absence of the final conclusion (*nigamana*), there would be nothing to indicate the mutual relationship among the proposition and the other factors, or the fact of their combining to accomplish a common purpose, and what too would it be that would be declared as proved by means of such expressions as *so is this*?

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 39.

It is clear from the above that the final conclusion is not the same as the proposition; the latter puts forward the fact only tentatively, as requiring confirmation by the reasoning with the aid of the probans and the instance, while the former puts it forward as one fully established, and thus, precluding the possibility of the truth being contrary to it. This cannot be done by the proposition (*Pratijñā*), as, if it did, then the rest of the factors would be entirely futile.[1]

Ten factored syllogism.

Vātsyāyana mentions that there were some old Naiyāyikas according to whom there are *ten factors* in a syllogism and they are the following five in addition to the other recognized five: (1) *jijñāsā* (desire to know). It is only that which urges, or brings forward, the purpose meant to be accomplished by the cognition of a thing not already cognized. As to the question why does a man desire to know what is cognized, it is said that he does so simply with a view that when he comes to know it in its true character, he will either abandon it, or acquire it, or treat it with indifference; so that the ideas of abandoning, or acquiring, or treating them with indifference are the purposes served by the true knowledge of the thing; and it is for the sake of this purpose that the man desires to know the thing.

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[1] *Tātparya* on 1.i.39.

To this it is said that certainly, this desire does not prove anything and as such, cannot be regarded as a factor of reasoning which is meant to prove the conclusion.

(2) Doubt (*saṁśaya*). It forms the basis of the desire to know, it apprehends mutually contradictory properties; and as such, it can be regarded as only proximate to true cognition; as of the two contradictory properties only one can be true. So though it is regarded as a separate category, yet it cannot be regarded as a factor of a syllogism. It cannot prove anything not being of the nature of true cognition.

(3) *Śakyaprāpti* (capacity to accomplish what is desired). As for instance, the instruments of right cognition have the capacity of accomplishing, for the cognizing agent, the apprehension of the objects of cognition. This could not form part of an argument put forward for proving a proposition, in the manner in which the statement of the proposition forms part of it.

(4) *Prayojana* (purpose) which consists in the ascertaining of the real nature of the thing sought to to be known. This is the result, and not a factor.

(5) *Saṁśayavyudāsa* (dispelling of doubt) which consists in the setting forth of the counter-proposition and then denying it. This only tends to lend support to some other instrument of right cognition (*pramāṇa*).

So this cannot be regarded as a part of the argument put forward to prove a proposition. Hence, Nyāya does not believe in these five as distinct factors.

Besides, the Jainas also had accepted ten factored syllogism which has been already discussed in the first volume.[1]

(e) *Nirṇaya*

Nirṇaya (demonstrated truth)—when there is an ascertainment of the real character of the thing after duly deliberating over the two sides of the question, an argument in favour of a certain conclusion and also that in its confutation, we have what is called *nirṇaya*. So Gotama has defined it as—

vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyāmarthāvadhāraṇam nirṇayah[2].

Vātsyāyana clarifies it as—in regard to every matter of dispute we have two opposite views, one seeks to establish the truth of a certain conclusion with regard to the thing under investigation, and the other denies that conclusion, and seeks to confute the former view; and these two, the arguments favouring and the arguments refuting, are based upon the conclusion (*pakṣa*) and its confutation (*pratipakṣa*) and the two sets of arguments themselves when appearing together come to be spoken of respectively as *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*. And of these two views, it is necessary that one should be rejected and the other confirmed; and when one is confirmed, the ascertainment with regard to that is called *nirṇaya*.[3]

(f) *Vāda*

Now, we come to a different type of subject. Reasoning helps the reasoner to arrive at a definite conclusion either by himself alone, or by holding a consultation with others. In the latter case, there arise occasions for discussion and mutual criticism and it is this method of arriving at a conclusion that constitutes *vāda*, *Jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrabasthāna*. A brief survey of all these is also necessary to be given in this *Science of Reasoning*.[4]

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[1] PP. 289-91.

[2] *Gotamasūtra*, I. 1. 41.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 41.

[4] *Pariśuddhi* on I. ii. 1.

Meaning and scope of Vāda.

Vāda (discussion) has been defined as consisting in the putting forward, at least by two persons, necessarily for the purpose of knowing the *ultimate truth* of a conception and a counter-conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings, neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine, and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the five factors already explained. So says Gotama[1]—

pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ.

It is explained by Vātsyāyana as when two contrary particular characters are alleged to subsist in the same substratum, they are called *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*, as when we have two such allegations as *Ātman is* and *Ātman is not*. And it is this sort of assertion that constitutes *Vāda*. It is mostly between a teacher and a taught for arriving at the *truth*. It is subject to such eight clinchers (nigrahas), namely, *nyūna* (when the syllogism falls short of any factor), or *adhika* (when some more factors are unnecessarily added to the syllogism) and *apasiddhānta* (use of wrong doctrines) beside the usually recognized five types of fallacies.

Place of wrong arguments in Vāda.

The *Pariśuddhi* is of the view that of the 22 types of clinchers, there are six, namely *pratijñāhāni*, *pratijñāsannyāsa*, *nirarthaka*, *arthāntara*, *avijñātārtha* and *apārthaka*, which by their very nature cannot he urged in *Vāda*; there are again, the following seven wrong methods of arguments which though possible to be used, should not be urged. These are : *pratijñāntara*, *hetvantara*, *ajñāna*, *apratibhā*, *vikṣepa*, *matānujñā*, *and paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa*. Again, there are the following seven which may be urged in *Vāda*. These are : *virodha*, *aprāptakāla*, *nyūna*, *adhika*, *punarukta*, *ananubhāṣaṇa and apasiddhānta*. Again, there are two which when used put an end to the controversy.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. ii. 1.

These are *hetvābhāsa* and *niranuyojyānuyoga*. It is also to be noted that in *Vāda* the supporting and condemning are done strictly in accordance with proofs and reasonings and not by means of casuistry etc. which are used only for attaining *jaya* (victory) or *parājaya* (defeat), while in *Vāda*, it is the desire to arrive at the *reality* that the two parties carry on the debate.

(g) *Jalpa*

Disputation (*Jalpa*) is that which is endowed with the characteristics found in the *Vāda*, namely, it puts forward a conception and a counter-conception, it consists in supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings, is not opposed to the main doctrine and is carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the five factors, and in which, there is supporting and condemning by means of casuistry (*chala*), futile rejoinder (*jāti*) and clinchers (*nigrahasthāna*). The last characteristic shows that *Jalpa* is distinct from *Vāda*.

It is to be noted that though *chala* etc. are not directly helpful to prove one's own argument, yet through *pramānas* they also help the reasoning by condemning the views of the opponent.[1] So has been said that *Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* serve the purpose of safeguarding the sprouting of seeds.[2] Similarly, when a person condemns a counter-conception by means of proofs, if he employs casuistry etc., they become helpful in setting aside or warding off the attacks that might be made against that condemnation. Thus, casuistry etc. are employed only as subsidiary auxiliaries.

(h) *Vitaṇḍā*

Vitaṇḍā (wrangling) is the same as *Jalpa* with the condition that there is no establishing of the counter-conception (*Pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā*) in the former.[3] That is to say, out of the above described two allegations in regard to two contrary characters as subsisting in the same substratum, which have been mentioned above, as *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa* (conception and counter-conception), the wrangler does not establish one that he himself holds and which he does not like to commit, but only goes on criticizing the proofs adduced for establishing the conception of the other person. He does not proceed to establish the proposition which he lays down as to be proved by himself, as is found in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* of Śrīharṣa.[1]

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[1] *Bhāṣya*, I. ii. 2. [2] *Sūtra*. IV. ii. 50.

[3] *Sūtra*, I. ii. 3.

(i) *Hetvābhāsa*

Hetvābhāsa (fallacious probans) are so called, because they do not possess all the characteristics of a correct probans, and yet are sufficiently similar to the probans to appear as such. It is to be again, pointed out at this stage that a good and correct inference has to fulfil five conditions, namely, (1) the *hetu* must be present in the *Pakṣa* (subject, or minor term), (2) the *hetu* must be present in the *sapakṣa* (a similar instance or a positive instance), (3) *vipakṣādvyāvṛtti*-the *hetu* must be absent in the counter-instance, like a lake in the inference of fire from smoke, (4) *avādhitaviṣayatva*-that is, the *hetu* must not be such as can be subverted by any stronger proof, and (5) *asatpratipakṣa*, the *hetu* should not be such as can give a chance for proving the opposite. These may be well illustrated in the following manner :

Five conditions of a correct *hetu*.

(1) *Pakṣadharmatvam*—In the inference, *Parvato vahnimān, dhūmāt*; the hetu *dhūmavatva*, a *dharma*, must be present in the *pakṣa*, *parvata*. Again, (2) The same *hetu* is also present in the positive instance, namely, kitchen (*sapakṣa*). (3) The same *hetu* is totally absent from the lake which is the *vipakṣa* in this inference. (4) The presence of the *sādhya* of this *hetu*, that is, fire, is not disproved in the *pakṣa*, that is, *parvata*, in the same inference. And (5) this *hetu* does not give a chance to another *hetu* which may prove just the opposite conclusion (*sādhyaviparīta-sādhakaṁ hetvantaraṁ*

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. ii. 3.

yasya na vidyate). If any of these five conditions is not fulfilled, it becomes a case of *hetvābhāsa*.[1]

Gotama has classified it under five heads, namely, (1) *savyabhicāra* (inconclusive), (2) *viruddha* (contradictory), (3) *Prakaraṇasama* (neutralised), (4) *Sādhyasama* (unknown) and (5) *Kālātīta* (mistimed). These are all the fallacies of the probans.[2]

It is necessary to explain and illustrate these. Thus,

Varieties of fallacy explained.

(1) *Savyabhicāra* (inconclusive). It is also called *anaikāntika*. It is that type of probans which makes the *sādhya* indecisive. For instance, in the example—Sound is non-eternal (śabdo'nityaḥ), because it has the characteristic of having *prameyatva* (knowability). In this inference, *prameyatva* is the *hetu* which is present in the *pakṣa* (śabda), in the *sapakṣa* (eternal *Ākāśa*) and also in the *vipakṣa* (jar, for instance). This should not be; for the *hetu*, as it is here, cannot prove the eternality of sound. It is called *Sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*.

Another subdivision of it is *Asādhāraṇa anaikāntika*; for instance, in the inference, *bhū* (earth) is eternal, for it possesses odour. Now, the *hetu* (*gandhavattva*) is not present in the *sapakṣa* (eternal *Ākāśa*), nor is it present in the *vipakṣa*, non-eternal water etc. But it is present only in *pakṣa*, *pṛthivī*. Hence, this is a fallacious probans.

(2) *Viruddha* (contradictory) is that which is in concomitant relation with the opposite of the thing to be proved (*sādhya*). For instance, in the inference-*śabdo nityaḥ kṛtakatvāt* (sound is eternal, as it is produced), the *hetu*, that is, being produced, is in concomitant relation with non-eternal things, like a jar or so, being based on the argument, all that is produced is non-eternal.

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[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 52, 53, 166, 167.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. ii. 4.

(3) *Prakaraṇasama* (neutralised). It is also called *satpratipakṣa*. As for instance, in the inference, *śa daḥ anityaḥ*, *anityadharmānupalabdheḥ* (sound is non-eternal, because it does not possess the characteristics of eternal objects). This gives a chance to argue in opposite way also. Thus, one may say, *Śab-daḥ nityaḥ*, *anityadharmānupalabdheḥ* (sound is eternal, as the characterstics of non-eternal objects are not found in sound).

Gotama, however, defines it as that which is put forward to establish a definite conclusion, while it is one that only gives rise to suspense (and vascillation) in regard to the point at issue (*prakaraṇacintā*).[1]

(4) *Sādhyasama* (unknown). It is that type of *hetu* (probans) which, being still to be proved, is not different from the *sādhya* (probandum). As for instance, in the inference, Shadow is a substance (*chāyā dravyam*), because it has motion (gatimattvāt). Here, the probans does not differ from the probandum. Both are equally to be proved. In fact, it is a mistake to take the shadow moving. What actually happens is that as the object moves along, it obstructs certain portions of light, and what is perceived as shadow is only the continued absence of those portions of light that are obstructed by the moving objecct.[2]

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* defines it as that whose subsistence in the subject is as unsettled as that of the probandum. The *Tātprya*, however, says that the definition given by Gotama is meant to include all the four types of *asiddha*, namely, *svarūpāsihda*, *ekadeśāsiddha*, *āśrayāsiddha* and *anyathāsiddha*; as every one of these is still to be proved and as such, it is similar to the probandum. It is also called *pakṣā-siddha*. Udayanācārya has defined it as, *vyāptasya hi pakṣadharmatayā pratītiḥ siddhiḥ tadabhāvaḥ asidhaḥ*(*sidha* is that *hetu* which is *vyāpta* of the *sādhya* and is known to be present in the *pakṣa*, while the negation of this is *asiddha*).[3]

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[1] *Sūtra*, I. ii. 7. [2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. ii. 8.

[3] *Pariśuddhi*, Ms. Fol. 1211; *Kusumāñjali*, III. 7.

(5) *Kālātīta* or *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*. It is defined as that inference in which the absence of the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* (subject) is denied through *pratyakṣa*, or any other *pramāṇa*.[1] It is also called *Bādhitaviṣaya*. As for instance, *agniḥ anuṣṇaḥ, kṛtakatvāt, jalavat*. Here, the presence of the *sādhya-anuṣṇatva* (not being hot) is proved to be totally absent in the *pakṣa*, fire.

These are the five types of fallacy accepted by the Nyāya system. Besides, there are three more generally recognized fallacies, *avyāpti*, *ativyāpti* and *asambhava* (too narrow, too wide and impossible probans) which are also included under those very five fallacies.[2] So there is no more than five fallacies in the Nyāya system.

(j) *Chala*

Meaning of the divisions of Chala.

Chala (casuistry) consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning other than the one intended.[3] It is of three kinds, *Vākchala* (verbal casuistry), *Sāmānyachala* (generalising casuistry) and *Upacārachala* (figurative casuistry).

(1) *Vākchala* is that which consists in assuming a meaning other than that intended to be conveyed by a word, when the meaning intended is not definitely specified. For instance, *Navakambalo'yam brāhmaṇaḥ*. In this sentence what the speaker means is that the brāhmaṇa has got a *new* blanket. But the compound word *navakambala* has been misrepresented as *nine* blankets and the opponent throws out the argument by saying that how can this poor brāhmaṇa possess *nine* blankets ? So what the other man has said is wrong. This is due to the opponent's twisting the meaning of the word, not meant for the purpose.

(2) *Sāmānyachala* consists in the urging of an absurd signification, which is rendered possible by

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[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 178.

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 179.

[3] *Gotamasūtra*, I. ii. 10.

the use of a too generic term.[1] As for instance, when one man says—oh ! this Brāhmaṇa is endowed with learning and character; and another replies, learning and character are quite natural to a Brāhmaṇa. The latter assertion is met by opposition, by assigning to the word (*Brāhmaṇa*) a meaning other than the one intended, that is, by assigning to it an entirely absurd meaning. This opposition being in the following form,—if learning and character are natural to the *Brāhmaṇa*, then they should be found in the *Vrātya* (the Brāhmaṇa who has not been initiated into *upanayana* ceremony within the period prescribed) also, as he also is a *Brāhmaṇa.*[2]

(3) *Upacaracchala.* A statement being made on the basis of the secondary (figurative) denotation of words; if it is opposed by a denial of the existence of what is asserted (on the basis of their primary denotation), this constitutes figurative casuistry.[3] As for instance, some one says—the platform is howling (*mañcāḥ krośanti*). But this sentence is misinterpreted as platform never howls; it is the man standing on the platform who is howling. This is a case of figurative casuistry.

(k) *Jāti*

Jāti explained and illustrated.

Jāti (futile rejoinder) is that objection which is taken on the basis of mere similarity and dissimilarity.[4] When a certain reasoning has been put forward, the objection to it that follows is called *jāti.* The objection is in the form of opposition, an attack, a denial on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity. That is to say, when the probans put forward by the first party is one that is intended to prove the conclusion through its similarity to the example, and an objection is taken on the basis of its dissimilarity to the example, or *vice versa,* we have what is called

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[1] *Gotamasūtra*, I. ii. 13.

[2] *Bhāṣya*, I. ii. 13.

[3] *Sūtra*, I. ii. 14.

[4] *Sūtra*, I. ii. 18.

Jāti, futile rejoinder, as it comes up as an opponent to the original reasoning.[1]

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* explains that the futile rejoinder is that which is urged on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity alone, that is, irrespectively of any idea of invariable concomitance; in fact, it continues, similarity and dissimilarity do not enter into all cases of futile rejoinder. It makes a futile rejoinder when no notice is taken of invariable concomitance. This is what has led the modern logicians to define *Jāti*, futile rejoinder, simply as *asaduttaram* (wrong answer), that is, an answer which is either incapable of shaking the opposite view, or which is vitiated by self-contradictions.

Vācaspati's view.

The *Tātparya* has an interesting note here. It says that it is not always reprehensible to put forward a futile rejoinder; for instance, when a man, upholding the authority of the Veda, is met by a series of arguments against its authority, and at the spur of the moment he does not find proper answers to these arguments, he is fully justified in urging what is really a futile rejoinder, if he feels that by so doing he will crush the atheistic tendency of the audience produced by his opponent's arguments. But in other cases, a futile rejoinder is urged only unknowingly.[2]

There are several varieties of this *Jāti*, such as, *utkarṣasamā*, *apakarṣasamā*, *Sādharmyasamā*, *vaidharmyasamā*, etc.

Viśvakarman in his commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā* says that there are twenty-two other types of *Jāti* which also should be included under this very head[3] as given in the *Gotamasūtra*.[4] The other twenty-two types are: *varṇya*, *avarṇya*, *vikalpa*, *sādhya*, *prāpti*, *aprāpti*, *prasaṅga*, *pratidṛṣṭānta*, *anutpatti*, *saṁśaya*,

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[1] *Bhāṣya*, I. ii. 18.

[2] Notes from Dr. Ganganatha Jha's English translation on I. ii. 18.

[3] P. 182.

[4] V. i. I.

prakaraṇa, *ahetu*, *arthāpatti*, *aviśeṣa*, *upapatti*, *anupalabdhi*, *anitya*, *nitya*, and *kārya*.[1]

I give below in brief the meaning of each of the types of *Jāti* mentioned in the *Gotamasūtra*.[2] Vātsyāyana has explained and illustrated these in his *Bhāṣya*. Thus he says :—

(1-2) *Sādharmya and Vaidharmya-sama*[3] (Parity *per* similarity and *per* dissimilarity)—When the original proposition is propounded on the basis of similarity, if the opposition to it, seeking to establish contrary to its predicate, is set also on the basis of similarity, and this opposition does not differ from the argument put forward in support of the original proposition, it is a case of that opposition which is called *Sādharmya-sama*.

As for example—

Kriyāvān ātma,
dravyasya kriyāhetuguṇayogāt ;
dravyaṁ loṣṭaḥ kriyāhetuguṇayuktaḥ, kriyāvān,
Tathā cātmā, tasmāt kriyāvān.

The opposition sets up the following opposition to it also on the basis of similarity :—

niṣkriyaḥ ātmā, vibhuno dravyasya niṣkriyatvāt,
vibhu ca ākāśaṁ niṣkriyam ca, tathā ca ātma,
tasmān-niṣkriyaḥ.

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[1] *Sūtra*, V. 1. 1

[2] V. 1. 1.

[3] Udayanācārya in his *Bodhasiddhi*, also called *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*, thus explains the significance of the term *Sama* occuring at the end of all these terms. (1) According to the *Vārttika*, it means *equalization* ; that is, the futile rejoinder is put forward for the purpose of counter-poising or neutralizing the effects of the original reasoning ; (2) According to the *Bhāṣya*, it means that the futile rejoinder is put up with a view to show that there is nothing in the original reasoning which differentiates it from what is now put forward ; (there is not much difference between these two). (3) Others explain it as meaning that the futile rejoinder puts the original *reasoner* on exactly the same footing as his opponent putting forward the rejoinder. (4) The *equality* of the futile rejoinder lies in the fact that while demolishing the reasoning of the first party, it demolishes itself also. It is to be added that Udayana admits himself the last explanation.

Translation.—Ātman is active, as every substance is, endowed with qualities, conducive to activities; the clod of earth, which is a substance, is endowed with qualities and is conducive to activity, and is found to be active, so is the *ātman*, hence, the *ātman* must be active.

The opposition sets up the following opposition to it also on the basis of similarity :— *Ātman* is inactive, as every all-pervading substance is inactive; *Ākāśa*, which is an all-pervading substnce, is inactive, the *Ātman* is also so, hence, *Ātman* is inactive.

There is no special reason why on the ground of similarity to active substances the *Ātman* should be regarded as active, and it should not be regarded as inactive, on the ground of its similarity to inactive substances. Thus, inasmuch as there is no special reason which makes one or the other more valid, this is an instance of futile rejoinder *per* similarity.

Similarly, *parity per dissimilarity* may be illustrated as follows :

niṣkriyaḥ Ātmā, vibhutvāt; kriyāvad dravyamavibhu dṛṣṭam, yathā losṭaḥ; na ca tathā Ātmā, tasmānniṣkriyaḥ.

Translation—the clod of earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to activity, is found to be limited in its extent; the *Ātman* is not so limited; therefore, the *Ātman* cannot be active, like the clod of earth.

There being no special reason why, on the basis of similarity to an active substance, the *Ātman* should be regarded as active; and why on the basis of its dissimilarity to the active substance, it should not be regarded as inactive; and inasmuch as there is no such special reason, it is a case of *Vaidharmyasama*.
(3) *Utkarṣasama*—It is explained thus: when the opposer puts forward the contingency of an additional property of the example subsisting in the subject it is called *Parity per Augmentation*.

As for example—

yadi kriyāhetuguṇayogāt loṣṭavat kriyāvān Ātmā, loṣṭavadeva sparśavānapi prāpnoti / atha na sparśavān, loṣṭavat kriyāvānapi na prāpnoti /

Translation—(Against the proposition that the *Ātman* is active, because it is endowed with properties conducive to action, like the clod of earth), the opposition is set up, if by reason of the presence of qualities conducive to action,the *Ātman* should, like the clod of earth, be regarded as active, then like the clod of earth, it has to be regarded as tangible also; if it is not tangible, like the clod of earth, then it should not be active either; or you should point out some special reason why it should be regarded as active and not as tangible.

(4) *Apakarṣasama.*—When the opposer urges the contingency of the *absence of a certain property* in the subject, on the analogy of the example, it is *Parity per subtraction*.

As for example—

loṣṭaḥ khalu kriyāvān avibhuḥ dṛṣṭaḥ; kāmaṁ Ātmā'pi kriyāvān avibhuḥ astu, viparyaye vā viśeṣo vaktavyaḥ.

Translation—The opposition is set up (against the same proposition), inasmuch as the clod of earth is found to be active and not all-pervading, the *Ātman* also, if active, should be regarded as not all pervading; or you should point out some special reason (why it should be regarded as active and not as all-pervading. Here the property of all-pervadingness is subtracted from the *Ātman*.)

(5-6) *Varṇya and avarṇya-sama*—*Varṇya* means that which is yet to be known; hence, uncertain; and *avarṇya*, certain, is the reverse of that. These two properties meaning uncertainty and certainty belong respectively to the subject and the example (the presence of the probandum in the example being known for certain, while its presence in the subject is still uncertain); and when, in opposition, the opposer reverses these qualities, then we have the *Parity per uncertainty* and *Parity per certainty*.[1]

(7) *Vikalpasama*—The example, being endowed with the property that constitutes the probans (proving the desired proposition), if the opponent attributes to it some other property, and then urges the fact of this other property being such as is not invariably concomitant with the properties of the probandum it is a case of *Parity per shuffling*.

Example—kriyāhetuguṇayuktam kiñcidguru, yathā loṣṭaḥ/kiñcillaghu, yathā vāyuḥ/evaṁ kriyāhetuguṇayuktam kiñcit kriyāvatsyāt, yathā loṣṭaḥ; kiñcidakriyaṁ yathā Ātmā.

Translation—(against the above mentioned proposition) we have the opposition, one thing endowed with the qualities conducive to action is found to be possessed of gravity, as we find in the clod of earth; while another thing similarly endowed is found to be devoid of gravity, as we find in air; similarly, it is possible that while one thing, the clod of earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is active, another thing, the *Ātman*, which is similarly endowed, may be without action.[2]

(8) *Sādhyasama*—That character is called *Sādhya* which is found to be one upon which the whole force of the probans and the other factors of reasoning is operative; and when such character is attributed to the example, it is *Parity per probandum*.

Example—yadi yathā loṣṭaḥ tathā Ātmā prāptaḥ, tarhi yathā Ātmā tathā loṣṭaḥ/ sādhyaścāyamātmā kriyāvān iti kāmaṁ loṣṭo'pi sādhyaḥ/atha naivam, na tarhi, yathā loṣṭaḥ tathā Ātmā.

Translation—If the *Ātman* is to be regarded as active, in the same manner as the clod of earth is active, then it comes to this that the clod of earth is like the Ātman; and the *Ātman* is the subject in regard to which the presence of activity is still to be proved; hence, the clod of earth also should be one in regard to which the presence of activity is still to be proved; if it is not so, then it is not true that the *Ātman* is like the clod of earth which means that the example cited is not right.[1]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 4.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 4.

(9-10) *Prāpti* and *aprāpti-sama*—Is it by becoming united with the probandum that the probans would establish it? or by not becoming united with it? It cannot establish it by becoming united with it; because by becoming united with it, it would become non-different from it, and as such, could not establish it. When of two things, both are existent, and become united, which could be the probans, the establisher (*sādhaka*) and which the probandum, the established?[2] If, on the other hand, the probans does not become united with the probandum, then on that very account it could not establish it; for example, the lamp does not illumine an object unless it is united with it. When the opposition is urged on the basis of uniting, it is *Parity per convergence*, and when it is urged on the basis of non-uniting, it is *Parity per Non-convergence*.[3]

Prasanga and Pratidrṣṭāntasama.

(11-12) When the opposition is set up in the form of continued questioning, that it is necessary for the propounder of the original proposition to point out the proof for the probans also, it is opposition called *Parity per continued question*.

For instance, the opposition says, you do not mention the reason for asserting that the clod of earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, must be active; and until the reason is mentioned, nothing can be accepted as true.[1]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 4.

[2] It is only what is not already accomplished that can be established; what is united with anything must be an accomplished entity; hence, no such thing can be what is to be established, the probandum; and when two things unite, they become identified; hence, if the probans and the probandum become united, there can be no relation of cause and effect between them.—*Tātparya*.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya* V. i. 7.

Again, when the opposition is based upon a counter-instance, it is *parity per counter-instance.*

As for example—The original proposition having been put forward in the form—the *Ātman* is active, because it is endowed with qualities conducive to action, like the clod of earth; the opponent sets up a counter-instance,—*Ākāśa*, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is found to be without action, and hence, why cannot the *Ātman* be regarded as active, like *Ākāśa*? But what is that quality in *Ākāśa* which is conducive to action? It consists of contact with air, which aided by *saṁskāra* leads to action, as is found in the case of the contact with the tree.[2]

(13) *Anutpattisama*—The proposition being stated in the form,-sound is non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the jar. The opponent sets up the following opposition—Before it is produced, the sound has not appeared; hence, at that time the character of coming after effort, which is the ground urged for its non-eternality, does not subsist in sound; and since this character does not subsist in sound, it follows that sound is eternal; and that which is eternal is never produced. This opposition based on non-generation is *Parity per non-generation or non-production.*[3]

(14) *Saṁśaya-sama*—The proposition being put forward in the form—sound is non-eternal, because it

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[1] The *Tātparya* thus explains the difference between *parity per continued question* and *parity per probandum*: In *parity per probandum*, the opponent urges the necessity of the probans and all other factors of reasoning being provided in support of the example, exactly in the same manner as is done in support of the probandum; while in the *parity per continued question*, he only wants to know by what means of cognition the example is known.

[2] The contact of air with the tree leads to the action of moving in the tree; hence, the contact of air in *Ākāśa* also should be conducive to action.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 12.

comes after effort, like the jar; the opponent opposes it by casting doubt over it : even though sound comes after effort, it has this similarity to the eternal *Sāmānya*, that both are perceptible by the senses; and the same also constitutes its similarity to the non-eternal jar; thus, by reason of its similarity to both eternal and non-eternal things, there must be doubt as to the real character of sound.[1]

(15) *Prakaraṇasama*—By reason of the *similarity* (of sound) to both, eternal and non-eternal things, there is likelihood of the two contrary views (i. e. the original Proposition as well as its contrary):—this is what is meant by the term '*prakriyā*', or 'vacillation' in the Sūtra: One view being—'sound must be non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar',—the other view is propounded on the basis of the similarity (of sound) to eternal things ('sound must be eternal, because it is cognized by the auditory organ, like the *śabdatva*,). Thus, then, it is found that when the Probans-'because it comes after effort'—is put forward as constituting the similarity (of sound) to non-eternal things, it is not free from the possibility of the contrary view being set up; and in the face of this possibility, the conclusion sought to be based upon that Probans cannot be established. The same holds good in regard to a Probans that would be put forward as constituting the 'similarity' (of sound) to eternal things. The Opposition put forward on the basis of this 'vacillation' constitutes '*Parity per Neutralisation*'.

What has been said in this Sūtra applies also to the case of *Dissimilarity*; and 'by reason of Dissimilarity to both, there arises vacillation,—and Opposition based upon this reasoning constitutes *Parity per Neutralisation*''.[2]

(16) *Ahetusama*—'Probans' is that which proves; and this could exist only either (a) before, or (b) after, or (c) together with, the probandum (that which

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 14.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 16.

it is intended to prove). Now, (a) if the Probans is held to exist before the Probandum,—at the time that the Probandum is not there, of what could it be the 'probans', 'means of proving'? (b) If it is held to exist after the Probandum,—in the absence of the Probans, of what could there be the 'Probandum' (to be proved)? (c) If the Probans and the Probandum are held to exist (simultaneously), since both would be equally existent, which could be the 'probans' (means of proving) of what? From all this follows that the 'probans' does not differ from what is *non-probative*'.

This contention, thus based upon similarity to what is non-probative, constitutes '*Parity per Non-probativeness*'.[1]

(17) *Arthāpattisama*—The proposition having been sought to be established by the reasoning—'sound is non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the jar',—if the opponent seeks to establish the contrary conclusion by means of Presumption,—this is a case of '*Parity per Presumption*'.

It is as follows :—'If sound is held to be non-eternal, on the ground of its coming after effort, which constitutes its similarity to non-eternal things,—then it follows by implication, that sound must be regarded as eternal, on the ground of its similarity to eternal things, consisting in the fact that it is intangible, like eternal things'.[2]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 18.

This Futile Rejoinder differs from '*Parity per Convergence*' and '*Parity per Non-convergence*' on the following points :—(1) In these latter the question raised was in regard to the form of the Probans, while in the present case, it is raised in regard to its causal efficiency; (2) in the latter two the convergence, or otherwise, was in regard to the thing denoted by the words of the probans, while here it is the verbal expression that is taken up for enquiry; (3) there were only two alternatives, while here we have three; (4) those two had the semblance of the contention urging the fact of the qualification of the Probans being untrue, while here the contention urges a reasoning to the contrary—*Bodhasiddhi* of Udayana.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 21.

(18) *Aviśeṣasama*—The single (common) property, in the case in question, is that of coming after effort; and because this single property is present in sound and in the jar, if these two things be regarded as non-different,—i.e., both be regarded as 'non-eternal';—then all things should have to be regarded as non-different—Why?—Because the property of 'existence' is present in all; the one property of 'existence' is present in all things; and since 'existence' is present in all things, all things should be regarded as non-different. Such contention constitutes '*Parity per Non-difference*'.[1]

(19) *Upapattisama*—"If sound is held to be non-eternal, because there is present ground (or evidence) for its non-eternality—there is present evidence for eternality also, in the shape of intangibility; so that it may be regarded as eternal also". This, being an opposition based upon the presence of grounds for both, 'Eternality' and 'Non-eternality', is '*Parity per Evidence*'.[2]

(20) *Upalabdhisama*—Even in the absence of the *character of coming after effort* which is mentioned as the cause (ground) of 'non-eternality'—this 'non-eternality' is found in that sound which proceeds from the breaking of the branches of the tree shaken by the wind (this sound not being the product of the effort of any person);—and the opposition, based upon this fact of the Probandum being found to exist even in the absence of the Probans, constitutes '*Parity per Apprehension*'.[3]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 23.

Udayana in his *Bodhasiddhi*, notices a different interpretation of this *Sūtra* by which the meaning is as follows :—'The single property that constitutes the Probans is really effective; so that if the Subject and the Example were taken as possessed of the unqualified probandum, then *they would be non-different in every way*, *Sarvāviśeṣaḥ*; because their co-existence is well-known.'

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 25.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 27.

The *Bodhasiddhi* mentions five kinds of this *Futile Rejoinder* : (1) The Subject existing in the absence of the Probandum, which makes it a case of the Fallacy of 'Contradiction';—

(21) *Anupalabdhisama*—(The First Parity puts forward the Proposition in the following form)— 'It is not true that even before it is uttered, sound exists and (if it is not heard), it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it';—this is not true—why ?—because we do not perceive any covering or obstruction; that is, in the case of such things as water (underground) and the like, we find that when they are existent, if there is non-apprehension of them, it is due to the presence of obstruction (in the shape of the surface of the ground under which the water lies); in the case of sound, however, we do not find its non-apprehension to be due to the presence of obstruction or any such causes of non-apprehension; and such cause of its non-apprehension would certainly have been perceived (if it existed), just as it is perceived in the case of water etc.;—as a matter of fact, however, no such cause is perceived (in the case of sound); hence, it follows that when sound is not apprehended (heard), its condition is contrary (not analogous) to that of the water etc. (i.e. while water etc., are existent, sound is non-existent.)

"The '*Non-apprehension*' *of Obstruction* etc., is not apprehended;—and from this 'non-apprehension of the non-apprehension,' it follows that the latter does not exist; and this 'non-apprehension' being non-existent, what has been urged by the First Party as the 'Probans' of his reasoning is found to be non-existent; all which leads to the conclusion that obstruction etc., are existent. And since the contrary conclusion is thus proved, the original proposition—'it is not true that even

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(2) the Subject existing without the Probans,—this being a case of the Fallacy of the 'Unknown';—(3) the Subject existing without both Probans and Probandum,—when there are both of the said fallacies;—(4) the Probandum existing without the Probans—this being a case of untrue premiss, the Probans not being invariably concomitant with the Probandum;—(5) the Probans existing without the Probandum, in which case also the necessary invariable concomitance between the two would be wanting. It goes on to cite examples of the *Futile Rejoinder* based upon each of these five.

before it is uttered, sound exists, and it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it'—is not proved.

Thus, it is found that the probans, 'because obstruction is not apprehended', is equally applicable to the obstruction, and to the non-apprehension of the obstruction."

This opposition, based upon non-apprehension, constitutes '*Parity per Non-apprehension*'.[1]

(22) *Anityasama*—"When the First Party says that—'sound should be regarded as non-eternal, by reason of its similarity to the jar, which is non-eternal',—he becomes faced with the undesirable contingency of having to regard all things as non-eternal, by reason of their similarity (consisting of existence) to the jar, which is non-eternal".—This opposition based upon 'non-eternality' constitutes '*Parity per Non-eternality*'.[2]

(23) *Nityasama*—The proposition is put forward in the form—'sound is non-eternal'; now, is this 'non-eternality' of sound eternal, everlasting, or non-eternal, evanescent? If it is present in sound at all times, then, since the property (non-eternality) is everlasting, the thing to which that property belongs (sound) must also be everlasting, so that sound should be eternal. If, on the other hand, the said property (non-eternality) is not present in sound at all times,—then since (at some time or other) 'non-eternality' would be absent in sound, sound would be 'eternal'. This opposition based upon 'Eternality', constitutes '*Parity per Eternality*'.[3]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 29.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 32.

This *Futile Rejoinder* is described as based upon 'similarity'; it includes also a similar rejoinder based upon dissimilarity'—says the *Bodhasiddhi*.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 35.

In this Sūtra, the mention of 'non-eternality' is meant to include all those specific reasons that may be adduced in support of the non-eternality of sound. The sense of the definition of '*Parity per Eternality*' is as follows—When the opponent puts forward certain exhaustive alternatives in regard

(24) *Kāryasama*—The original proposition is put up in the form-'sound is non-eternal, because it is the outcome of effort'; now that which is 'the outcome of effort' is such as, not having previous existence comes into existence; as is found to be the case with such products as the jar and the like; that which is 'non-eternal', on the other hand, is such as, having come into existence, ceases to exist. Such being the condition of things, the opposition is set up on the basis of the diverse character of the products of effort. 'Coming into existence after effort' we find in the case of the jar, and we also find the 'manifestation' of things concealed under some obstruction, by the removal of the obstruction (and this also is the outcome of effort); and there is no special reason to show whether sound comes into existence after effort, or there is only manifestation of it (after effort); and the opposition set up on the basis of this fact of both these (production and manifestation) being equally the 'products of effort;[1] is '*Parity per Character of Effect*'.[1]

(25) *Kathābhāsa*—(The first step consisting of the Proposition, 'sound must be non-eternal, because it is the outcome of effort, like the jar'), it is urged against this that the Probans is 'inconclusive', and being 'inconclusive', it cannot prove the 'conclusion' —(this represents the second step);—(to this the First Party, offers the following wrong answer, which represents the third step)—If my Probans cannot prove the conclusion because it is inconclusive, then—that is, the denial also is 'inconclusive'; it denies something, and does not deny other things; and being 'inconclusive', it cannot prove the desired conclusion.

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to the property put forward by the First Party, and shows that none of these is admissible, and then proceeds to urge that the Subject cannot, on that account be accepted as having that property;—this form of opposition constitutes '*Parity per Eternality*'—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 37.

The mere fact of Sound being the 'outcome of effort, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is non-eternal, it comes into existence or is destroyed; for even if it were only manifested, it could be regarded as the 'outcome of effort'.

Or, the opponent having said—"If sound be held to be non-eternal, there is no special reason why what happens to sound, after effort, is production, and not manifestation",—(he is met by the First Party with the following wrong answer) if sound be held to be eternal, then also there is no special reason why what happens to sound is manifestation, not production. Thus special reasons being equally wanting in both views, both are equally inconclusive.[1]

(l) *Nigrahasthāna*

Nigrahasthāna (clincher) is the last of the wrong process to defeat one's opponents. It has been defined as a case of misapprehension as also when there is incomprehension (*vipratipatti* and *apratipatti*). All the types of clinchers are meant for defeating an opponent and rarely to strengthen the truth. There are twenty two varieties of it mentioned by Gotama. They are : *pratijñāhāni*, *pratijñāntara*, *pratijñāvirodha*, *pratijñāsannyāsa*, *hetvantara*, *arthāntara*, *nirarthaka*, *avijñātārtha*, *apārthaka*, *aprāptakāla*, *nyūna*, *adhika*, *punarukta*, *ananubhāṣaṇa*, *ajñāna*, *apratibhā*, *vikṣepa*, *matānujñā*, *paryanuyojya*, *upekṣaṇa*, *niranuyojya*, *anuyoga*, *apasiddhānta*, and *hetvābhāsas*. These are all explained and illustrated by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya*,[2] and is briefly explained below :

(1) *Pratijñāhāni* (violating the proposition)—The *Bhāṣya* explains it as—the opposition having been set up on the basis of a certain property which is contrary to the Probandum, if the first party admits that that contrary property, which belongs to the counter-instance cited by the opponent, is present in the example cited by himself, he violates his original proposition; hence, this becomes a case of *Pratijñāhāni*.

As for Example—Sound is non-eternal (anityaḥ śabdaḥ), because it is perceptible by the senses (aindriyakatvāt), like the jar (ghaṭavat).

But the opponent says, that we find that generality (sāmānya) which is eternal, is also perceptible by the senses, and so why sound also should not be eternal (nitya) ? Being met with this opposition, the first party may say, if *sāmānya*, which is perceptible by the senses, is eternal, the jar also may be eternal; and in this the first party attributes eternality to the example that he had cited in support of his proposition and in so doing he violates his entire *pakṣa* (view point).

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 39. [2] V. ii. 1.

The *Bodhasiddhi* remarks that the sūtra describes two kinds of violating the proposition,—the first is described by the very name, *Pratijñāhāni* and another by the rest of the sūtra—*pratidṛṣṭāntadharmābhyanujñā svadṛṣṭānte pratijñāhāniḥ*, meaning when the property of the counter instance, urged by the opponent, is admitted by one to be present in the example cited by himself, it is a case of *Pratijñāhāni.*[1] The example of the former kind would be that case when, finding that he cannot bring forward arguments to sustain his position, the first party entirely surrenders his point saying—all right, I give up my point : Sound is not non-eternal. What is cited above is the example of the second kind.

(2) *Pratijñāntaram* (shifting the proposition). It has been defined as the subject of the original proposition having been denied, if the first party finds a diversity in the properties (of the example and the counter-instance), and puts it forward with a view to establish the former proposition.[2] The *Bhāṣya* says that in the same instance quoted above when the subject of the original proposition is denied, the first party finds a diversity in the properties of example and the counter-instance; that is, he finds that while both, jar and *sāmānya*, have a certain property, being perceptible by the senses, in common, there are others in which they differ, namely, that *sāmānya* is perceptible by the senses and all pervading, while the jar is perceptible and *not-all-pervading*; and perceiving this diversity of properties he puts it forward with a view to establish his former proposition, in the following manner : Just as the jar is not-all-pervading, so is sound also not-all-pervading and hence, like

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[1] V. ii. 2.

[2] V. ii. 3.

the jar, it should be non-eternal also. Now, here the former proposition was —sound is non-eternal; while sound is not-all-pervading is a totally different proposition.

The *Tātparya* adds the following to this : though when the first party puts forward the fact of sound being not-all-pervading, the idea in his mind is that, after having brought this home to the other party, he would add that as a qualifying clause to his original premiss, stating it in the form,—because sound, while being not-all-pervading, is perceptible by the senses, it must be non-eternal; yet until he actually does so, his position is clearly subject to the said clincher.

(3) *Pratijñāvirodha* (contradicting the proposition). The *Bhāṣya* explains it thus, the proposition is stated in the form—

Substance must be something different from the quality, because no objects are ever perceived, except colour etc.

Here, in this case there is a contradiction, that is, if substance is something different from quality, then it is not possible that nothing except colour etc. should be perceived; while if nothing except colour etc. is perceived, then it is not possible that substance should be something different from quality; thus, there is a conflict between the two statements—substance must be different from quality and nothing except colour etc. is perceived, which are mutually nugatory and are impossible.

The *Bodhasiddhi* remarks that the contradiction between the proposition and the statement of the probans has been mentioned only by way of illustration ; as a matter of fact, there is contradiction of the proposition whenever there is any inconsistency between any two factors of the reasoning, and also when the proposition is inconsistent with a well-ascertained fact.

(4) *Pratijñāsannyāsa* (renouncing the proposition). The original proposition having been put forward

in the form—Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the senses. The other party says—*Sāmānya* is perceptible by the senses, and is yet eternal, and similarly, sound also which is perceptible by the senses, may be eternal. The original thesis thus being opposed, if the first party happens, to say—who says that sound is non-eternal? This retraction of what had been affirmed in the proposition is what is called *pratijñāsannyāsa*.

(5) *Hetvantara* (shifting the probans). The *Bhāṣya* explains it as—The proposition is set up in the form—

Everything that is manifested has a single origin, because products emanating from a single origin have a definite magnitude (parimāṇa),

in the case of cup and other products of clay we find a definite magnitude (*parimāṇa*),

the product being of the same magnitude as the composition of the original substance, and such magnitude is found in every product;

and every manifested thing is found to have a definite magnitude;

hence, from the fact that every product emanating from a single origin has a definite magnitude, we conclude that everything that is manifested emanates from a single origin.

Against this argument of the first party, the following opposition is set up with a view to show that the probans is not invariably concomitant with the probandum :—

As a matter of fact, magnitude is found present in products emanating from the same origin, as also in those emanating from several origins. This opposition having been put forward, the first party says, my reasoning would then be because a definite magnitude is found in the cup and other products, in all which there subsists the same original substance, every manifested thing, having subsisting in it pleasure, pain and delusion (the constituent attributes of *avyakta*), is found to have definite magnitude; and from this follows that no other original substances being found subsisting in all manifested things, they must all have a single origin in the form of *Avyakta.*

Now, here it is found that in the first instance the first party stated the probans in an unqualified form, *because they have a definite magnitude* and when this was objected to, he added a qualification to it, in the from —*while having the same original substance subsisting in them*; and this thus becomes a case of *hetvantara.*

(6) *Arthāntara* (irrelevancy)—It means—something which is not relevant in the context. As for instance, in order to prove his statement—Sound is non-eternal, if he adduces the *hetu*, because that sound is the quality of *Ākāśa*, it is a case of *arthāntara*; or *Śabdaḥ nityaḥ, asparśatvāt.* Here also the *hetu* has nothing to do with the thesis.

(7) *Nirarthaka* (meaningless jargon). As for instance, sound is eternal, because ka, ca, ṭa, ta, pa are ja, ba, ga, ḍa, daśa and so on. All this is meaningless.

(8) *Avijñātārtha* (unintelligibility). If the assertion is made and is not understood by the audience and the second party even if stated three times, this constitutes unintelligibility. This may be due to the use of words having double meaning or having used words not ordinarily used, or uttered hurriedly.

(9) *Apārthaka* (inco-herence). In a case where, there being no connection between the expressions following one another, they are found to offer no connected meaning; as for instance, the words uttered-ten pomegranats (*daśa dāḍimāni*), six *apūpas* (breads) etc. where there is no connection.

(10) *Aprāptakālam* (inconsequentiality), when the factors of reasoning are stated in the reversed order. As for instance, in a syllogism, there is a natural order of the factors which gives a meaning and if this order is reversed whereby no natural meaning is derived, it is called a case of *aprāptakālam.*

(11) *Nyūna* (incomplete) and (12) *adhika* (redundant)-when less or more factors in a syllogism are offered.

(13) *Punarukta* (repitition). The re-statement of words and ideas constitutes repitition except in the case of reproduction.

(14) *Punarvacanam*—Repeating the actual statement by means of directly expressive words of what is already implied.

(15) *Ananubhāsaṇam*—If the first party fails to restate what has been stated by the second party, three times, and duly understood by the audience, it is a case of *non-reproduction*.

(16) *Ajñānam*—when the statement is not comprehended, it is a case of *incomprehension*.

(17) *Apratibhā*—It is embarassment when the party does not know the answer and keeps silent.

(18) *Vikṣepa*—When the party breaks off the discussion under the pretext of business, it is a case of *evasion*.

(18) *Matānujñā*, if the party admits flaw in his own thesis, and then urges the same in that of the opponent, it is a case of *confessing the contrary opinion*. In other words, when the party admits that defect in his thesis, which has been urged against it by the opponent, and without trying to show that his thesis is free from that defect, he simply says, the same defect is found in your statement also.

(19) *Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa*—When one party has rendered himself subject to a clincher, if the other party fails to bring it home to him, by directly charging him with it, the latter himself becomes subject to the clincher of *overlooking the censurable*.

(20) *Niranuyojyānuyoga*—when one party urges a clincher when there is no clincher, incurred by the other party, it is a case of *censuring the un-censurable*.

(21) *Apasiddhānta*—Having taken up one standpoint, if the party carries on the discussion without restriction, it is a case of *inconsistency*.

Hetvābhāsas have been already discussed before. This ends all the methods which in a debate the various parties can apply to obtain victory over his opponent.

It may be pointed out that though the ultimate end of Indian philosophy, particularly the Nyāya system, is to get rid of all the pains including the so-called pleasures, yet it is in reality, the correct knowledge of the absolute (*tattvajñāna*) which is the ultimate end of the system. This again, is possible through the direct perception, realization, of the *Ātman* as given in the śruti—*Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*. It is therefore, that Gotama says—*Tattvādhyavasāyasaṁrakṣaṇārtham jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṁrakṣaṇārtham kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat*,[1] meaning, disputation and wrangling should be carried on for the purpose of defending one's own determination to get at the truth; just as the hedge of thorny branches is put up for the protection of sprouting seeds.

Though Gotama mentions disputation and wrangling alone for the purpose of protecting the truth, yet it seems that all the other various categories, namely, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti and nigrahasthāna*, are also at times, to be utilized for protecting the truth. Besides, to me it seems that, no doubt, the system is an *ādhyātmika* school of philosophy in order to realize the *svarūpa* of the *Ātman*, yet those various methods of fighting for victory over the opponent are also meant to fight against the Buddhists and other *nāstikas* who preached against the *ādhyātmika* philosophy as ordinarily understood in common parlance for which the system of Nyāya stands.

Of these categories, *Vāda* alone is directly meant for the correct realization of the absolute reality, while all the rest are indirectly meant to be used in debates to gain the superiority over the opponents and that also to realize the *Truth* ultimately.

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[1] IV. ii. 50.

This practice of utilizing these methods of defeating the opponents became so popular in India and also in Tibet, later on, that it smashed the ultimate end of the śāstras. All the intelligent students became so very interested in this process of *jaya and parājaya* that they forgot that the ultimate end of all the schools was *Darśana*, visualizing the *absolute truth* and not *jaya* and *parājaya*.

These categories thus; have double edged function like the thorny hedges placed round about the flowers. They protect the most desired end, that is, flower, or the absolute reality and also prick those who approach them to destroy their existence. It is in this way, that the real nature of the *Absolute reality* is possible to be visualized without being mislead by the *Nāstikas*. This is the purpose of including these categories in this *Science of Reasoning* which is also ultimately meant to help the enquirer (*jijñāsu*) to have a vision of the *Ātman*. It is therefore, that the above section has been called the *Tattvajnānaparipālana prakaraṇa* (section dealing with the guarding of the true knowledge).

It is thus, that the correct knowledge of all the sixteen categories leads to the gradual removal of *mithyājñana*, thereafter, defects (*rāga, dveṣa and moha*), *pravṛtti* (action, that is, the feelings of pleasure and pain), birth and ultimately, entire pain for ever.[1] Therefore, I repeat what Vātsyāyana has said here—this *Science of Reasoning* dealing as it does, with the means of right cognition and the other categories, is the lamp to all sciences; the means of the knowledge of all things, it is the basis of all activities and as such, it has been expounded at the very outset of all the scientific investigations.

As regards the knowledge of the truth and the attainment of the highest good(spoken of in the *Nyāyasūtra*), it must be borne in mind that there is such knowledge and such attainment dealt with in (and pertaining specifically to) each of the four sciences or branches of knowledge, mentioned in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, namely, *Ānvīkṣikī*, *trayī*, *vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti*, in its own peculiar manner. In this science we are dealing with the science of the *Ātman* which is the knowledge of the truth, is the knowledge of the *Ātman* and other objects of cognition; and the attainment of the highest good, is the obtaining of Final Release, of course, from the standpoint of the Nyāya system. Gotama, even being fully aware of the *ultimate Reality* of Indian philosophy, that is, the *Ātma-darśana*, has confined his treatment in his system only from the common-sense point of view, keeping in mind the synthetic gradation amongst the various schools of philosophy.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 2.

At the end one thing I want to repeat. There is no system of Philosophy, including those of Cārvaka, Jaina and Buddhist, which really aims at any mutual criticizm of stand-points. They preach from their different *angle of vision* about the same *ultimate Truth-Ātmadarśana* which is the only goal of Indian thought in every field of learning. So has been said by Puṣpadanta in his *Mahimnaḥ stotra*—

Rucīnāṁ vaicitryāt
ṛjukuṭilanānāpathajuṣām
nṛṇāmekogamyaḥ
tvamasi payasāmarṇava iva ||

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